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not only inconsistent with their place in the modern global economy, but
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Treaty Clause exclusivity is best maintained by a judicially enforced
dormant treaty power barring the states from bargaining with foreign
powers, including indirect bargaining through measures that are contingent on foreign government policies—such as the Massachusetts law targeting companies doing business with Burma. However, state activities
that incidentally have effects overseas would not be precluded, and the jurisprudence must be informed by the original rationales for federal exclusivity and by the President’s discretion to exempt state activities posing
no threat to federal functions.
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INTRODUCTION
Everyone used to agree that state and local governments had no role to
play in U.S. foreign relations.1 The Constitution may have been unclear
about the precise responsibilities given to the President, the House, and the
Senate, but together, somehow, they held a federal monopoly on foreign
relations2—or, as the Supreme Court occasionally put the matter, there was
“one voice” in U.S. foreign relations, and it was the reassuring bass of Uncle Sam.3
But there were always two nagging problems with the orthodoxy of a
federal monopoly: it never really existed, and it was never clear why it
1. See L OUIS HENKIN, F OREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 150 (2d ed.
1996) (“At the end of the twentieth century as at the end of the eighteenth, as regards U.S. foreign relations, the states ‘do not exist’.”); LAURENCE TRIBE, A MERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-6, at 230
(2d ed. 1988) (“[S]tate action, whether or not consistent with current federal foreign policy, that distorts
the allocation of responsibility to the national government for the conduct of American diplomacy is
void . . . .”); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617,
1632 (1997) [hereinafter Goldsmith, Federal Courts] (noting “a remarkable consensus about the legitimacy of the federal common law of foreign relations”); Harold G. Maier, Preemption of State Law: A
Recommended Analysis, 83 A M. J. I NT’L L. 832, 832-33 (1989) (“The consensus today is that the central Government alone may directly exercise power in foreign affairs. Most current controversy about
the foreign affairs power concerns its distribution among the federal branches, not whether it resides in
the nation rather than the states.”). Of course, saying “everyone” invariably sounds like hyperbole. But
see infra note 320 (quoting John C. Calhoun’s endorsement of treaty power exclusivity).
For brevity’s sake, I will often refer solely to “states” as a shorthand for both states and subordinate political entities like counties and municipalities.
2. Thus, when Edward Corwin famously described a constitutional “invitation to struggle for the
privilege of directing American foreign policy,” he assumed that only the Congress and the President
were invited. Compare E DWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at 201
(Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter CORWIN, T HE PRESIDENT] (“[T]he Constitution, considered only for its affirmative grants of powers capable of affecting the issue, is an invitation
to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.”), with EDWARD S. CORWIN,
NATIONAL SUPREMACY: TREATY POWER VS. STATE POWER passim (1913) [hereinafter CORWIN,
NATIONAL SUPREMACY] (describing the supremacy of national treaty authority).
3. For modern canonical expressions of this view, see Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,
441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979) (noting “the Framers’ overriding concern that ‘the Federal Government must
speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments’” (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436 (1968)
(finding unconstitutional “state involvement in foreign affairs and international relations—matters
which the Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal Government”); id. at 441 (“[E]ven in absence of a
treaty, a State’s policy may disturb foreign relations.”); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 317 (1936) (“The Framers’ Convention was called and exerted its powers upon the irrefutable postulate that though the states were several their people in respect of foreign affairs were
one.”). For prior cases, see infra note 331.
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should. States have always had an effect on U.S. foreign relations,4 and
they are now bolder than ever. Some state activities sound exactly like diplomacy. In addition to symbolic political ties5 and routine economic transactions,6 states establish offices overseas, launch trade and investment missions, sign bilateral and multilateral agreements, and participate in
international summits. 7 Even ostensibly local acts can have serious effects
abroad. In the 1960s, some states targeted Eastern Bloc countries through
trade boycotts8 and reciprocal inheritance laws; 9 in the 1970s, they shunned
4. See generally JOHN M. KLINE, STATE GOVERNMENT INFLUENCE IN U.S. INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC POLICY 16-19 (1983) (providing an historical overview of state participation in foreign affairs); Dennis James Palumbo, The States and American Foreign Relations 296-98 (1960) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with author) (suggesting that state influence in foreign relations has remained relatively constant since the nation’s founding).
5. See, e.g., Sister Cities International, Welcome to Sister Cities International (visited Feb. 15,
2000) <http://www.sister-cities.org> (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (cataloging sister-city relationships). Such relationships are not wholly devoid of substance: for example, several city councils
forged ties with Nicaraguan cities as a means of dissenting from federal policy, see E ARL H. F RY, T HE
EXPANDING ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN U.S. F OREIGN AFFAIRS 90 (1998), while
over two dozen cities and communities declared themselves sanctuaries for Central American refugees,
see Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 A M. J. I NT’L L. 821, 822
(1989).
6. Sometimes even the purchase and sale of goods proved controversial, as in the decision by a
Texas official to ship tons of hormone-free beef to England in the midst of highly contentious negotiations between the United States and the European Community (“EC”) over the latter’s barriers to hormone-treated beef. The federal government, incensed, initially withheld the health certifications necessary for shipment, and it also threatened to prosecute the official for negotiating with EC officials in
violation of the Logan Act. See Earl H. Fry, States in the International Economy: An American Overview, in S TATES AND PROVINCES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 23, 37 (Douglas M. Brown & Earl
H. Fry eds., 1993) [hereinafter STATES AND PROVINCES] (describing Texas’s beef shipment to England
and the federal government’s initial opposition to that shipment); Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair
Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 459, 515 (1994) (same); see also
infra text accompanying notes 325-28, 434-36 (discussing the Logan Act).
7. See F RY, supra note 5, at 67-75 (describing states’ international activities); id. at 92 (describing Idaho trade missions to and from Libya); STATES AND PROVINCES, supra note 6, at 34-35 (describing annual summits between U.S. governors and their Canadian and Mexican counterparts on regional
trade and environmental matters); John M. Kline, United States’ Federalism and Foreign Policy, in
STATES AND PROVINCES, supra note 6, at 201, 221-22 [hereinafter Kline, Federalism and Foreign Policy] (describing attempts by oil-rich states to cozy up to OPEC); Martin Lubin, The Routinization of
Cross-Border Interactions: An Overview of NEG/ECP Structures and Activities, in STATES AND
PROVINCES, supra note 6, at 145 (describing the structure and activities of the Annual Conference of
New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers); Scott Baldauf, Foreign Policy Goes Local,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 24, 1999, at 1 (describing regular meetings between officials from
Texas and Mexico concerning implementation of NAFTA).
8. See Richard B. Bilder, East-West Trade Boycotts: A Study in Private, Labor Union, State and
Local Interference with Foreign Policy, 118 U. PA. L. R EV. 841, 882-84 (1970) (discussing the enactment of local laws that discouraged sales of goods from Communist nations). Other actions followed
episodically:
Fifteen states pulled Soviet vodka from state liquor store shelves after the downing of a Korean passenger plane in 1983, while the governors of New York and New Jersey moved to
deny the Soviet foreign minister’s plane the right to land in their states during the United
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firms supporting the Arab boycott of Israel;10 in the 1980s, they used their
economic clout to attack South African apartheid;11 in the 1990s, they campaigned against European banks holding Holocaust-related assets12 and
against repressive regimes in Burma (Myanmar) and elsewhere,13 and increasingly adopted “Buy American” laws, notwithstanding international
procurement reform.14
Nations’ debate on the incident. Oregon’s Health Division sought to bill the Soviet Union
for costs associated with their response to the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986, and California’s governor appealed directly to the Soviet leadership regarding its handling of protests
in the Armenian Republic in 1988.
Kline, Federalism and Foreign Policy, supra note 7, at 223.
9. See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 430 n.1 (1968); William B. Wong, Comment,
Iron Curtain Statutes, Communist China, and the Right to Devise, 32 UCLA L. REV. 643 (1985).
10. The states were at least successful in encouraging preemptive national legislation. See Eric L.
Hirschhorn & Howard N. Fenton, III, States’ Rights and the Antiboycott Provisions of the Export Administration Act, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 517, 522-26 (1981); see also Export Administration
Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(c) (1994) (preempting state foreign boycott laws).
11. See Bilder, supra note 5, at 822 (noting that a number of states, counties, and cities enacted
divestment or procurement laws targeting South Africa’s apartheid policy); Howard N. Fenton, III, The
Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions, 13 N W. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 563, 563-68 (1993) (discussing state and local sanctions against South Africa); Peter J.
Spiro, Note, State and Local Anti–South Africa Action as an Intrusion upon the Federal Power in Foreign Affairs , 72 VA. L. REV. 813, 816-24 (1986) (examining anti–South Africa divestment measures
taken by state and local governments). Lower court cases resolving challenges to these measures were
not of one piece. Compare Board of Trustees of the Employees’ Retirement Sys. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 730-57 (Md. 1989) (upholding Baltimore ordinances requiring city pension funds
to divest their holdings from companies engaged in business in South Africa), with New York Times
Co. v. City of New York Comm’n on Human Rights, 361 N.E.2d 963, 966-69 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that
New York City anti-discrimination laws did not prohibit the New York Times from carrying an advertisement for South African employment opportunities), and Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v.
Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300, 307 (Ill. 1986) (invalidating an Illinois statute excluding South African coins
from state tax exemptions available to other foreign coins).
12. A conference of nine hundred state officials threatened sanctions against Swiss banks notwithstanding the express objections of U.S. officials. See John Authers et al., Banks Pay a High Price for
Putting the Past Behind Them, F IN. T IMES, Sept. 9, 1998, at 4. According to one estimate, “[e]very important breakthrough in the negotiations [with Swiss banks] came soon after threats from U.S. local
government officials to impose sanctions.” John Authers & Richard Wolfe, When Sanctions Work, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 1998, at 22. New York City’s comptroller also spearheaded a campaign to impose sanctions on Deutsche Bank, and to oppose its merger with Bankers Trust, until eventually prevailed upon
by the State Department. See Marilyn Henry, Deutsche Bank Gets Approval for $10 B. U.S. Takeover,
JERUSALEM POST, May 23, 1999, at 4; Fed Clears a Planned U.S.-German Bank Merger, N.Y. T IMES,
May 21, 1999, at C22.
13. See generally USA Engage, State & Local Sanctions Watch List (last modified July 27, 1999)
<www.usaengage.org/news/status.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (compiling a “watch list”
of pending proposals, failed or inactive proposals, and enacted divestment, selective purchasing, and
other sanctions laws relating to over one dozen foreign countries); John M. Kline, Continuing Controversies over State and Local Foreign Policy Sanctions in the United States, P UBLIUS, Spring 1999, at
111 passim [hereinafter Kline, Continuing Controversies].
14. See JOHN H. J ACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 227-28 (2d ed. 1997) (noting the proliferation of state “Buy American” laws,
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Matters have come to a head with Massachusetts’s selective purchasing law, which was among the first to target Burma.15 The European Union
and Japan filed complaints before the World Trade Organization (“WTO”)
alleging that the law violated the Uruguay Round.16 Those proceedings
were suspended after the Massachusetts law was enjoined,17 but the Supreme Court is now reviewing the matter in Natsios v. National Foreign
Trade Council.18 The international attention paid to these and like measures
makes the nostrum that states are “unknown to foreign nations”19 sound
despite the terms of the Uruguay Round); Christopher F. Corr & Kristina Zissis, Convergence and Opportunity: The WTO Government Procurement Agreement and U.S. Procurement Reform, 18 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 303, 321-22 (1999) (same). Compare Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of
Comm’rs, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800, 805-06 (Ct. App. 1969) (invalidating the California Buy American Act as
unconstitutionally infringing on the federal government’s exclusive foreign affairs powers), with Trojan
Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 906-15 (3d Cir. 1990) (upholding Pennsylvania’s “Buy
American” statute), and K.S.B. Tech. Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 381
A.2d 774, 789 (N.J. 1977) (upholding the New Jersey “Buy American” statute).
15. The law establishes a restricted purchase list of all companies “doing business” with
Burma—expansively construed —and bars the Commonwealth from procuring goods or services from
those companies, unless procurement is essential and there is no other bid or offer, certain medical supplies are involved, or the bid or offer in question is more than 10% below the next-lowest alternative.
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, §§ 22G, 22H, 22I (West 1998).
16. See Christopher McCrudden, International Economic Law and the Pursuit of Human Rights:
A Framework for Discussion of the Legality of “Selective Purchasing” Laws Under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement , 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 7 (1999) (noting the allegation by Japan and the
EC that the Massachusetts law violates the Government Procurement Agreement); World Trade Organization, Overview of the State-of-Play of WTO Disputes (last modified Feb. 1, 2000)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/bulletin.htm> (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (detailing the
status of the EC and Japanese WTO complaints against the United States).
17. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 293 (D. Mass. 1998), aff’d
sub nom., National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct.
525 (1999).
18. 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999) (granting certiorari). The Massachusetts law, and the district court and
court of appeals’ decisions in Natsios, have been the subject of extensive commentary discussing preemption, the Foreign Commerce Clause, foreign affairs power, and even free speech issues involved.
See, e.g. , Lynn Loschin & Jennifer Anderson, Massachusetts Challenges the Burmese Dictators: The
Constitutionality of Selective Purchasing Laws, 39 S ANTA CLARA L. REV. 373, 375 (1999) (concluding
that selective purchasing laws are not preempted by federal law and do not violate the dormant Commerce Clause or the federal government’s exclusive foreign affairs power); Matthew C. Porterfield,
State and Local Foreign Policy Initiatives and Free Speech: The First Amendment as an Instrument of
Federalism, 35 S TAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (1999) (postulating that some types of state and local foreign policy
sanctions are protected by both the Tenth and the First Amendments); Daniel M. Price & John P. Hannah, The Constitutionality of United States State and Local Sanctions, 39 HARV. I NT’L L.J. 443, 447
(1998) (arguing that local economic sanctions infringe upon powers reserved exclusively to the federal
government); David Schmahmann & James Finch, The Unconstitutionality of State and Local Enactments Restricting Business Ties with Burma (Myanmar), 30 V AND. J. T RANSNAT’L L. 175, 179 (1997)
(asserting that state initiatives to punish businesses engaged in activity in Burma are preempted, as well
as violating the Foreign Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and possibly the Due Process
Clause).
19. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 228 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring).
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surreal, like the doctrine that excludable aliens have not “entered” the
United States even if they are standing in Wrigley Field.20 The precarious
position of the executive branch, which was compelled to defend itself before the WTO (while futilely lobbying Massachusetts to repeal the law21),
confirms that the federal government is not wholly in charge of the nation’s
foreign policy 22—and the manner in which Massachusetts assumed its role
scarcely makes one sanguine about the alternatives.23
20. See Michael H. Shuman, Dateline Main Street: Local Foreign Policies, 65 FOREIGN POL’Y
154, 162 (1987) [hereinafter Shuman, Local Foreign Policies] (noting “[t]he discrepancy between constitutional theory and practice”). See generally F RY, supra note 5, passim (detailing the growth of state
and local activities); Fry, supra note 6, passim (same); Michael H. Shuman, Dateline Main Street:
Courts v. Local Foreign Policies, 86 F OREIGN POL’Y 158 passim (1992) [hereinafter, Shuman, Courts]
(same). Cf. Ethan A. Klingsberg, Note, Penetrating the Entry Doctrine: Excludable Aliens’ Constitutional Rights in Immigration Processes, 98 YALE L.J. 639, 639-40 (1989) (describing the entry doctrine).
21. The Clinton Administration conducted a “fierce internal debate” about whether to participate
in the legal challenge to the Massachusetts law, which involved reconciling State Department condemnation of Burma, defense of the Massachusetts law as the named party in the WTO proceedings, and its
well-understood opposition to the state law on grounds of principle and politics. Michael S. Lelyveld,
Clinton Refrains from Intervening in Myanmar Case, J. COM., Mar. 11, 1999, at 3A; see also Fred
Hiatt, Boston’s Stand on Human Rights, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 1997, at A19; Michael S. Lelyveld, U.S.
May Defend, Oppose State’s Sanctions Law, J. COM., Feb. 3, 1999, at 3A; Dierdre Shesgreen, Can
States Set Trade Policy?, L EGAL TIMES, Aug. 17, 1998, at 4. Although the federal government declined
to participate in the lower courts or at the certiorari stage in the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General
recently filed an amicus brief in support of the private respondents. See Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council (No. 99-474), 120
S. Ct. 525 (1999) (granting certiorari), available in 2000 WL 194805; David G. Savage, Lawyers for
U.S. Seek End to Myanmar Boycott, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2000, at A3.
This clash between the President’s international interests and domestic capabilities is by no
means unique. See, e.g., Richard Wolffe, Sanctions Against Swiss Put Washington on Spot , FIN. T IMES,
July 4, 1998, at 2 (noting threats by the Swiss government to initiate WTO proceedings concerning state
and city sanctions against Swiss banks and the Clinton administration’s opposition both to international
proceedings and to sanctions).
22. In the Massachusetts matter, then–Undersecretary of State Stuart Eizenstat was reportedly informed by European allies that they would not cooperate further on multilateral action until the controversy was resolved. The controversy also occasioned a February 1998 negotiation between EU, United
Kingdom, and Massachusetts officials, with a State Department official as a bystander, in which state
representative Byron Rushing was petitioned to amend the law—and he replied that he would only do
so if the EU imposed new sanctions against Burma. See Robert S. Greenberger, States, Cities Increase
Use of Trade Sanctions, Troubling Business Groups and U.S. Partners, W ALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1998, at
A20; see also USA Engage, Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary David Marchick Before the
Maryland House of Delegates Committee on Commerce and Government Matters, March 25, 1998
(visited Feb. 18, 2000) <http://usaengage.org/legislative/marchick.html> (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (reprinting testimony that such laws might make U.S. policy preferences inconsistent and confusing, impair negotiation with foreign governments, and give rise to ancillary disputes over their consistency with international legal obligations, having “the practical effect of interfering with the President’s ability to conduct our foreign policy”); Lee H. Hamilton, Editorial, Local Interference with
Foreign Policy, B OSTON GLOBE, Nov. 9, 1998, at A23 (arguing that state and local sanctions may “diminish the leverage of our diplomatic institutions” and “interfere with the ability of the president and
Congress to pursue a coherent, united foreign policy,” so that “[t]o allow state and local governments to
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This profound dissonance between theory and practice has only accentuated the second problem with the federal monopoly—no one has explained satisfactorily why it exists in the first place. The Constitution does
not speak of foreign affairs, let alone a federal monopoly.24 Unsurprisingly,
then, leading cases either go outside the Constitution for support,25 cite no
textual support whatsoever,26 or rely on judicially created doctrines of uncertain pedigree and scope.27 The case law also fails to justify any role for
the judiciary, leaving it vulnerable to suggestions that congressional toler-

pursue their own foreign policies would create dangerous confusion in the way the United States interacts with other nations, and [it] would severely weaken our ability to protect U.S. national interests”);
Steven Spear, 50 Different Departments of State, T HE EXPORT PRAC., July 15, 1997, at 8 (describing
efforts by the State Department and the Office of the United States Trade Representative to change the
Massachusetts Burma law, as well as a visit to Massachusetts by the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia to
dissuade state lawmakers from passing new sanctions legislation, and concluding that such efforts have
generally met with “indifference”); Kevin Whitelaw, The Very Long Arm of the Law, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Oct. 14, 1996, at 57 (“Trying to monitor the foreign policy of 50 states and 7,284 municipalities is, to put it simply, a nightmare for companies and national governments alike. ‘There’s no way
we can keep track of all the individual actions,’ admits one State Department official.”).
23. This Article does not consider whether, apart from constitutional considerations, the Massachusetts Burma law is an appropriate instrument for encouraging change in Burma’s profoundly antidemocratic and repressive regime. But the means by which the Massachusetts legislation was crafted
(an anti-apartheid sanctions bill was adapted by removing the words “South Africa” and substituting
“Burma (Myanmar)”), the attention paid to the international consequences (the bill’s sponsor, Representative Byron Rushing, volunteered, “I had no idea we were party to the Government Procurement
blah-blah”), and the preliminary understanding of its constitutional legitimacy (Representative Rushing
commented, “Our constitution is older than the country’s. We can do these things.”) give one pause. A
State’s Foreign Policy: The Mass That Roared, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 1997, at 32-33.
24. See Shuman, Courts, supra note 20, at 162 (“Most people—and not a few legal scholars—would be surprised to learn that the Constitution nowhere contains the terms ‘foreign relations,’
‘foreign policy,’ or ‘international affairs.’”). Indeed, as explained further below, it appears to contemplate certain foreign affairs functions for the states. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (providing that the
states may enter into agreements or compacts with foreign powers so long as there is congressional consent); infra text accompanying notes 244-46, 333-58.
25. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-18 (1936) (proposing an
extra-constitutional theory of the federal monopoly over foreign affairs); infra text accompanying notes
45-47 (discussing Curtiss-Wright).
26. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968) (holding that state regulations “must give
way if they impair the efficient exercise of the Nation’s foreign policy”); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S.
275, 279 (1875) (reasoning that a California immigration statute was impermissible because it gave a
considerable amount of power to a state official who did not accordingly bear the risk for claims of action brought under the statute); infra text accompanying notes 48-57, 368-75 (discussing Zschernig).
27. See, e.g., National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir.) (enjoining a
Massachusetts law on the grounds that it (1) violated the foreign affairs power; (2) violated Foreign
Commerce Clause doctrines prohibiting facial discrimination against foreign commerce, interference
with “one voice” in commercial matters, and extraterritorial regulation; and (3) was preempted by federal legislation), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999).
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ance of state activities should be enough to excuse state activity having foreign repercussions of the most significant kind.28
Stressing the persistence of state practices, and the lack of any apparent constitutional basis for a federal monopoly, an important recent wave of
scholarship suggests doing away with the monopoly altogether—that is,
abandoning the notion that the courts should enforce a “dormant” foreign
relations preemption of state activities, absent intervention by the political
branches.29 Revisionist scholars depict dormant foreign relations preemp28. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 303 (1994) (holding that the
Constitution permits application of California’s corporate franchise tax to a multinational banking enterprise).
29. For remarks on this renaissance, see Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs
Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1089, 1090-1106 (1999) (describing the components of, and recent shift
away from, “foreign affairs exceptionalism”); G. Edward White, Observations on the Turning of Foreign Affairs Jurisprudence, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1120-25 (1999) (exploring the impact of the
emerging international order on foreign affairs law). For exemplars, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position,
110 H ARV. L. REV. 815, 860-70 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International
Law] (questioning the legitimacy and continuing validity of dormant foreign relations preemption);
Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1624 (proposing the renunciation of dormant foreign relations preemption); Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70
U. COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1410-24 (1999) [hereinafter Goldsmith, The New Formalism] (rejecting the
foreign relations effects approach in political question, act of state, and dormant foreign affairs preemption doctrines); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1226 (1999)
[hereinafter Spiro, Foreign Relations] (concluding that, in light of new participation by states in global
affairs, “there is no justification for the courts to enforce a default rule protecting federal exclusivity in
the face of contrary state-level preferences”); Peter J. Spiro, New Players on the International Stage, 2
HOFSTRA L. & P OL’Y SYMP. 19, 20 (1997) (attributing the need for a reexamination of traditional international affairs law to the dilution of the primacy of the nation-state); Peter J. Spiro, The States and
Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 121, 123 (1994) [hereinafter Spiro,
Demi-Sovereignties] (arguing that “the presumption of national uniformity and control over foreign relations matters . . . no longer prevails in a post-national world order”); A.M. Weisburd, State Courts,
Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. I NT’L L. 1, 20-27 (1995) (criticizing “broad federal common law of foreign relations” as inconsistent and lacking in authority).
In a recent contribution along similar lines, which appeared as this Article was being readied for
publication, Michael Ramsey concludes that, based on the original understanding, “there is no constitutional limit upon state power beyond the express or implied limitations directed at particular subjects
such as war and treatymaking and the general preemptive power.” Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of
the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. R EV. 341, 348 (1999). Though conceptually distinguishable, the revisionist view of dormant
foreign relations preemption is closely affiliated with other work challenging the scope of positive political authority in the realm of foreign relations. See, e.g., Curtis Bradley, The Treaty Power and
American Federalism, 97 M ICH. L. R EV. 390, 395 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley, The Treaty Power] (arguing that the federal treaty power should be subject to the same federalism limitations as are Congress’s legislative powers); John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution,
and the Original Understanding, 99 C OLUM. L. R EV. 1955 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Globalism] (arguing that congressional consent was originally considered indispensable before treaties would have domestic legislative effect). Like Professor Ramsey’s recent piece, John Yoo’s article on self-execution
came to my attention shortly before this piece was to be published, making it impossible to address his
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tion as both a departure from the original understanding and a relic of the
past. To their lights, the doctrine emerged full-grown in Zschernig v.
Miller,30 a 1968 Supreme Court decision striking down an Oregon reciprocal inheritance statute,31 before being reduced by Barclays Bank PLC v.
Franchise Tax Board32 to little more than what the dormant Commerce
Clause would otherwise provide.
Taking Barclays Bank one step further, the new scholarship proposes
getting rid of such preemption altogether, but not on the predictable basis
of states’ rights.33 Instead, it is claimed, globalization makes confining the
states to purely internal matters entirely untenable.34 Cabining the states is
also thought to be an inappropriate function for the courts, since Congress—not the judiciary—is in charge of federal law and the nation’s for-

arguments or those of his commentators with the care they deserve. See also Martin S. Flaherty, History
Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land”,
99 C OLUM. L. R EV. 2095 (1999) (responding to Professor Yoo’s Globalism); Carlos Manuel Vázquez,
Laughing at Treaties, 99 C OLUM L. R EV. 2154 (1999) (same); John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 C OLUM. L. R EV. 2218 (1999) (replying to Professors Vázquez and Flaherty).
30. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
31. See id. at 441; Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1630 (describing Zschernig as relying on dormant foreign relations preemption); Joel P. Trachtman, Nonactor States in U.S. Foreign
Relations?: The Massachusetts Burma Law, 92 A M. S OC’Y INT’L L. P ROC. 350, 357 (1998) (describing
Zschernig as “[d]ormant foreign relations power preemption”); see also infra text accompanying note
51 (attributing the debut of dormant foreign relations preemption to Zschernig).
32. 512 U.S. 298 (1994); see also infra text accompanying notes 58-62, 75-76 (describing the
premises and subsequent treatment of Zschernig).
33. Federalism’s values are invoked more indirectly, either based on appeals to consistent treatment, see Bradley, Treaty Power, supra note 29, at 394 (arguing against “treaty power exceptionalism”), or tradition, see Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1714 (noting critically that “[t]hese
new foreign relations issues are much more closely tied to traditional state prerogatives than traditional
foreign relations issues, and decentralization of these matters often serves salutary ends”). But see
Porterfield, supra note 18, at 23-48 (expressly emphasizing the speech and political participation functions of federalism). This Article does not seek to address the normative case for or against state participation in any depth, except to the extent of explicating the original warrant for the federal treaty
power and considering whether that warrant has been unsettled by subsequent developments. See infra
Part II. But cf. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis,
41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 906-08 (1994) (questioning the United States’ preoccupation with federalism).
34. See, e.g. , Goldsmith, Federal Courts , supra note 1, at 1670-80 (positing that the blurring of
the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs discredits the theory that states lack a legitimate
interest in foreign affairs); Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1246-52, 1259-75 (identifying
the weaknesses and impracticality of federal exclusivity).
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eign policy.35 Such arguments may well appeal to a Court sympathetic to
state sovereignty and suspicious of constitutional common law.36
The revisionist account is compelling if one accepts the premises of
the federal monopoly orthodoxy—namely, that foreign relations effects
must be the touchstone for any judicially imposed limit on state activities,
and that any constitutional doctrine must speak in broad terms to all activities having the requisite effects. Such an approach, I would concede, has
serious deficiencies, including its lack of any apparent basis in the Constitution. If those premises are wrong, however, perhaps both the orthodoxy
and the revisionists are mistaken. The key, it seems, lies in locating a
“new” constitutional principle, one recovered from a Constitution that still
speaks to the modern world.
That principle, I argue, is the “dormant treaty power”—the Treaty
Clause’s preemption of state authority even in the absence of any ratified
treaty.37 The dormant treaty power does not preclude all state activities affecting foreign relations. Instead, it proscribes a relatively well-defined
class of state foreign affairs activities: those involving direct or indirect negotiating—put less formally, bargaining—with foreign powers on matters
of national concern. The bargaining approach acknowledges, for example,
a state’s presumed authority to engage in ordinary contractual relations
with foreign corporations and governments, to tax foreign corporations, and
to denounce foreign governments in the strongest terms, regardless of the
effects.38 At the same time, a state cannot negotiate with a foreign power in
35. See, e.g., Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1692-95 (explaining the tendency of
courts to err in attempting to create a federal common law in foreign affairs); Goldsmith, The New
Formalism, supra note 29, at 1420 (describing the discrepant response of the political branches to judicial overprotection, as opposed to underprotection, of U.S. foreign relations interests).
36. In National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct.
525 (1999), the First Circuit noted recent criticisms of the federal monopoly and contentions that Barclays undermined prior case law but observed that lower courts lack the power to depart even from
weakened Supreme Court precedent—leaving to the Supreme Court “‘the prerogative of overruling its
own decisions.’” Id. at 59 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997))).
37. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (conferring the treaty power on the President and the Senate); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting states from entering into any treaty, alliance, or confederation).
Describing the treaty power as “dormant” does not, of course, mean that the Senate and President need
be inert, any more than congressional authority under the dormant Commerce Clause is dissipated when
the House or Senate considers legislation. To the contrary, the principle reflects a constitutional judgment that the treaty power is never truly dormant, but may be exercised by engaging or failing to engage foreign powers in negotiations toward the conclusion of a treaty. The point of the label, instead, is
to differentiate between “dormant” federal preemption by virtue of the Treaty Clause and federal preemption by a ratified treaty pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. See id. art. VI, cl. 2; infra text accompanying note 264 (considering the relationship between Article VI and the dormant treaty power).
38. It should be noted, however, that the dormant treaty power is not exclusive of other
non–foreign relations preemption doctrines, such as might be raised by state laws discriminating against
foreign commerce. See, e.g. , Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1625 (making a similar ca-
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order to secure concessions. Moreover, the state cannot indirectly negotiate
(for example, by imposing higher taxes on corporations domiciled in the
country in question) in pursuit of the same end.
The dormant treaty power’s bargaining-oriented approach offers concrete advantages over both the federal monopoly orthodoxy and the revisionist critique. For one, it is founded on a clear grant of constitutional
authority to the federal government and a parallel bar of state authority,
rather than vaguer propositions concerning the desirability of exclusive
federal authority (or, for that matter, the desirability of preserving state
authority). Focusing on treaty-related functions also allows us to recognize
the similarity between direct negotiations with a foreign government and
indirect bargaining through unilateral changes in state law, without licensing a judicially unmanageable inquiry into foreign relations effects (or, for
that matter, turning a blind eye toward those effects). Finally, the dormant
treaty power provides a coherent justification for not passing the buck to
Congress—namely, the judiciary’s mandate to provide the President with
the freedom necessary to exercise the treaty functions conferred on the executive branch by the Constitution.
Part I of this Article briefly evaluates the approach of present foreign
affairs doctrines to the problem of state-conducted activities touching on
foreign relations. As critics have suggested, prevailing foreign affairs doctrine is objectionable because it lacks any clear basis in the Constitution,
and because it further requires the judiciary to engage in complex assessments concerning the foreign effects of state activities. As a result, current
foreign affairs doctrine substitutes the judicial appraisal of foreign relations
for the more considered judgment of Congress—or, at best, defers to executive judgment without any constitutional basis for doing so, to the apparent disadvantage of state interests. If recent case law has not abandoned
this approach, perhaps it should.
Part II then examines the horizontal and vertical distribution of the
constitutional power to negotiate international agreements. The original
understanding is important here not only for the usual reasons,39 but also to
veat); Edward T. Swaine, The Triumph of Local Politics?, 93 AM. S OC’Y INT’L L. P ROC. 247 (1999)
(considering statutory preemption and dormant Commerce Clause objections to the Massachusetts
Burma legislation); infra Part I.B (briefly summarizing the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause doctrine). State activities might also conflict with specific Article I grants of authority other than the Commerce Clause—for example, by touching on matters of defense policy. See Perpich v. Department of
Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 353-54 (1990) (noting that, even while the Militia Clauses permit organized
state militia, those militia are subject to federal limitations).
39. Those reasons are varied—and contested—but most scholars still assume that the original understanding is highly pertinent. See, e.g., Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to
History in Legal Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM L. R EV. 87, 104-24 (1997) (appraising critically the ubiq-
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rebut the suggestion by revisionists that the entire notion of federal foreign
relations exclusivity is ahistorical. This view is mistaken, at least to the
extent that it impugns the exclusivity of treaty-related functions.40 Without
attempting to divine the outer perimeters of executive authority over foreign affairs, I argue that the constitutional text and early history of the
Treaty Clause, as well as subsequent practice and case law, establish that
the President is invested with an independent and substantive (if not necessarily plenary) authority to negotiate international agreements. The President was enlisted, I argue, both to facilitate effective negotiation and to reinforce federal barriers against unwise foreign entanglements. It is this
power, not Congress’s authority over commerce, that is at stake when states
attempt to conduct foreign relations. It is absolutely clear, moreover, that
both the Framers and their successors regarded state interference with this
presidential power as unlawful.
The kernel of the dormant treaty power is evident in the abundant
dicta and commentary supporting the federal monopoly,41 and in Chief Justice Taney’s extraordinary opinion in Holmes v. Jennison.42 But this has not
left us with a full-fledged doctrine to apply, particularly given the intervening confusion caused by cases like Zschernig and Barclays Bank. Accordingly, Part III develops a doctrine for judicial application. I first exuity of appeals to original understanding in legal scholarship); Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience,
112 H ARV. L. R EV. 611, 616 (1999) (“[P]ractically everyone who deals with the Constitution treats the
Founding as special and privileged in some sense.”). But cf. Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S.
CAL. L. REV. 381, 394-412 (1997) (critiquing halfway adherence to originalism). For a recent discussion of whether and how the original understanding of the treaty power may be determinative, compare
Yoo, Globalism, supra note 29, at 1982-85 (defending the historical approach), with Vázquez, supra
note 29, at 2158-68 (noting limits to narrow historical methods).
40. To be clear, however, the dormant treaty power has evolved over time. As explained below,
nineteenth-century state activities touching on foreign relations may have been tolerated because of
contemporary doubts about the scope of the federal government’s power under the Treaty Clause. See
infra text accompanying notes 303-32. Consequently, one might argue that preempting state activity
based on the dormant treaty doctrine is somewhat asynchronous, in that it permits expanding federal
power (via judicial enforcement of the now-limitless Treaty Clause) without any structural compensation. See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. C T. R EV. 125,
130 (defending, in principle, the “translation” of federalism limits to counterbalance the expansion of
federal power under the Commerce Clause).
The significance of the objection in this particular context turns, among other things, on whether
nineteenth-century uncertainties about the treaty power really amounted to a shared understanding
about its limits, a matter generally beyond the scope of this Article. But see, e.g., infra notes 313-19
(highlighting the diversity of opinion on subject-matter limits). While translating the federal system en
masse has undoubted virtues, I hope to demonstrate that the commitment to federal exclusivity in negotiating treaties, whatever the substantive reach of the Treaty Clause, has been a consistent constitutional
objective—and is intellectually coherent in its own right.
41. See, e.g., supra notes 1-3; infra Part I.A and notes 320, 330-31.
42. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).
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amine arguments to the effect that the Framers’ approach is antiquated, or
that positive political authority—that is, affirmative steps taken by the political branches to protect their prerogatives—renders judicial intervention
unnecessary. I conclude, however, that neither line of argument comes to
grips with the defensible (and constitutional) judgment as to the necessity
of preserving the President’s authority to negotiate treaties in the national
interest.
The final part then argues that a judicially enforced prohibition on
state bargaining with foreign powers is the most practical and the most
principled means of fleshing out the dormant treaty power. The bargaining
approach naturally proscribes certain forms of state conduct, such as state
measures contingent on the policies of foreign powers, that occupy an uncertain position under prevailing doctrine, while just as plainly permitting
other measures of otherwise uncertain legality—such as purely unilateral
state conduct and state relations with foreign private parties. Incidental instances of state bargaining should also be permitted on grounds consistent
with the treaty power’s externality and collective action rationales. Finally,
while the bargaining approach vests considerable authority in the judiciary,
its basis in the Treaty Clause warrants inviting the executive branch to exempt unproblematic classes or instances of state conduct, substituting its
judgment on foreign affairs matters that rest ultimately—if not
solely—with the political branches.
I. THE DORMANT DOCTRINES OF THE FEDERAL MONOPOLY
State and local measures touching on foreign affairs clearly cannot be
maintained in the teeth of enacted federal law—including, at a minimum,
federal statutes, treaties, and congressionally authorized regulations.43 But
state and local measures may also be preempted by one or more principles
of dormant federal power arising directly from the Constitution—primarily,
the foreign affairs power doctrine and the “one voice” component of the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. Understanding these existing doctrines
43. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(1) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] (describing international law and international agreements of the United States as supreme over state law); id. § 303
(broadly construing international agreements as including treaties and other measures within congressional and presidential authority under the Constitution); id. § 302 cmts. c, d (explaining that U.S.
authority to make international agreements, including by means other than treaties, is not limited by the
Tenth Amendment); H ENKIN, supra note 1, at 191, 197 (explaining that the treaty power is not limited
by powers reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment). But see, e.g., Bradley, The Treaty Power,
supra note 29, at 391-95 (outlining disagreement with the “nationalist” view). For discussion of
whether other executive policies, such as executive agreements, preempt state law, see infra text accompanying notes 107-10.
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is critical to understanding the revisionist critique and the need for alternatives.
A. The Federal Foreign Affairs Power
The most general expression of the federal monopoly of international
relations is commonly referred to as the federal foreign affairs power. The
standard version posits that the United States, by its nature as an independent sovereign, possesses powers appropriate to nationhood and sovereignty—powers implicitly vested by the Constitution in the federal government, without reservation under the Tenth Amendment.44 Justice
Sutherland’s variant, essayed in dicta in Curtiss-Wright, suggests that “external sovereignty” passed directly from Great Britain to the Union of
States, therefore obviating any need for federal powers to be spelled out,
either in the Articles of Confederation or subsequently in the Constitution.45
Few today subscribe to Justice Sutherland’s views,46 and any distinctive influence of his Curtiss-Wright dicta on the vertical distribution of foreign affairs authority has been more apparent than real.47 The more general
44. See, e.g., The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (“For local interests the several States of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations,
we are but one people, one nation, one power.”); cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920)
(stating that the federal government’s authority under the Treaty Clause may be broader than Article I
authority).
45. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936). Justice Sutherland did not expressly claim any extra-constitutional assignment of power—the closest he came was in
asserting that “the investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not
depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution” and that the powers, even if not detailed in the
Constitution, “would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality,”
id. at 318—which by itself is consistent with a theory of implicit authority. The opinion also cited, if
only incidentally, more traditional authority, like The Chinese Exclusion Case. See id. at 317. Nevertheless, many distinguish his explanation from the more conventional claims of implicit constitutional
authority. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 18-19.
46. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 94 (1990) (summarizing “withering criticism” of Curtiss-Wright);
see also RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ D ESIGN 21-47 (1987) (discussing whether
states were independent sovereignties before the adoption of the Constitution); LOUIS FISHER,
PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 57-61 (1995) (criticizing the practice of drawing legal support for foreign
affairs from Curtiss-Wright); M ICHAEL J. G LENNON, C ONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 14-15 (1990) (addressing implied congressional will); David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of
Mr. Justice Sutherland’s Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946).
47. Curtiss-Wright was a nondelegation case. Because President Roosevelt’s proclamation of an
embargo was directly authorized by a joint resolution of Congress, there was no conflict between presidential and congressional authority; likewise, because the company challenged a federal criminal prosecution, there was no issue of the residual authority remaining with the states. Accordingly, all the Court
needed to conclude was that foreign affairs were different for nondelegation purposes. See HENKIN,
supra note 1, at 20 n.**. The case has since been cited extensively in support of construing executive
authority liberally, especially as to statutory questions, see, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291
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notion of federal exclusivity, however, has had episodic bite. In Zschernig
v. Miller,48 the Supreme Court considered an Oregon statute conditioning
inheritance by a nonresident alien upon proof that U.S. citizens possessed a
nondiscriminatory right of inheritance in the alien’s home country, that
U.S. citizens had the right to receive payments from the estates of persons
dying in that country, and that Oregon proceeds would not be confiscated
by the foreign government—a standard that barred a citizen of East Germany from inheriting personal property.49 Eschewing the Curtiss-Wright
theory (and, indeed, any discernible theory at all), Justice Douglas wrote
that “the history and operation of this Oregon statute make clear that [it] is
an intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress.”50 The Court accordingly
struck down the Oregon statute, notwithstanding the lack of conflict with
any demonstrable federal activity. To many, this was the debut of the dormant federal foreign affairs power.51
Precisely what state activities Zschernig precludes is notoriously unclear. The Court suggested at some points in Zschernig itself that the
gravamen of its complaint lay with Oregon’s arrogation of the authority to
conduct foreign relations.52 For the most part, though, the Court suggested
(1981); KOH, supra note 46, at 93-95, 134-41, but it has been of virtually no significance in aggregating
federal power. But see Charles Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 Y ALE L.J. 1, 5 (1973) (arguing that while Curtiss-Wright is often dismissed as
dicta, it continues to be available as precedent).
48. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
49. See id. at 430-32.
50. See id. at 432 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941)).
51. See Bilder, supra note 5, at 825 (“Zschernig is a unique case—the only one in which the Supreme Court has clearly stated such a doctrine of ‘dormant’ foreign relations power.”); Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1625-30, 1649-58 (“Sabbatino and Zschernig were viewed at the time of
their announcement to mark a significant break with prior law.”); see also H ENKIN, supra note 1, at 162
(concluding, after describing general principle of foreign relations preemption, that “[u]ntil 1968 there
was no hint of such a principle”); id. at 163 (saying, of Zschernig, that “[t]his was new constitutional
doctrine”); Frederic L. Kirgis, Zschernig v. Miller and the Breard Matter, 92 AM. J. INT. L. 704, 704
(acquiescing in Bilder’s description); Hans A. Linde, A New Foreign-Relations Restraint on American
States: Zschernig v. Miller, 28 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
VÖLKERRECHT 594, 601-03 (1968) (describing Zschernig as “without precedent”); Maier, supra note 1,
at 835-36 (describing Sabbatino and Zschernig as novel applications of “a structural analysis to find
that state authority may be found to be preempted even when there is no actual interference with the
national conduct of foreign affairs”). But see Harold G. Maier, Cooperative Federalism in International
Trade: Its Constitutional Parameters , 27 M ERCER L. REV. 391, 403 (1976) (“Zschernig, however, does
not represent a new doctrine. In fact, it represents only a more explicit verbalization of an approach to
constitutional interpretaion [sic] in foreign affairs cases which has been implicit and, sometimes, explicit for almost 200 years.”).
52. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 437-38 (“As one reads the Oregon decisions, it seems that foreign
policy attitudes, the freezing or thawing of the ‘cold war,’ and the like are the real desiderata. Yet they
of course are matters for the Federal Government, not for local probate courts.”); see also id. at 439
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that the state’s activities interfered with federal power to conduct foreign
relations simply because they had an undue effect on foreign nations. Distinguishing Clark v. Allen,53 which upheld a California statute having only
an “incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries,” Justice Douglas
claimed that the Oregon statute created more than a mere “diplomatic
bagatelle” and had “great potential for disruption or embarrassment,”54 such
that it might “well [have] adversely affect[ed] the power of the central government to deal with those problems.”55 The type of “problems” at issue
and which branch of the central government retained responsibility were
not made clear. But the Court’s refusal to accept the executive branch’s
submission that Oregon’s policy did not interfere with foreign relations,56
coupled with the Court’s references to powers “entrust[ed] to the President
and Congress,”57 suggests at a minimum that the doctrine in question was
not rooted in Article II.

(explaining that the purpose of one provision of the Oregon statute “was to serve as ‘an inducement to
foreign nations to so frame the inheritance laws of their respective countries in a manner which would
insure to Oregonians the same opportunities to inherit and take personal property abroad that they enjoy
in the state of Oregon.’” (quoting Closterman v. Schmidt, 332 P.2d 1036, 1042 (Or. 1958)); id. at 441
(highlighting the need to avoid interfering with “the power of the central government to deal with [foreign relations]”); infra text accompanying notes 84-90.
53. 331 U.S. 503 (1947). In Clark, the Supreme Court dismissed a facial challenge to a California
reciprocal inheritance statute as “far-fetched,” considering the law to be among the many state laws
having “some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries” that “none would claim cross the forbidden line” protecting the federal foreign affairs power. Id. at 517; see also infra text accompanying notes
363-67 (discussing Clark). Only four of the eight Justices participating in Zschernig thought the Court’s
results could be reconciled. Compare Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433-35 (refusing the invitation to reexamine the Court’s ruling in Clark v. Allen), with id. at 443 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“To the extent that
Clark v. Allen is inconsistent with these views, I would overrule that decision.” (citation omitted)), and
id. at 458 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“It seems to me impossible to distinguish the present case from Clark
v. Allen in this respect in any convincing way.”), and id. at 462 (White, J., dissenting) (indicating
agreement with the relevant portion of Justice Harlan’s concurrence).
54. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 435; see also id. at 436 (describing inquiries as entailing a “kind of
state involvement in foreign affairs and international relations—matters which the Constitution entrusts
solely to the Federal Government”).
55. Id. at 441; see also infra text accompanying notes 92-93.
56. Justice Stewart put the matter bluntly in his separate opinion:
The Solicitor General, as amicus curiae , says that the Government does not “contend that
the application of the Oregon escheat statute in the circumstances of this case unduly interferes with the United States’ conduct of foreign relations.” But that is not the point. We deal
here with the basic allocation of power between the States and the Nation. Resolution of so
fundamental a constitutional issue cannot vary from day to day with the shifting winds at the
State Department. Today, we are told, Oregon’s statute does not conflict with the national
interest. Tomorrow it may. But, however that may be, the fact remains that the conduct of
our foreign affairs is entrusted under the Constitution to the National Government, not to the
probate courts of the several States.
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 443 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting the Solicitor General’s amicus brief).
57. See supra text accompanying note 50.
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Whatever the Court’s original intention, it has since neglected Zschernig.58 Consequently, some believe that Zschernig is confined to its facts,
and only proscribes state-directed inquiries, particularly by courts, into the
nature or operation of foreign governments. 59 If so, why? Perhaps the Court
felt that the states could be trusted to apply the principle,60 or came to regard Zschernig as a period piece driven by Cold War anxieties.61 Perhaps
instead the Court wanted to continue to maintain the federal monopoly as a
judicial rule, but decided to emphasize instead the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause and its “one voice” component.62 If so, that decision may just
as effectively have sealed the federal monopoly’s doom.
B. The Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is hardly a promising alternative to Zschernig.63 State laws touching on foreign commerce may be
found unconstitutional for reasons wholly familiar from the interstate
commerce context.64 Notwithstanding the similarity of the constitutional
58. As Frederic Kirgis recently observed, “[t]he Supreme Court has never squarely relied on it in
the thirty years it has been on the books.” Kirgis, supra note 51, at 705; see also infra text accompanying notes 75-76 (discussing the effects of Barclays Bank).
59. See Bilder, supra note 5, at 825 n.27 (stating that later opinions suggest that Zschernig can be
“narrowly interpreted as proscribing only state or local statutes”); see also Kirgis, supra note 51, at 706
(noting that “[t]his interpretation limits Zschernig to its facts”). The Restatement, in contrast, suggests
that Zschernig more broadly bars states “from ‘intruding’ on the exclusive national authority in foreign
affairs”—without describing what actions might intrude, or where the exclusive national authority lies.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 43, § 402 reporter’s note 5 (1987) (stating that an “exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe by states is governed by the same principles whether the exercise of jurisdiction has
international or inter-state implications.”).
60. After Zschernig, the Court summarily disposed of two cases, having been assured that the state
courts would themselves apply the decision. See Gorun v. Fall, 393 U.S. 398, 398 (1969) (per curiam);
id. at 398-99 (Douglas, J., concurring); Ioannou v. New York, 391 U.S. 604, 604-05 (1968) (per curiam); see also Harold G. Maier, The Bases and Range of Federal Common Law in Private International Matters, 5 V AND. J. T RANSNAT’L L. 133, 141-45 (1971) (citing and analyzing lower-court cases
involving state inheritance statutes); Wong, supra note 9, at 675-85 (same).
61. See H ENKIN, supra note 1, at 165 n.** (“One would be bold to predict that [Zschernig] has a
future life; might it remain on the Supreme Court’s pages, a relic of the Cold War?”); see also id. at
165.
62. See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 434 (1979) (citing Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976) and requiring that courts first inquire whether a
proposed tax on a foreign instrumentality prevents the federal government from speaking with one
voice).
63. See Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 79-80 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(describing the Court’s ever-changing approach); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce
Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 428 (1982) (promoting a new model for judicial scrutiny grounded in
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV); Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed Economics of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191 (1998).
64. Laws facially discriminating against foreign commerce are “virtually per se invalid.” Oregon
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text conferring authority over foreign and interstate commerce,65 potential
interference with foreign commerce must survive additional hurdles.66
States probably cannot defend themselves on the ground that they are actWaste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994); accord Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 575 (1997); id. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331 (1996). But even facially discriminatory measures may
survive this “strictest scrutiny,” Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979), if they are not protectionist, see, e.g., Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99 (defining “discrimination” as “differential treatment
of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter”). It is unclear whether discrimination against a particular foreign country’s commerce, as opposed to discrimination against all foreign commerce, is covered. See New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 27476 (1988); cf. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue and Fin., 505 U.S. 71, 79-80 (1992)
(noting that, if a state tax law “does not favor business activity in the United States generally over business activity abroad,” “this would indeed suggest that the statute does not discriminate against foreign
commerce”). In Natsios, the First Circuit assessed a less-direct form of foreign discrimination—by the
state of Massachusetts against all companies doing business in Burma (not just against Burmese companies)—in a fashion indistinguishable from “one voice” analysis. See National Foreign Trade Council
v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 67-68 (1st Cir.) (citing Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S.
159, 194 (1983); Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448-49), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999).
Nondiscriminatory state measures may also be held unconstitutional if “the burden imposed on
[foreign] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); accord BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 571-72 (1996)
(holding that a state can protect its own consumers but may not use punitive damages to impose its own
regulatory policies on other states); Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99; see also Healy v. Beer Inst., 491
U.S. 324, 335-36 (1989) (stating that the Commerce Clause prohibits the application of a state statue to
conduct that takes place “wholly outside of the state’s borders” (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624, 642-43 (1982))); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
583 (1986) (holding that a New York law requiring wholesale alcohol prices in New York not to exceed
the lowest prices charged by sellers elsewhere unconstitutionally controlled liquor prices in other
states). In Natsios, the First Circuit held that the same principle applied to attempts by states to exercise
control outside the United States, though presumably the case could also have been made based on the
effects of the Massachusetts law elsewhere within the United States. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 46.
65. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (providing Congress with the power “[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States”).
66. See, e.g., Kraft, 505 U.S. at 79 (“[T]he constitutional prohibition against state taxation of foreign commerce is broader than the protection afforded to interstate commerce . . . in part because matters of concern to the entire Nation are implicated.”); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438 n.9
(1980) (noting “that Commerce Clause scrutiny may well be more rigorous when a restraint on foreign
commerce is alleged”); Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 446 (“When construing Congress’ power to ‘regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations,’ a more extensive constitutional inquiry is required.”); id. at 448 (citations omitted):
Although the Constitution . . . grants Congress power to regulate commerce “with foreign
Nations” and “among the several States” in parallel phrases, there is evidence that the Founders intended the scope of the foreign commerce power to be the greater. Cases of this
Court, stressing the need for uniformity in treating with other nations, echo this distinction.
Accord Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 482 (1888):
It may be argued . . . [that] the inference to be drawn from the absence of legislation by
Congress on the subject excludes state legislation affecting commerce with foreign nations
more strongly than that affecting commerce among the States. Laws which concern the exterior relations of the United States with other nations and governments are general in their
nature, and should proceed exclusively from the legislative authority of the nation.
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ing more as market participants than as regulators.67 More important, at
least until recently, state laws could violate the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause if they impaired the federal government’s ability to “speak with one
voice” in foreign commercial matters.68 That test originated in the ImportExport Clause, which involved a power that was both conferred on the federal government and expressly denied to the states.69 Perhaps because the
67. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 437-38 & n.9 (1980) (noting that “[w]e have no occasion to explore
the limits imposed on state proprietary actions by the ‘foreign commerce’ Clause,” but that “scrutiny
may well be more rigorous when a restraint on foreign commerce is alleged”); see also South-Central
Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 96 (1984) (plurality opinion) (citing this reservation in
Reeves); id. at 100 (concluding, after finding that a protectionist state restriction did not qualify for the
market-participant exception and that the restriction violated ordinary Commerce Clause restrictions,
that “[w]e are buttressed in our conclusion that the restriction is invalid by the fact that foreign commerce is burdened by the restriction”). Some of the defense’s stated rationales—including “evenhandedness” relative to private market participant and the lower risk that states will favor their own citizens
when buying and selling, see College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
119 S. Ct. 2219, 2230-31 (1999)—may not apply as well in the foreign context. The erosion of the sovereignty basis for the market participant defense may also make the Court reluctant to extend it further.
See, e.g. , Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528. 531 (1985) (overruling National
League of Cities); Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438-39 (citing sovereignty considerations); Japan Line, 441 U.S.
at 449 n.13 (“In National League of Cities v. Usery, the Court noted that Congress’ power to regulate
interstate commerce may be restricted by considerations of federalism and state sovereignty. It has
never been suggested that Congress’ power to regulate foreign commerce could be so limited.” (citation
omitted)); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 822 n.4 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“The absence of any articulated principle justifying this summary conclusion leads me to infer that the
newly announced ‘state sovereignty’ doctrine of National League of Cities v. Usery . . . is also the motivating rationale behind this holding.” (citing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976))). But cf. Dan T. Coenen, The Impact of the Garcia Decision on the Market-Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, U. ILL. L. REV. 727, 727 (1995) (contending that Garcia supports, rather than undermines, the market-participant exception). Even if there is a market-participant
defense, matters going beyond “merely choosing [the state’s] trading partners” to “attempting to govern
the private, separate economic relationships of its trading partners,” may not qualify. South-Central
Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 95-96, 99 (1984) (plurality opinion). Finally, states would
obtain little comfort unless there were also a market-participant exception to Zschernig. See Natsios,
181 F.3d at 60 (rejecting such an exception). But see Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 742 F. Supp.
900, 903 (M.D. Pa.) (describing the incidental effect of a “Buy American” law as owing to state “participation in the market place and not to any effort to control or regulate commerce with foreign countries”), aff’d, 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1990); Amarel v. Connell, 202 Cal. App. 3d 137, 139 (1988) (distinguishing, for purposes of a Zschernig challenge, the “purely commercial” nature of alleged belowcost sales by the defendant of milled California rice to the Republic of Korea).
68. See generally Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 320-30 (1994); Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 9 (1986); Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448-49,
451-53; Container Corp. of Amer. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 193 (1983).
69. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1 (empowering Congress “[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises” for certain general purposes, provided “Duties, Imposts and Exercises shall be
uniform throughout the United States”); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (providing that “[n]o State shall, without
the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports,” save under narrowly
defined circumstances). For brief accounts of the background, see, for example, Michelin Tire Corp. v.
Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976) (discussing the Framers’ three main concerns with committing this
power to the federal government); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534, 556-58
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states are less clearly prohibited from regulating foreign commerce, the
Court has cautioned that the merest deviation from national uniformity will
not invalidate a state policy. Instead, the “one voice” doctrine requires distinguishing matters “merely [having] foreign resonances” from those “implicat[ing] foreign affairs.”70 The “one voice” test thus appears “functionally identical” to the dormant foreign relations preemption indicated by
Zschernig, because “[i]t requires courts to analyze the extent to which state
law will ‘offend’ foreign nations and provoke foreign retaliation.”71
The two doctrines are at least equally toothless. Japan Line remains
the only Supreme Court case holding that a state policy violated the “one
voice” requirement.72 In Barclays Bank, the Supreme Court gave short
shrift to a claim that California’s use of a “worldwide combined reporting”
method to determine corporate franchise tax owed by multinationals violated the “one voice” doctrine, notwithstanding the serious diplomatic controversy produced by California’s policy. 73 Central to the Court’s reasoning
was the idea that Congress—which, as the branch tasked with the “active”
Commerce Clause, was better placed than a court to determine what was
compatible with the federal voice—had failed to override the California tax
in question.74 Some read Barclays Bank as the death-knell for the “one
voice” doctrine,75 and further consider the Court’s apparent disdain for
(1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (same).
70. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194. The Court noted, however, that a state law might still violate the “one voice” doctrine if it conflicted with a “clear federal directive,” apparently for reasons familiar from the preemption context. Id.
71. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1637; see also Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra
note 29, at 164-65 (criticizing the application of the “one voice” test in Barclays Bank on the ground
that the Court failed to take foreign repercussions into account).
72. See Vinmar, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 947 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1997).
73. Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 324. As the Court noted, 20 countries supported amici briefs
against California’s position. Then–Secretary of State George Schultz noted in 1986 that “[t]he Department of State has received diplomatic notes complaining about state use of the worldwide unitary
method of taxation from virtually every developed country in the world.” Id. at 324 n.22. Also, the
British Parliament enacted legislation that would, if implemented, tax U.S. corporations. See id.
74. See id. at 320-31.
75. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1705 (“As for the one-voice test in dormant
foreign Commerce Clause cases: Barclays Bank effectively eliminated it.”). For (slightly) milder assessments, see Bradley, The Treaty Power , supra note 29, at 447 (describing Barclays Bank as having
“largely repudiated the strong ‘one voice’ doctrine suggested in some of [the Court’s] earlier foreign
commerce clause decisions”); Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 29, at 164 (describing Barclays
Bank as “a highly significant retreat” in the “one voice” doctrine); Charles Tiefer, Free Trade Agreements and the New Federalism, 7 M INN. J. G LOBAL TRADE 45, 53 (1998) (claiming that Barclays Bank
“all but ended the era of the Japan Line ‘one voice’ doctrine”); Trachtman, supra note 31, at 356 (noting “a shift toward greater deference to state law” in “one voice” doctrine and other aspects of dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause jurisprudence). But see National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d
38, 68-69 (applying “one voice” doctrine), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999).
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Zschernig as definitively indicating that there was no longer any general
foreign affairs power.76 Particularly to those skeptical of federal judicial
power, Barclays Bank was not unlike a powerful general-purpose pesticide:
whatever the foreign relations doctrines were, it killed them.
C. Why the Dormant Doctrines Are . . . Dormant
If a legal doctrine’s success lies in its ability to resolve controversies
in a predictable fashion, then neither the foreign affairs power nor the “one
voice” doctrine has been terribly successful. One problem is that neither
has much support in the constitutional text. As noted previously, the Constitution does not speak in general terms of foreign relations or foreign affairs, nor does the mélange of more specific federal authority in Articles I
and II necessarily exclude all state authority.77 It is not unprecedented, of
course, for the Supreme Court to resolve issues of governmental authority

76. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 S TAN. L. R EV. 529, 560 n.189 (1999) (claiming that Barclays Bank “rejected dormant preemption in the international taxation context”); Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law,
supra note 29, at 865 (citing Barclays Bank as one of the “reasons to think that Zschernig’s dormant
foreign relations preemption retains little, if any, validity”); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
The Abiding Relevance of Federalism to U.S. Foreign Relations, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 675, 678 n.23
(1998) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Abiding Relevance] (claiming that Barclays Bank “may have
eliminated the remnants of the dormant foreign affairs preemption announced in [Zschernig]”); Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1700 (“The Court rejected the [plaintiffs’] challenge and in the
process gutted the essential components of the federal common law of foreign relations.”); Goldsmith,
The New Formalism, supra note 29, at 1426 (same); Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1266
(“[T]he Barclays Bank decision bodes ill for the ‘one-voice’ jurisprudence, most obviously with respect
to the dormant foreign Commerce Clause. But the same reasoning could be deployed to reverse the
rules of Zschernig and Sabbatino as well.”). But see Natsios, 181 F.3d at 49-59 (applying Zschernig to
the Massachusetts Burma law); Kirgis, supra note 51, at 706-08 (considering the application of Zschernig to the Breard controversy, and noting that “on the few occasions when the Supreme Court has characterized its own holding in Zschernig, it has done so broadly” (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank
of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983); First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759,
765 (1972) (opinion of Rehnquist, J.))).
77. See U.S. CONST. art. I (authorizing Congress to raise and support military forces, to declare
war by a majority vote of both houses, to borrow money, to regulate immigration and naturalization, to
punish piracy and felonies on the high seas, as well as offenses against the law of nations, and to regulate tariffs and foreign commerce); id. art. II (assigning the President the general “executive Power,”
designating the President as Commander-in-Chief, assigning the President at least part of the power to
make treaties and to select “ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,” authorizing the President
to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers,” and generally entrusting the power to “take care
that the laws be faithfully executed”). While these powers may authorize the federal government to accomplish whatever it may need, they do not exhaust the potential for foreign relations. For example, as
explored below, states enjoy the power of forming agreements or compacts with foreign powers. See
infra text accompanying notes 244-46, 333-58. As the First Circuit observed, “Zschernig makes clear
that, by necessary implication, the federal government’s foreign affairs power exceeds the power expressly granted in the text of the Constitution . . . .” Natsios, 181 F.3d at 60.
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extra-textually.78 But there is a bias against creating extra-constitutional
federal authority, particularly where parallel state authority is excluded.79
The dormant doctrines also failed to articulate any coherent theory about
which part, if any, of the federal government possessed the requisite
authority. The result, in practice, is that the federal courts have been left in
charge—a result that many find less acceptable than enduring the occasional excesses of state activity.
1. The Problematic Role of the Judiciary. For as many allusions as
one can find to the incompetence of states in the arena of foreign affairs,80
there may be just as many adverting to the incompetence of the judiciary.
In Barclays Bank, for example, the Court declared, in a coda to its “one
voice” analysis, that “[t]he Constitution does ‘not make the judiciary the
overseer of our government,’” and concluded that “we leave it to
Congress—whose voice, in this area, is the Nation’s—to evaluate whether
the national interest is best served by tax uniformity, or state autonomy.”81
78. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (explaining that “[b]ecause there is
no constitutional text speaking to th[e] precise question” of the constitutionality of federal commandeering of state officers, “the answer . . . must be sought in historical understanding and practice, in the
structure of the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this Court”). See generally Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbral, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1089 (1997) (defending the
Rehnquist court’s reliance on penumbral readings).
79. As Louis Henkin noted of attempts to articulate a federal foreign affairs power: “That the new
United States government was to have major powers outside the Constitution is not intimated in the
Constitution itself, in the records of the Convention, in the Federalist Papers, or in contemporary debates.” HENKIN, supra note 1, at 19-20. Moreover, as Justice Scalia observed in the dormant Commerce
Clause context, the Framers not only knew how to deny authority to the states, but also how to vest exclusive authority in the federal government, rather than leaving the matter for inference. See Tyler Pipe
Indus. v. Washington State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 259-65 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80. See infra note 331 (collecting cases).
81. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 330-31 (1994) (quoting Youngtown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); accord Bradley &
Goldsmith, Abiding Relevance, supra note 76, at 678; Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1643
(criticizing the “judicially enforceable, self-executing realm of federal exclusivity in foreign affairs”);
cf. Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 328 (“The judiciary is not vested with power to decide ‘how to balance a
particular risk of retaliation against the sovereign right of the United States as a whole to let the States
tax as they please.’” (quoting Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983)));
Reeves, 447 U.S. at 439 (justifying the market participant doctrine on grounds that “the competing considerations in cases involving state proprietary action often will be subtle, complex, politically charged,
and difficult to assess. . . .[, which is] a task better suited for Congress than this Court.”). Prior to Barclays Bank, at least, the Court also evidenced concern about encroaching on matters better entrusted to
the President. See, e.g., Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111
(1948):
It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret . . . . [T]he
very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of
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In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,82 a contemporary of Zschernig
that likewise emphasized the preemptive effect of federal law, the Court
nonetheless stressed the judiciary’s relative incompetence at foreign
relations questions, not to mention the risks that court judgments might
“seriously interfere with negotations being carried on by the Executive
Branch.”83
The perils of involving courts in foreign affairs have been accentuated
by the pivotal importance to the dormant doctrines of discerning the foreign
effects of state activities. Even prior to Barclays Bank, the Court indicated
its reluctance to conduct such inquiries. As previously discussed, Zschernig
went the farthest in espousing an effects approach, but the Court may also
have been emboldened in that instance by the fact that its immediate rivals
in foreign-effects prophesizing were state probate courts, bodies equally ill
schooled in foreign relations (and likely more parochial to boot).
Zschernig and other cases otherwise struggled without success to
frame the issue of dormant foreign relations preemption in non-effects
terms. Sometimes the test invoked highly legalistic considerations—such as
whether the contested state policy set a precedent for other polities to follow,84 conflicted with a legally cognizable national policy,85 or simulated a
prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.
See also Lori Fisler Damrosch, Foreign States and the Constitution, 73 VA. L. REV. 483, 517 n.135
(1987) (noting application of Justice Jackson’s reasoning in a constitutional context). The incompetence
of courts in foreign affairs matters is not, of course, universally acknowledged. See, e.g. , T HOMAS M.
FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN
AFFAIRS? 46-48, 126-55 (1992) (recognizing that “cases turning on foreign facts present unusual evidenciary [sic] problems for judges” but arguing that problems of competence and proof may be overcome); Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1257 n.140 (arguing that whether a state measure is
likely to disrupt national foreign policy is readily susceptible of judicial analysis).
82. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
83. Id. at 430-33 (explaining that judicial evaluation of exceptions to the “act of state” doctrine
would interfere with policy judgments best conducted by the executive branch).
84. In Zschernig, for example, the Court seemed to be concerned with the prospect that similar
“foreign policy attitudes” by other jurisdictions would impair the ability of the federal government to
manage national affairs. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 437-38 n.8 (1968); Kirgis, supra note
51, at 705 (noting multiple-jurisdiction emphasis). Japan Line, too, emphasized the risks presented by
copycat laws, observing:
If other States follow California’s example (Oregon already has done so), foreign-owned
containers will be subjected to various degrees of multiple taxation, depending on which
American ports they enter. This result, obviously, would make “speaking with one voice”
impossible. California, by its unilateral act, cannot be permitted to place these impediments
before this Nation’s conduct of its foreign relations and its foreign trade.
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453 (citations omitted).
85. The Court emphasized that the asymmetric taxation of Japanese cargo containers occurred in
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federal function86—but invariably the test required distinguishing between
permissible and impermissible impacts. Alternatively, the Court tried to
look for some threshold effect of the state policy on foreign nations—usually, an affront that risked retaliation87—from which it could infer an effect on U.S. foreign relations. Such an approach may have seemed
more objective, and less intrusive, than asking the judiciary to determine
whether a particular state initiative was consistent with the nation’s foreign
policy.88 But providing foreign nations with what amounts to a “heckler’s
veto” over state policies sits uncomfortably,89 particularly when the loudest
heckler is likely to be the very target of often-legitimate state condemnation.90
the shadow of a treaty evidencing “a national policy to remove impediments to the use of containers as
‘instruments of international traffic.’” Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1322(a)
(1994)); see also id. at 452 (“California’s tax prevents this Nation from ‘speaking with one voice’ in
regulating foreign trade. The desirability of uniform treatment of containers used exclusively in foreign
commerce is evidenced by the Customs Convention on Containers, which the United States and Japan
have signed.”). While the Court also cited the risk of retaliation against the entire nation, it did so in
part because such retaliation appeared nearly automatic. See id. at 453 & n.18 (acknowledging an
“acute” risk of retaliation from Japan and a German statutory mechanism for automatic reprisal).
86. See supra text accompanying note 52.
87. See, e.g., Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983) (distinguishing matters merely having “foreign resonances” from those also “implicat[ing] foreign affairs”);
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 432 (1964) (predicting that judicial invalidity of
foreign acts of state would “likely . . . give offense to the expropriating country”).
88. Cf. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, 19, Barclays Bank
PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (Nos. 92-1384 & 92-1839) [hereinafter Barclays Bank
Amicus Brief]:
The factual question whether a particular state tax will precipitate foreign complaints, although far more expertly addressed by the political branches, is not wholly insusceptible of
resolution through judicial proceedings. Questions concerning the federal government’s
proper response to such complaints, however, raise issues of foreign policy falling entirely
outside the judicial ken.
Thus, Zschernig identified the state law in question as having had more than an “incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries,” from which the Court concluded that there was a “direct impact upon
foreign relations” without attempting to determine whether Oregon was in sync with an overall national
policy. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441; see also id. at 440 (“It seems inescapable that the type of probate
law that Oregon enforces affects international relations in a persistent and subtle way.” (emphasis
added)). As if to contrast its approach, the Court noted that Oregon probate courts had “launched inquiries into the type of governments that obtain in particular foreign nations,” id. at 434, leading to
“minute inquiries concerning the actual administration of foreign law, into the credibility of foreign
diplomatic statements, and into speculation whether the fact that some received delivery of funds should
not preclude wonderment as to how many may have been denied the right to receive,” id. at 435 (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. See Barclays Bank Amicus Brief, supra note 88, at 18 (“Threats of retaliation by foreign governments, however, cannot be sufficient in themselves to render a state tax invalid. Such a legal rule
would in essence give foreign governments a ‘heckler’s veto’ over state taxing authorities.”).
90. In Zschernig, the Supreme Court cited Bulgaria’s protests to substantiate the claim that foreign
relations had been affected. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 437 n.7. In Natsios, the First Circuit, citing that
example, held that “foreign government views . . . are one factor to consider in determining whether a
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The bottom line, almost unavoidably, was whether the state regulations in question interfered with federal authority where it mattered,91 or
genuinely “impair[ed] the effective exercise of the Nation’s foreign policy.”92 Yet even in Zschernig, where the precedent of Clark placed a premium on identifying distinctive foreign effects, the Court failed to advert to
any evidence that Oregon’s judicial practices were of concern to anyone
outside the state other than the plaintiffs.93 Small wonder, then, that the
Barclays Bank Court came to stress that even the most basic assessments of
overseas effects were within the competence of the federal political
branches.94
2. The Problematic Role of the Political Branches. Given these
considerations, it may seem that the better part of valor would have been to
defer to the coordinate branches, particularly where the inquiry focused on
the consistency of states with the federal government’s “voice.” Indeed, the
federal government’s position was sometimes portrayed as dispositive.95
law impermissibly interferes with the federal government’s foreign affairs powers” and noted the objections by fellow Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) members to the treatment of
Burma—but did not, for whatever reason, note Burma’s objections. National Foreign Trade Council v.
Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 55 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999).
91. The Japan Line Court, for example, claimed the objective of preserving “federal uniformity in
an area where federal uniformity is essential,” but it quickly turned its inquiry to the foreign impacts.
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1976). Similarly, in Container Corp. ,
the Court explained that “if a state tax merely has foreign resonances, but does not implicate foreign
affairs,” it will not violate the “one voice” doctrine and that “a state tax at variance with federal policy
will violate the ‘one voice’ standard if it . . . implicates foreign policy issues which must be left to the
Federal Government.” Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194. As became clear in Barclays Bank, the Court
had no preordained notion of what matters “must be left to the Federal Government.”
92. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440; see also Ramsey, supra note 29, at 361 (concluding, after reviewing case law, that “the momentum in the lower courts seems to be toward a reading that looks
broadly to the degree of state ‘interference’ or ‘impairment,’ in keeping with the broad language of the
foundational Supreme Court cases and contrary to some commentary’s attempt to limit Zschernig to its
facts”).
93. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441 (asserting that Oregon’s statute had a “direct impact upon foreign relations” and speculating that “it may well adversely affect the power of the central government to
deal with those problems”). As Justice Harlan argued in his concurring opinion, the majority’s result
was “based almost entirely on speculation”: “[T]he Court does not mention, nor does the record reveal,
any instance in which such an occurrence has been the occasion for a diplomatic protest, or, indeed, has
had any foreign relations consequence whatsoever.” Id. at 460 (Harlan, J., concurring); see id. (Harlan,
J., concurring) (citing representations by the U.S. government as to the lack of consequences). Justice
Harlan noted the majority’s citation of a complaint by Bulgaria, but he attributed the complaint to the
“very existence of state statutes which result in the denial of inheritance of inheritance rights to Bulgarians,” rather than to inflammatory judicial opinions. Id. at 460 n.27 (Harlan, J., concurring). Indeed,
Bulgaria’s complaint as excerpted indicated little more than that the denial of proceeds was ill received.
See id. at 437 n.7.
94. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 327-28 (1994).
95. See id. at 332 (Scalia, J., concurring) (construing the “one voice” analysis in Itel Containers as
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But the Court relied on political branch views almost solely to buttress
findings that state measures were not problematic. Where the Court struck
down state laws as unconstitutional, it did so with little regard to the expert
opinion of the executive branch: the State Department’s input was
considered irrelevant in Zschernig,96 and it was consulted solely on the
operation of foreign law in Japan Line.97 Rejecting the “one voice” claim in
Container Corp. of American v. Franchise Tax Board,98 on the other hand,
the Court held up the executive branch’s failure to file in opposition to the
California tax as proof that U.S. foreign policy “is not seriously
threatened.”99 Informal congressional input has been treated similarly:
acquiescence has been read not merely as permitting state action (and,
thereby, abnegating the need for any enhanced dormant Commerce Clause
analysis),100 but as indicating that Congress found no fault with, or
approved of, the state policy in question.101 The United States, it would
appear, is just another heckler, conspicuous mainly when silent.
giving to the executive branch “the power to determine the constitutionality of a state law”); Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 81 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (comparing the majority opinion to Japan Line and concluding that “it thus appears that a ruling on the constitutionality of a
state law ultimately turns on the position of the Executive Branch”); Shuman, Courts, supra note 20, at
160 (speculating that a Baltimore anti-apartheid ordinance “surely” would have been found to disrupt
foreign relations “had the Justice Department joined the case”).
96. See supra text accompanying note 56.
97. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 452 n.17 (1976) (citing attestations
by the Solicitor General and the State Department that Japan taxed containers at full value, thereby
giving rise to double taxation).
98. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 195-96 (1983) (noting that
“unlike Japan Line, the Executive Branch has decided not to file an amicus curiae brief in opposition to
the state tax. The lack of such a submission is by no means dispositive.”).
99. Id. at 196; see also Opusunju v. Giuliani, 669 N.Y.S.2d 156, 159 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (noting, in
rejecting a Zschernig-based challenge to a decision by the city of New York to rename a city street near
the Nigerian consulate after a jailed Nigerian rebel, that the “State Department has claimed no interference by New York City with foreign policy, and has elected not to participate in this matter”). In distinguishing Japan Line on these grounds, Container Corp. plainly attributed greater significance to the
executive branch’s submission in the former case than had the original decision. The Solicitor General
had submitted pertinent views in another case before the Court in the very same Term as Container
Corp., but the majority discounted that. Compare Container Corp. , 463 U.S. at 195 n.33 (noting the
absence of any indication that the Solicitor General intended a previous memorandum to govern Container Corp.), with id. at 204 (Powell, J., dissenting) (concluding that absent any indication to the contrary, views submitted in connection with another case may be pertinent).
100. See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 323. The Court found the premises of both Wardair Canada
Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986), and Container Corp. to be that
Congress may more passively indicate that certain state practices do not “impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential”[;]. . . it need not convey its intent
with the unmistakable clarity required to permit state regulation that discriminates against
interstate commerce or otherwise falls short under Complete Auto inspection.
Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 323 (quoting Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448)).
101. See Barclays Bank , 512 U.S. at 326 (citing the history of Senate action as “reinforc[ing] our
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This asymmetric treatment of political branch input makes perfect
sense given the doctrinal bases for the dormant federal monopoly. No state
policy can really prevent the federal government from speaking with one
voice; Congress, should it so choose, can always preempt the offending
state policy. 102 The real questions, instead, are whether the federal government is entitled to maintain the nation’s voice by lesser means—speaking
at a softer volume, as it were—and how interference with that authority can
possibly be evidenced.103 For Congress, the issue should never arise, since
it speaks preemptively or not at all.104 Treating nonauthoritative expression
(for example, amici briefs, committee reports, debates, and failed legislation) as preemptive would not only raise federalism problems, but would
also exceed congressional authority under Article I.105 Such concerns are
not present, however, if the same means of expression are read merely to
relieve states from burdens imposed by the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause.106

conclusion that Congress implicitly has permitted the States to use the worldwide combined reporting
method”); id. at 327 (citing “indicia of Congress’ willingness to tolerate States’ worldwide combined
reporting mandates”); Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 75 (1993) (citing an
amicus brief by the United States and congressional acquiescence as indicating that “[t]o the extent Itel
is arguing that taxes like Tennessee’s engender foreign policy problems, the United States disagrees”);
Wardair Canada , 477 U.S. at 12 (“It would turn dormant Commerce Clause analysis entirely upside
down to apply it where the Federal Government has acted, and to apply it in such a way as to reverse
the policy that the Federal Government has elected to follow.”); cf. National Foreign Trade Council v.
Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 53 (1st Cir.) (citing divergence between Massachusetts law and federal policy as
one factor in Zschernig analysis), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999).
102. See Itel Containers, 507 U.S. at 80-81 (Scalia, J., concurring).
103. See Barclays Bank Amicus Brief, supra note 88, at 17 n.12 (“The danger, more precisely
stated, is that a State’s taxing scheme may prevent the federal government from implementing its policies by methods other than statutes or treaties. That danger is particularly acute in the realm of foreign
relations, where important international understandings may for various reasons be less formalized.”).
104. See DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED
YEARS, 1789-1888, at 334 (1985) [hereinafter CURRIE, T HE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT]
(“[T]he Constitution makes clear that Congress can act only by the affirmative vote of both Houses.”).
105. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-59 (1983) (holding that the “one-House veto” was an
unconstitutional attempt by Congress to usurp Article I’s “explicit and ambiguous provisions” relating
to the legislative process).
106. See Barclays Bank , 512 U.S. at 323-28 (construing congressional silence as sufficient to resolve a “one voice” claim, whether or not it would be sufficient to satisfy fully other standards imposed
by the dormant Commerce Clause); id. at 332 (Scalia, J., concurring) (construing the majority’s satisfaction with legislative inaction as similar to restrictive view of dormant Commerce Clause); see also
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 614-15 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that existing dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence relies in part on the theory that
congressional silence connotes preemption of state legislation, a proposition “rejected by this Court in
virtually every analogous area of the law”). But see Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 336 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (indicating that, absent “express congressional authorization,”
multiple taxation of foreign corporations violates the Foreign Commerce Clause).
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The executive branch is nominally more versatile in expressing federal
policy, but its authority for interfering with state activities is less clear. As
long as federal authority is rooted in the Foreign Commerce Clause, the
President has precious little to say about it: absent congressional delegation, any residual authority not exercised by Congress or reserved to its use
falls to the states, not to the executive branch.107 The President has some
rather hazy independent constitutional authority that, when definitively exercised, may preempt inconsistent state law.108 But this authority probably
107. See, e.g. , Itel Containers , 507 U.S. at 81 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[The President] is
better able to decide than we are which state regulatory interests should currently be subordinated to our
national interest in foreign commerce. Under the Constitution, however, neither he nor we were to make
that decision, but only Congress.”); see also Trojan Tech., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 913-14
(3d Cir. 1990):
And while it is possible that sub-national government procurement restrictions may become
a topic of intense international scrutiny, and a target in international trade negotiations, that
possibility alone cannot justify this court’s invalidation of the Commonwealth’s statute. This
is especially true when Congress has recently directed its attention to such restrictions and
has taken no steps to preempt them through federal legislation. Indeed, in light of Congress’
evident concern with achieving freer trade on a reciprocal basis, to strike Pennsylvania’s
statute would amount to a judicial redirection of established foreign trade policy—a quite inappropriate exercise of the judicial power.
108. Nonplenary authority, at least, may have any of several bases. One is the “executive Power.”
U.S. C ONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. Compare Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 128 (1926) (citing “executive power” as its basis for permitting the President to remove the postmaster, notwithstanding the
statute), with Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (interpreting the Executive Power Clause as “an allocation to the presidential office of the generic
powers thereafter stated”). A second is the President’s duty to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. C ONST. art. II, § 3; see also In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890) (construing the Take Care
clause to extend to the enforcement of “the rights, duties and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our international relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of the government
under the Constitution”). A third is the unenumerated foreign affairs power. See United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (citing the “very delicate, plenary and exclusive
power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations,” together with congressional delegation, as a basis for presidential authority). Presidential authority in this realm is commonly teased together from these or other specific constitutional grants, or otherwise implied, but has never been the model of consistency or influence. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at
40:
[T]he constitutional lawyer will have the hard choice between the theory that the conduct of
foreign affairs, undefined, was indeed “granted in bulk” to the President as executive power,
and the need to scrounge among, and stretch, spare constitutional clauses to eke out full
powers which the President has in fact commanded and many of which he was probably intended to have.
See also id. at 13-62 (discussing the potential bases for presidential authority).
One recurring issue is whether independent executive authority has the same domestic legal effect as a formal preemptive enactment. See id. at 54 (“No one has suggested that under the President’s
‘plenary’ foreign affairs power he can, by executive act or order, enact law directly regulating persons
or property in the United States.”); Ramsey, supra note 29, at 390-432 (considering, and rejecting, constitutional bases for executive preemption). Where the Court has conceded such effect, it is often hard
to determine whether the President’s authority was genuinely independent of Congress. Compare, e.g.,
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942) (describing the executive’s “[p]ower to remove such
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lacks the force of legislation, and so may be regarded as inferior to expressions of congressional sentiment.109 Less definitive pronouncements, like
executive suggestions, are of even more controversial weight, and in the
absence of congressional authorization might be regarded as attempts to
usurp either congressional or judicial authority.110
obstacles to full recognition as settlement of claims” as “a modest implied power of the President” from
his authority as the “sole organ”), and United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (same), with
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678-80 (1981) (requiring implicit congressional approval as a
“crucial” element for upholding executive action); cf. Louis Henkin, Provisional Measures, U.S. Treaty
Obligations, and the States, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 679, 681-82 (1998) [hereinafter Henkin, Provisional
Measures] (construing Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 579 (1943), and Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,
324 U.S. 30, 38 (1945), as indicating that “[t]he states are bound by U.S. foreign policy decisions even
if they do not take any formal form” and that such decisions have preemptive effect in both federal and
state courts); Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV.
134, 145-59 (1998) [hereinafter Ramsey, Executive Agreements] (discussing claims settlement case
law); Evan Todd Bloom, Note, The Executive Claims Settlement Power: Constitutional Authority and
Foreign Affairs Applications, 85 C OLUM. L. R EV. 155, 157-63 (1985) (same). The same may be said of
the President’s authority to negotiate foreign agreements outside the scope of the treaty power. See
Dames & Moore , 453 U.S. at 679-80 (relying, in addition, on congressional approval to support presidential action); Pink, 315 U.S. at 222 (recognizing that the judiciary should not review the propriety of
the President’s conduct of foreign relations); Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330-32 (holding that the President’s
actions resulting in the recognition of the Soviet government did not require the advice and consent of
the Senate); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 43, § 303(4) (“[T]he President, on his own authority,
may make an international agreement dealing with any matter that falls within his independent powers
under the Constitution.”); HENKIN, supra note 1, at 229 (citing, as agreements the President can conclude “on his own authority,” “those related to establishing and maintaining diplomatic relations,
agreements settling international claims, and military agreements within the Presidential authority as
Commander in Chief,” and “doubtless many other ‘sole’ agreements” are acceptable, “but which they
are is hardly agreed”). But cf. Ramsey, Executive Agreements, supra, at 236-37 (arguing that original
understanding would have denied any domestic effect to sole executive agreements).
109. Consistent with the principle that executive authority is most precarious where it is “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress,” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-38 (Jackson, J.,
concurring), lower courts have held that executive agreements do not have the capacity to override congressional statutes enacted under the explicit authority of the Foreign Commerce Clause. See United
States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 659-60 (4th Cir. 1953), aff’d on other grounds, 348 U.S.
296 (1955); see also R ESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 43, § 303 cmt. j (explaining that, while sole
executive agreements preempt state law, “[t]heir status in relation to earlier Congressional legislation
has not been authoritatively determined”); CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, L IBRARY OF
CONGRESS, T REATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: T HE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
SENATE 66-68 (Comm. Print. 1993) [hereinafter CRS] (discussing cases in which courts have voided
sole executive agreements that were incompatible with federal laws); 1 CUMULATIVE DIGEST OF
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1981-1988, § 5, at 1296-311 (Marian Nash Leich
ed., 1994) (same).
110. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts , supra note 1, at 1708-10 (proposing that the courts should
“create” foreign relations law only when the executive suggests). For representative criticisms, see
Thomas M. Franck, The Courts, The State Department and National Policy: A Criterion for Judicial
Abdication, 44 M INN. L. R EV. 1101, 1102-04 (1960) (arguing that courts should not abdicate authority
to the executive branch automatically, instead employing a “pragmatic” technique to determine when to
adjudicate foreign relations claims); John Norton Moore, The Role of the State Department in Judicial
Proceedings, 31 F ORDHAM L. R EV. 277, 296-302 (1962) (concluding that courts should not always de-
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The treatment of executive branch views in Barclays Bank is illuminating. The United States’ position on the legality of California’s method
of taxation was not the model of constancy. After steadily supporting the
taxpayers, the Justice Department changed its view at the eleventh hour to
oppose refunds, on the ground that California’s tax had not conflicted with
U.S. foreign economic policy during the tax years in question.111 The Solicitor General’s brief did not, accordingly, emphasize the domestic and
international fracas the tax had engendered, 112 but nevertheless argued carefully for the relevance of executive branch views. As the brief explained,
federal foreign policy “is especially likely to take the form of informal
agreements, understandings, long-term strategies, etc., that have not been
codified in a statute or treaty,”113 but which are nonetheless vital to the
President’s ability to deal effectively with foreign governments.114 At the
same time, the mere existence of foreign complaints should not be taken to
mean—in the absence of authoritative executive action—that a state policy
violates the Constitution.115 Absent a controlling treaty or statute, the brief
argued, “the courts must respect the judgments of the President regarding
matters of foreign policy both where the President has determined that state
compliance with an international norm is essential and where he has determined that foreign governments should not be allowed to dictate the practices of the States.”116
fer to executive determinations on matters of international law).
111. For the United States’ account of its litigating position, see Barclays Bank Amicus Brief, supra note 88, at 1-14.
112. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 342 n.22, 328 n.30 (1994); supra
text accompanying note 73.
113. Barclays Bank Amicus Brief, supra note 88, at 16.
114. See id. at 17. As the brief later put it, “[t]he danger of improper encroachment on the President’s conduct of foreign affairs, as noted above, is not limited to the situation where a State’s method
of taxation conflicts with an international understanding agreed to by the President or otherwise undermines the nation’s international trade policies.” Id. at 20.
115. As the brief explained:
Executive power is also improperly diminished when a court strikes down a state law on the
basis of a foreign complaint that the President has determined to resist. . . . The executive
branch must be free in addition to adopt a middle ground: to acknowledge the validity of
foreign concerns, and to attempt to persuade state officials to respond thereto, without insisting upon the States’ immediate conformity with the federal norm. The courts therefore
should not lightly infer a Foreign Commerce Clause violation from the mere fact that executive branch officials have attempted to persuade state authorities to alter their policies. Such
an approach not only risks undue impairment of legitimate state prerogatives; it may also reduce presidential power by diminishing the executive’s ability to employ “jawboning” and
informal negotiation without invoking the specter of a constitutional confrontation.
Id.
116. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 19 (“[T]he Court must ascertain the contours of federal
policies not codified in any statute or treaty; and in that process the statements of executive branch officials are entitled to substantial evidentiary weight.”).
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The Court plainly rejected this approach. One reason may have been
the difficulty in identifying executive branch policy. The government’s position in Barclays Bank suggested that even determining whether a national
policy exists is a matter of art, one that might require deferring to executive
branch policy developed in the throes of litigation—something the Solicitor
General acknowledged to be problematic, as if the shifts in the Barclays
litigation itself were not proof enough.117 And surely broadcasting U.S. negotiating positions, and executive branch views on the complaints of foreign countries, would scarcely be conducive to diplomacy.
The more intractable difficulty was the absence of a constitutional basis for deferring to the executive branch. California, the putative beneficiary of the executive’s revised views, argued that any authority vested in the
President was subsumed, in effect, by the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause.118 The Court agreed. Foreign commerce, in the Court’s view, was
entrusted to Congress, and if Congress had tolerated the state’s conduct,
“Executive Branch communications that express federal policy but lack the
force of law cannot render unconstitutional California’s otherwise valid,
congressionally condoned, use of worldwide combined reporting.”119
117. See id. at 21.
118. According to California, this argument was
consistent with the rule that the Congress and the President share authority over foreign affairs. If a state tax affecting foreign commerce is valid either by way of congressional
authorization or under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause tests (which include the balancing of foreign policy considerations), it cannot be unconstitutional on the basis of infringement upon foreign affairs.
Brief for Respondent at 46-47, Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (No. 921384) (citation omitted) [hereinafter Barclays Respondent’s Brief]. “[C]onstru[ing] Executive Branch
foreign policy aspirations as authoritative federal policy,” California argued, would disable Congress
and the Constitution’s requirement that treaties become law only upon Senate ratification. Id. at 47. Any
other indication from the executive branch would merely be “thwarted aspirations.” Id.
119. Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 330; see also id. at 328-29 (distinguishing between the “one voice”
of the “Federal Government” and “[t]he Executive statements to which Colgate refers”); id. at 329-30
(describing cited executive branch actions as “merely precatory”). At oral argument, a member of the
Court responded to the suggestion that the executive branch evidenced federal policy by noting that
foreign commerce “is in fact entrusted to Congress.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Barclays Bank
PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (Nos. 92-1384 & 92-1839); see also id. at 18 (quoting
one Justice as replying to the originalist argument that the President required the ability to constrain
states in order credibly to bargain for advantages for U.S. business by stating, “I thought Mr. Hamilton
was arguing that in support of giving Congress the power to regulate foreign commerce . . . .”).
Harold Koh, responding to arguments that Barclays Bank spelled the end to the federal foreign
affairs monopoly, claims that the decision “reveals less about the Supreme Court’s view of federalism
than about the Court’s traditional judicial deference to the executive branch in foreign affairs.” Harold
Hongju Koh, Commentary: Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1848
(1998); see also National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 58 n.13 (1st Cir.), cert.
granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999). While Barclays Bank ’s holding may indeed be exaggerated, see infra
text accompanying note 523, it is hard to conclude that the Court was deferring to the executive branch.
The Court’s explanation that the judiciary should be loathe to intervene in matters “‘more the province
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Given its premises, the Court’s conclusions seem perfectly valid. If
the federal government’s powers derive from an Article I clause, it is hard
to perceive why the President’s quasi-evidentiary submissions should determine whether a foreign or state government should prevail. The executive’s assumption of such authority would seem to be an affront not only to
the states, but also to Congress. However, if those premises are invalid,
perhaps the President’s authority does not live or die with the “one voice”
test. Another possible foundation—the Article II treaty power—has routinely been neglected.120
II. THE DORMANT TREATY POWER
The seemingly simple vesting of the “Power . . . to make Treaties”
raises more than its share of intractable constitutional questions. Fortunately for present purposes, the dormant treaty power rests on several discrete propositions. The first concerns the scope of the President’s power to
negotiate. At least in the absence of Senate instruction, the President’s negotiating authority is substantive, not merely communicative, and is coextensive with the federal government’s authority. This is obviously so in
practice. Contrary readings of the original understanding begrudge the
President such a role largely because they suppose that the horizontal distribution of authority was zero-sum. In fact, the President’s role was introduced in the expectation that his service as the Senate’s surrogate would in
some respects augment, rather than diminish, legislative authority, by permitting the Senate to change the U.S. course and to decline to endorse
flawed treaties. Involving the President would also advance extrinsic inter-

of the Executive Branch and Congress’” absent proof of a serious threat, see Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at
327 (quoting Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 196 (1983)), does not say how such a
threat might be determined. Indeed, the Court expressly disregarded the Solicitor General’s views in
upholding the state tax, see Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 330 n.32, and entertained no opinion concerning
his submission that courts must respect “‘the judgments of the President regarding matters of foreign
policy,’” Koh, supra, at 1849 (quoting Barclays Respondent’s Brief, supra note 118, at 20).
120. Michael Ramsey’s recent article is somewhat of an exception. Professor Ramsey also finds the
Article I case for dormant foreign relations preemption wanting, see Ramsey, supra note 29, at 369-90,
prompting him to consider—and ultimately reject —the Executive Power Clause as an alternative basis.
See id. at 391-432. Although he notes the potential preemptive effect of the Treaty Clause, it is primarily as a standard against which broader theories might be measured and ultimately dismissed. See, e.g.,
id. at 384 n.157 (citing evidence of the original understanding); id. at 393-94 & n.192 (citing textual
evidence and case law); id. at 406-07 (citing textual evidence); id. at 404-06 (arguing that dormant foreign relations preemption is contraindicated by Article VI supremacy of treaties). Otherwise, he appears
to view the Executive Power Clause as the only legitimate basis for any substantial preclusion of state
foreign relations activities. See id. at 391 (concluding that “the appropriate way to view the exclusion of
states from interference in foreign policy is as a consequence of the executive power in foreign affairs,
and that a constitutional exclusion of the states can be defended—if at all—only on this ground.”).
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ests by facilitating the negotiation of superior treaties and checking inferior
ones.
The President’s constitutional prerogative to forge American foreign
relations, and to stymie them, is accordingly of great significance for construing the authority left to the states in the absence of a treaty or statute.
Both the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution demonstrated hostility toward state activities tending to interfere with the dormant treaty
power. Here, the Framers were quite clear in supposing that the vertical
distribution of authority was zero-sum, and that permitting the states to
simulate the international bargaining powers of the national government
would disserve the interests of all concerned. The rationale and scope of
any broader federal monopoly was occasionally obscured, but prior to the
Supreme Court’s inconsistent decisions in Clark and Zschernig, both political practice and case law clearly proscribed state activities that
amounted to bargaining with foreign powers.
A. The President’s Treaty Power
Contemporary disputes over the horizontal allocation of treaty powers—for example, over alternatives to treaties121 and executive treaty reinterpretation122—typically concern the end-game of agreements, rather than
how they are made. Aside from a few pitched battles dully familiar to constitutional scholars, 123 negotiating treaties has been relatively pacific. Practice has consistently and unswervingly accorded the President primary and
complete (if not necessarily plenary) authority over treaty negotiation.124 At
121. The controversy appeared to be resolved by mid-century, before its revival among academics—but not politicians—during the debates over NAFTA and the Uruguay Round. Compare, e.g.,
Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional? , 108 H ARV. L. R EV. 801, 820-32 (1995)
(defending congressional-executive agreements), with Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure
Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. R EV. 1221,
1228-35 (1995) (suggesting alternatives to treaty-making are unconstitutional).
122. Compare, e.g., David A. Koplow, Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executive Reinterpretation
of Arms Control Treaties, 137 U. P A. L. R EV. 1353, 1396-401 (1989) (attacking the executive power to
reinterpret treaties), with Lawrence J. Block et al., The Senate’s Pie-in-the-Sky Treaty Interpretation:
Power and the Quest for Legislative Supremacy, 137 U. PA. L. R EV. 1481, 1483-92 (1989) (defending
same).
123. See infra text accompanying notes 214 (discussing the treaty with the Creek Indians), 220
(discussing the neutrality proclamation of 1793), 221 (discussing the Jonathan Robbins incident).
124. The consistency of this view over time bears emphasis. See, e.g., Howard R. Sklamberg, The
Meaning of “Advice and Consent”: The Senate’s Constitutional Role in Treatymaking, 18 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 445, 474 (1997) (“Nowadays, the Senate plays no part in treaty-making other than to consider
agreements that the President has already signed.”); Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 6 F.3d 648, 652
(9th Cir. 1993) (“The President alone has the authority to negotiate treaties with foreign countries.”);
CRS, supra note 109, at 69 (1993) (“[T]he actual negotiation of treaties and other international agreements is widely recognized as being within the power of the President.”); Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Fre-
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the same time, the Senate has set negotiating objectives and inserted itself
or its members into negotiations without provoking substantial debate over
its prerogatives.125

derick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Control over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67
CHI.-KENT L. R EV. 571, 579 (1991) (“Since the founding of the republic, it has been accepted practice
that the President initiates and conducts the negotiation of treaties, bringing a signed or otherwise final
draft to the Senate for its advice and consent.”); GLENNON, supra note 46, at 164 (1990) (“Participation
by the Senate (or Congress) in certain [aspects of the treaty-making] process is not constitutionally
permitted. The core presidential power, perhaps, is negotiation.” (citations omitted)); CORWIN, THE
PRESIDENT, supra note 2, at 214 (1984) (“[T]here is no more securely established principle of Constitutional practice than the exclusive right of the President to be the nation’s intermediary in its dealings
with other nations.”); Aris Gloves v. United States, 420 F.2d 1386, 1393 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (“The making of
treaties is a power delegated to the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The negotiation
of treaties is a matter solely within the discretion of the President.”); Myres S. McDougal & Asher
Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments
of National Policy (pt. 1), 54 YALE L.J. 181, 203 (1945) (“No one today doubts that the President has
complete control of the actual conduct of negotiations in the making of all international agreements or
that he is the appropriate authority to make final utterance of an agreement as the international obligation of the United States.”); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (“[The
President] alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation, the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself
is powerless to invade it.”); A LBERT H. PUTNEY, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND LAW
293 (1908) (“Throughout the whole history of the country the share of the Senate in treaties has consisted in ratifying treaties already negotiated.”); WOODROW WILSON, C ONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES 77 (1908):
The initiative in foreign affairs, which the President possesses without any restriction whatever, is virtually the power to control them absolutely. . . . [H]e may guide every step of diplomacy, and to guide diplomacy is to determine what treaties must be made, if the faith and
prestige of the government are to be maintained.
Accord 5 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 739, at 179 (1906) (“The negotiation and modification of treaties is a prerogative of the Executive, with which the courts cannot interfere.”); 2 F RANCIS WHARTON, A D IGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 139,
at 75 (2d ed. 1887) (“The negotiation and modification of treaties is a prerogative of the Executive, with
which the courts cannot interfere.”); 3 JOSEPH STORY, C OMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 1517, at 370 (1833):
The question was, whether the agency of the Senate was admissible previous to the negotiation, . . . or was limited to the exercise of the power of advise and consent, after the treaty
was formed . . . . The practical exposition . . . which seems to have occurred in President
Washington’s administration, was, that the option belonged to the executive to adopt either
mode . . . .
Accord Jefferson’s Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States, One Hundred Fifth Congress, H.R. Doc. No. 104-272, § 554, at 298-99 (2d Sess. 1997) (“By the Constitution of
the United States this department of legislation is confined to two branches only of the ordinary legislature—the President originating and the Senate having a negative. . . . [T]he negotiations are carried on
by the Executive alone . . . .”); Jefferson’s Opinion on the Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplomatic
Appointments (Apr. 24, 1790), in 16 The Papers Of Thomas Jefferson, 1789-1790, at 379 (Julian P.
Boyd et al. eds., 1961) (“The transaction of business with foreign nations is Executive altogether. It
belongs then to the head of that department, except as to such portions of it as are specially submitted to
the Senate. Exceptions are to be construed strictly.”).
125. For a good discussion of such initiatives, see CRS, supra note 109, at 69-81 (considering the
negotiation and conclusion of international agreements).
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The difficult question is whether these practices are simply the bad
habits of institutions more attuned to politics than to the Constitution, each
secure in the knowledge that it has a further opportunity to veto any errant
treaty that may result.126 Some think that the President has compromised his
authority by permitting Senate intervention. 127 Many more feel that practice
deviates from the original understanding of the President as merely an
agent—the nation’s negotiator and “sole organ of foreign relations,” perhaps, but only in the sense of relaying the Senate’s will to foreign countries.128 Permitting the President to determine the message, in this view, is
more in the nature of a lapse than an entitlement.
The original understanding, and the nation’s early practices, are certainly more equivocal than the settled routines of today. And neither provides clear answers to the issues that might be raised by a death match over
constitutional authority—were the President, for example, to flout clear negotiating instructions from the Senate. But if we focus on the scope of
presidential authority in the absence of such a struggle, the original understanding of the treaty power is quite in keeping with modern practice. The
best evidence indicates that where the Senate’s power to involve itself in
treaty preliminaries (whatever that power’s potential scope) lay unexercised, the President was to have full authority to negotiate on behalf of the
United States, including complete latitude either to conduct and conclude
negotiations or to avoid them altogether.
The federal separation of powers under the Treaty Clause may at first
seem unrelated to the proper role of the states in foreign affairs. But understanding what amounts to the President’s dormant authority to control the
negotiation of treaties is indispensable, not only to understanding where
Zschernig and Barclays Bank erred, but also to articulating the constitu-

126. See, e.g., P UTNEY, supra note 124, at 292 (“The system of checks and balances, so often referred to, hinders the establishment of a vigorous foreign policy.”); cf. Dennis J. Mahoney, Advice and
Consent, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 31 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986)
(arguing that the present practices of consulting influential Senators, party leaders, and prominent
committee members “are better understood as political devices to improve the chances of obtaining
consent than as deference to the constitutional mandate to obtain advice”).
127. Among leading contemporary authorities, Phillip Trimble seems to fall within this category.
See Phillip R. Trimble, The President’s Foreign Affairs Power, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 750, 756 (1989)
(“Congress and individual members have induced the Executive to advance claims of present positions
of particular interest to the member.”); accord Phillip R. Trimble & Alexander W. Koff, All Fall Down:
The Treaty Power in the Clinton Administration, 16 BERKELEY J. I NT’L L. 55, 58 (1998) (noting that
members of Congress can have a “practical impact” on foreign policymaking by the executive).
128. See generally H. Jefferson Powell, The Founders and the President’s Authority over Foreign
Affairs, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1471, 1471-72 nn.2-3 (1999) [hereinafter Powell, The Founders]
(listing authorities subscribing to the “congressional-primacy” theory of the foreign affairs power).
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tional basis for withholding from the states authority left unexercised by
Congress.
1. Text and Structure. As indicated above, the Treaty Clause does
not assign clear roles to the President or to the Senate, leaving the
President’s authority in the absence of Senate instruction rather unclear.129
The design of the two branches seems to give the President decided
advantages in initiating negotiations,130 but the Framers scarcely anticipated
the modern presidency, and may equally have had a different understanding
of the Senate’s power to provide “advice” than we do today.131
Indeed, Arthur Bestor’s leading studies of the original understanding
of the Treaty Clause concluded that Senate advice was a prerequisite for
presidential action.132 In his view, the Senate was obliged to determine “the
129. That the Treaty Clause resides in Article II says nothing about the nature of the authority
vested in the President, nor does it suggest that some aspect of that power is his alone. Compare Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 705 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam) (concluding, from the location of
the Treaty Clause, that “[i]t is the President as Chief Executive who is given the constitutional authority
to enter into a treaty”), vacated, 444 U.S. 996, 996-97 (1979), with Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The Treatymaking Clause as a Case Study, 1 PERSP. IN AM. HIST. (n.s.) 233, 278-79
(1984) (concluding that the “placement of the treaty clause within Article II was an act with editorial
significance, not an editorial quirk,” but noting that the precise significance is elusive), and Sklamberg,
supra note 124, at 457 (suggesting that the location of the Treaty Clause is inconsistent with strong
claims of Senate dominance, but noting that the veto power is located in Article I).
The text permits various means of reconciling the power to “make” treaties and the Senate’s prerogative to render “advice and consent.” Perhaps the President is empowered to do everything, and the
Senate is entitled only to react to a fully negotiated treaty. (Although such an interpretation tends to
eliminate the function of “advice.”) Perhaps, as is often casually asserted, the treaty power is shared in
every respect. (But this simply resigns to Corwin’s “struggle,” and assumes no attempt to differentiate
the roles of very different institutions.) Finally, it is possible, though uncommon, to argue that the
presidential role is separable but wholly modest: the power to “make” treaties could mean just the
power to ratify, following Senate consent. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE
FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 41 (1988) (“‘Make,’ however, might have signified merely that no treaty had
been executed until signed by the President.”). If so, however, the means by which treaties are “made”
in ordinary parlance is left mysterious, as are the matters on which the Senate provides “advice.”
130. See, e.g., HENRY CABOT LODGE, The Treaty-Making Powers of the Senate, in A FIGHTING
FRIGATE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 219, 232 (1902) (“The Senate . . . cannot in the nature of
things initiate a negotiation with another nation, for they have no authority to appoint or to receive ambassadors or ministers.”); TRIBE, supra note 1, § 4-4, at 219 (“[T]he Constitution plainly grants the
President the initiative in matters directly involved in the conduct of diplomatic and military affairs.”);
Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the IranContra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1292 (1988) (“Congress is poorly structured for initiative and leadership . . . . The Presidency, in contrast, is ideally structured for the receipt and exercise of power . . . .”).
131. Compare Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Taking Advice Seriously: An Immodest Proposal for Reforming the Confirmation Process, 65 S. CAL. L. R EV. 1577, 1579 (1992) (defining “advice” in purely
contemporary terms), with Sklamberg, supra note 124, at 448 (criticizing Reynolds’s approach).
132. See Arthur Bestor, “Advice” from the Very Beginning, “Consent” When the End is Achieved,
83 AM. J. I NT’L L. 718, 725-27 (1989) [hereinafter Bestor, Advice]; Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles of
Senate and President in the Making and Abrogation of Treaties—The Original Intent of the Framers of
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policy to be pursued in a treaty negotiation” and to “formally approv[e] the
diplomatic instructions embodying this policy,” while the President was to
seek advice and to justify any deviations in terms of “some more fundamental aim of the agreed-upon policy.”133 “Advice” thus meant permission,
making the Senate an indispensable participant in the negotiation of treaties.134 Were this view correct, the President’s function under the dormant
treaty power would seem just as meager as under the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause.
The permission hypothesis, however, is hardly dictated by the text.
Nothing in the term “advice” specifies the timing of Senate counsel. It
might, as subsequent practice suggested, relate to the postnegotiation
phase, perhaps including such authoritative actions as attaching reservations, amendments, or demands for renegotiation.135 The contemplated adthe Constitution Historically Examined, 55 WASH. L. REV. 1, 15-17 (1979) [hereinafter Bestor, Respective Roles]; Arthur Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Original
Intent of the Constitution Historically Examined, 5 S ETON HALL L. R EV. 527, 534-41 (1974) [hereinafter Bestor, Separation of Powers]. Bruce Ackerman and David Golove consider Bestor’s writings, with
Rakove’s, to be “[t]he best modern account[] of the Founders’ deliberations on treaty-making.” Ackerman & Golove, supra note 121, at 809 n.21. And Rakove characterizes Bestor’s as “[t]he most careful
analysis of the evolution of the treaty clause.” Rakove, supra note 129, at 235 n.5; see also Charles A.
Lofgren, War Powers, Treaties, and the Constitution [hereinafter Lofgren, War Powers], in THE
FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 242, 254 (Leonard W. Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney
eds., 1987) (describing Bestor as “a most careful student of the subject”).
133. Bestor, Respective Roles, supra note 132, at 112; see also Bestor, Advice, supra note 132, at
726:
[T]he phrase ‘by and with the advice and consent of the Senate’ constituted a requirement
that in performing the executive segment of the task of conducting foreign relations, the
President is to seek the formal advice of the Senate . . . concerning the policy to be pursued
and the ends to be sought.
Accord Bestor, Separation of Powers, supra note 132, at 540-41:
[T]he self-evident meaning of the treaty clause is that the Senate is to reach through discussion a consensus as to the policy to be embodied in a projected treaty; that the President,
acting through the nation’s diplomatic agents, is to take charge of negotiations designed to
realize that policy; and that when an international agreement is negotiated (with concessions
necessarily given and received), the Senate is to decide whether its final terms are acceptable.
134. Bestor is not alone in this view, but he is its most thorough proponent. See, e.g., LOUIS
HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 50 (1990) (“The framers had
probably intended that the President and a small Senate would deliberate together, prior to and during
negotiations, leading to treaties acceptable to both.”); TRIBE, supra note 1, § 4-4, at 221 (citing the requirement of Senate advice and consent as an example of where “the Constitution’s text . . . expressly
forecloses unilateral presidential conduct of foreign policy.”); Richard E. Webb, Treaty-Making and the
President’s Obligation to Seek the Advice and Consent of the Senate with Special Reference to the Vietnam Peace Negotiations, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 490, 490 (1970) (“[T]he President must seek the advice of
the Senate both before entering substantive treaty negotiations and also during their course, and the
consent of the Senate when specific agreements are to be pursued.”).
135. See Bestor, Separation of Powers, supra note 132, at 540 (acknowledging that the Senate’s
advisory function has “dwindle[d] away” into postnegotiating advice). Even the first treaty ratified by
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vice might also be nonbinding, such as offering counsel to the President
about how to improve prospects for Senate approval, or about whether ratification is advisable.136 More important, nothing in the text suggests that it
is the President’s task to solicit such advice, let alone suspend his activities
until it is rendered.
Nor is the parallel usage in state constitutions decisive on this point.
As Professor Bestor recounts, nearly half of the state constitutions had
councils providing “advice and consent” in areas of concurrent authority,
examples that were surely familiar to the Framers.137 But there are obvious
reasons to doubt the Framers’ intention to import such meanings unchanged—particularly since the President was created largely in abreaction
to the state executive model.138 Hamilton, as Publius, freely “admitted that

the Senate, the French Consular Convention of 1788, provides a ready example. The Continental Congress had directed Franklin to conclude a treaty along agreed lines, but Franklin came back with some
different terms, causing the treaty to be rejected. Jefferson later took up the negotiations, and Washington sent the fully negotiated treaty to the Senate “for your consideration and advice.” RALSTON
HAYDEN, THE SENATE AND TREATIES, 1789-1817, at 4-5 (1920); see also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 22-23 (1997) [hereinafter
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS] (discussing the Consular Convention).
136. Cf. HENKIN, supra note 134, at 48 (“[B]ut what is ‘advice,’ when and by whom is it to be
given, and must it be heeded?”).
137. See Bestor, Advice, supra note 132, at 726; Bestor, Separation of Powers, supra note 132, at
644-45 & n.430; cf. John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 218 (1996) (stressing the interpretive significance of
state constitutions). Not all such clauses were alike. For example, the Framers and their contemporaries
saw substantial differences between the relative autonomy accorded the executive in the New York and
Massachusetts constitutions and the executive’s subjugation to the legislature elsewhere. See R ICHARD
B. BERNSTEIN, A RE WE TO BE A NATION? T HE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 56, 61, 173 (1987);
CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 65-66 (1966).
138. Even the Articles of Confederation rejected an analogous national Council of State, see Bestor, Respective Roles , supra note 132, at 49-52, and the Constitutional Convention ignored calls for
councils, see Bestor, Separation of Powers, supra note 132, at 647-52. It is generally thought that the
Framers consciously modeled the President after the more independent state chief executives of the
New York and Massachusetts constitutions. See, e.g. , B ERNSTEIN, supra note 137, at 173. As Charles
Thach explained,
[s]tate experience thus contributed, nothing more strongly, to discredit the whole idea of the
sovereign legislature . . . . The majority of the delegates [to the Constitutional Convention]
brought with them no far-reaching distrust of executive power, but rather a sobering consciousness that, if their new plan should succeed, it was necessary for them to put forth their
best efforts to secure a strong, albeit safe, national executive.
CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1774-1789, at 53 (1969); see also 2 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 35 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) [hereinafter
FARRAND’S RECORDS] (Madison’s notes) (statement of Madison) (“The Executives of the States are in
general little more than Cyphers; the legislatures omnipotent. If no effectual check be devised for restraining the instability & encroachments of the latter, a revolution of some kind or other would be inevitable.”).
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in this instance [of treaty-making] the power of the federal executive would
exceed that of any State executive.”139
Finally, the suggestion that the Senate’s power to render “advice”
translates into a presidential duty to secure permission entails serious
structural deficiencies. The permission hypothesis suggests that the Senate
could disable negotiating by stonewalling—paralyzing the President’s supposed advantage of initiative.140 This interpretation of advice would also
make it the functional equivalent of consent, though Bestor and others hew
to the conventional view that consent per se (including the two-thirds requirement) refers solely to the Senate’s decision concerning a fully negotiated treaty. Therefore, the permission hypothesis should persuade us only if
we find supporting evidence elsewhere.
2. Understanding at the Founding. Indicia of the original
understanding may help us understand what the constitutional text leaves
unclear. If we follow Madison’s counsel that the best guides are “the evils
which were to be cured or the benefits to be obtained,”141 further doubt is
cast on the notion that the Senate’s permission is required before the
President assumes responsibility for negotiating with foreign nations.
a. The formal evolution from the Articles. The changed structure of
American treaty-making, by itself, makes a compelling case against the
permission hypothesis and in favor of the President’s dormant power.
Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress was the repository for all
national authority, and had the exclusive authority to send and receive
ambassadors and to enter into treaties and alliances.142 Congress could
appoint a quasi-executive “Committee of the States” to manage certain
national affairs during its recesses, but it could not delegate any committee
139. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 420 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
140. See infra text accompanying notes 203-05. The result would differ considerably from stonewalling during the consent process, when the public at least would be given an opportunity to judge the
merits of the negotiated treaty. The analogous risk posed by executive-oriented interpretations, of
course, is that the President might disable advice-rendering by concealing the fact of a negotiation until
it has been concluded. See Sklamberg, supra note 124, at 473-74 (proposing a presidential obligation to
satisfy Senate requests for information concerning policy goals to be pursued). There, however, the
Senate is not equally defenseless, since it still has the recourse of rendering advice afterward (and, more
importantly, of withholding consent).
141. See Letter from James Madison to Joseph Cabell (Oct. 30, 1828) (Madison’s annotations), in 9
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 323 n.4 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) [hereinafter MADISON WRITINGS].
142. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION arts. VI (restricting the authority of the states), IX (detailing congressional authority); infra notes 251-55 and accompanying text (discussing the division of
authority under the Articles on treaty-related powers).
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matters requiring approval by a supermajority of nine states, such as the
entry into treaties and alliances.143 When actually created for what proved
to be a brief period in 1784, the Committee was specifically precluded from
“transact[ing] business” with foreign ministers “unless authorized thereto
by particular acts of Congress.”144 Congress seems to have delegated no
more authority to its presidents145 or to the succession of committees
established to address foreign affairs during its sessions.146
Against this background, the creation of the presidency, and the vesting in that President of the power to make treaties, is clearly significant.
The Treaty Clause involved the President in matters that the Articles of
Confederation confined to a legislative supermajority. And unlike the
Committee of the States as finally constituted—let alone the various congressional committees assigned to foreign affairs—the Constitution did not
expressly require that the President refrain from acting without prior specific authorization.
None of this was elaborated upon during the Convention. The delegates began with a narrow view of the presidential role,147 and there was
143. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, § 5.
144. 27 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 476-77 (1904-1937 ed.) (May 29, 1784)
[hereinafter JCC], available in <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwjc.html>. As a result, the
Committee served as “little more than a message center.” Bestor, Respective Roles, supra note 132, at
52. According to Richard Morris, the Committee’s “ineffective efforts constitute one of the most dismal
chapters in the history of the Congress.” R ICHARD B. MORRIS, THE FORGING OF THE UNION 1781-1789,
at 97 (1987) [hereinafter MORRIS, FORGING]; accord FREDERICK W. MARKS III, INDEPENDENCE ON
TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 153 (1973); Martin S. Flaherty, The
Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1772 n.260, (1996).
145. See MORRIS, FORGING, supra note 144, at 99-108.
146. The Committee of Correspondence was renamed the Committee of Secret Correspondence,
and later became the Committee for Foreign Affairs, before being replaced by the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1781. See EDMUND CODY BURNETT, THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 118 (1941); H.
JAMES HENDERSON, PARTY POLITICS IN THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 270 (1974); M ORRIS, FORGING,
supra note 144, at 95. Congress gave little or no authority to its committees, including those for foreign
affairs. See 1 BRADFORD PERKINS, THE CREATION OF A REPUBLIC EMPIRE, 1776-1865, at 54-55 (1993);
JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 196 (1979); Bestor, Respective Roles, supra note 132, at 52-60; Calvin C.
Jillson & Rick K. Wilson, A Social Choice Model of Politics: Insights into the Demise of the U.S. Continental Congress, 12 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5, 9-10 (1987); see also MARKS, supra note 144, at 152-53
(noting the difficulties caused by overlapping committees). But see GAILLARD HUNT, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES: I TS HISTORY AND FUNCTIONS 53 (1914) (claiming the
gradual development of “a real foreign office”).
147. In a debate on June 1, for example, the delegates exhibited concern that the Virginia Plan’s
proposal to give the executive “Executive rights vested in Congress by the Confederation,” 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 21 (Madison’s notes) (Resolution 7), might contain the more legislative powers of making war and peace, and the delegates thus struck that portion of the proposal. See
Bestor, Advice, supra note 132, at 720-22; Bestor, Respective Roles, supra note 132, at 79-81; Bestor,
Separation of Powers, supra note 132, at 575-76.
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little mention of a treaty-making role for the President (or, for that matter,
for the Senate) through most of the Convention.148 The first harbinger may
have been James Madison’s remark on August 23 that because the Senate
“represented the States alone,” and for “other obvious reasons,” “the President should be an agent in Treaties”—thus “[a]llowing the President &
Senate to make Treaties.”149 Contemporaneous discussion highlighted the
traditional role the Senate was expected to assume in instructing American
envoys.150 With little further consideration, the treaty power was transformed in committee into something nearly identical to its final version151—and was ultimately approved without significant controversy.152
Citing Madison’s remarks,153 a failed amendment,154 and the contrasting development of the Appointments Clause,155 Professor Bestor argues
148. See Bestor, Advice, supra note 132, at 719. In June, Alexander Hamilton proposed, in language quite similar to that ultimately adopted, that a chief executive was “to have with the advice and
approbation of the Senate the power of making all treaties.” 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at
292 (Madison’s notes) (Article 4); accord id. (Article 6) (granting to the Senate “the power of advising
and approving all Treaties”). Bestor notes that Hamilton did not offer his plan as a “proposition” because he “frankly conceded that neither the delegates nor the people ‘out of doors’ were ready to adopt
such a plan,” that no vote was taken, and that subsequent consideration was minimal. Bestor concludes
that this amounts, “in itself, to a refutation of the view that the framers were determined to create a
powerful presidency for the purpose of giving it primary responsibility for foreign affairs.” Bestor,
Separation of Powers , supra note 132, at 590-91 (emphasis added). This seems hasty. Many proposals
were made and abandoned in the course of the Convention, or at least abandoned so far as the records
reflect. In the case at hand, the issue of the executive’s authority for at least some of the matters proposed by Hamilton was simply left to the Committee of Detail (as Bestor acknowledges in a note), not
dismissed out of hand (as Bestor intimates). See id. at 590 & n.231. Furthermore, Hamilton’s tentativeness in presenting his non-“proposition” was professedly due to his desire to refine his proposals and
present them at a more opportune point. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 291 (Madison’s
notes). Hamilton asserted that the populace would “[a]t present” adopt neither his plan nor Randolph’s
plan, but that eventually they would “be ready to go as far at least as he proposes.” Id.
149. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 392, 394 (Madison’s notes).
150. See id. at 392-94 (concerning debate on whether requiring Senate ratification would harm
American diplomatic effectiveness).
151. The Treaty Clause was referred to the Committee of Detail, see id. at 394, and then to the
Committee of Postponed Parts (sometimes known as the Brearley Committee), see id . at 473, which
reported back on September 4 with a clause providing that “[t]he President by and with the advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall have power to make Treaties . . . . [b]ut no Treaty shall be made without
the consent of two thirds of the members present,” id. at 498-99.
152. Bestor notes that in the course of debate over the Senate’s powers relating to elections and
appointments, James Wilson and Gouverneur Morris both adverted to the Senate’s power “to make
Treaties,” as did Gouverneur Morris. See Bestor, Respective Roles, supra note 132, at 121-23. Bestor
concludes from Wilson’s remarks that the addition of the President to the Treaty Clause “did not give
that officer an independent, let alone a dominant, role in treatymaking,” while Morris’s remark (and
Madison’s failure to intercede) are read as indicating that the revised Treaty Clause “did not significantly increase the President’s involvement.” Id. It is hard to attribute such significance to these stray
remarks, or to the failure to correct them in the course of debating another issue, and the variant conclusions Bestor draws from them are striking.
153. See Bestor, Respective Roles, supra note 132, at 109 (arguing that Madison “was not propos-
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that the authors of the Treaty Clause “assumed it was a legislative responsibility to determine the objectives of any contemplated treaty negotiation.”156 By his reading, that responsibility mandated legislative intervention at some point early in any treaty negotiation.157 The argument relies
largely on the lack of fuss during the Treaty Clause’s drafting. To Bestor
and others, “[t]he absence of controversy on the matter is almost conclusive
proof that no radical change from previously established practices was
contemplated or apprehended.”158

ing a wholesale transfer of foreign-policy making from legislative to executive hands”); Bestor, Separation of Powers, supra note 132, at 635. For Madison’s remarks, see 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra
note 138, at 382-83 (Journal); id. at 392 (Madison’s notes).
154. Madison proposed that treaties of peace be exempted from the two-thirds rule, then suggested
that such treaties require only consent by two-thirds of the Senate “without the concurrence of the
President,” who might be too enamored of wartime authority. See 2 F ARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note
138, at 540 (Madison’s notes). To Bestor, Madison must have assumed “that the Senate would possess
the authority and the means to force the continuance of treaty negotiations along lines which the President opposed, and to take up for ratification a treaty that he refused to recommend.” Bestor, Respective
Roles, supra note 132, at 129; accord Bestor, Separation of Powers, supra note 132, at 653-55. That
interpretation is not inevitable—Madison may have imagined a President changing his mind, receiving
a disappointing accord from his agents, or succeeding to a treaty negotiated by his predecessor. Witness, for example, Jay’s later treaty with Great Britain, which Washington sat on for four months before
forwarding to Congress. See Gaillard Hunt, Introduction to SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, J AY’S TREATY: A
STUDY IN COMMERCE AND DIPLOMACY xiii (1962).
155. The Treaty Clause, unlike the nominating power, does not confer upon the President “any exclusive right to propose the course of action to be taken in foreign affairs,” nor “preclude[] the Senate
from giving formal advice before the beginning or during the progress of any treaty negotiation.” Bestor, Respective Roles, supra note 132, at 117.
156. Id. at 118.
157. See id. Bestor contends that, under the Treaty Clause,
[p]olicy matters were to be considered, at the beginning as well as at the end of negotiations,
by some kind of legislative body, in active collaboration with whatever executive officer
might be charged with carrying through or superintending the face-to-face bargaining with
other foreign ministers. Though the executive might be called upon to formulate the required
instructions to diplomatic agents, the legislative body would still be called upon to approve
the formulation, thereby giving “advice” in a formal mode.
Id.
158. Id. at 101. Again, Bestor is simply the most thorough expositor of this position. See H ENRY
MERRITT WRISTON, E XECUTIVE AGENTS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 50 (1929); Raoul Berger,
The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11 (1972); William Whitwell
Dewhurst, Does the Constitution Make the President Sole Negotiator of Treaties?, 30 YALE L.J. 478,
483 (1921); Lofgren, War Powers, supra note 132, at 255. The point is put more tentatively by Professor Rakove, who concludes that
[n]othing in this debate suggests that the framers viewed the president as the principal and
independent author of foreign policy, or that they would have reduced the advice and consent required of the Senate to the formal approval of treaties negotiated solely at the initiative and discretion of the executive.
JACK N. R AKOVE, O RIGINAL MEANINGS: P OLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION
266-67 (1996).
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The methodological objections to this reasoning are powerful. Assuming the Convention records have evidentiary significance,159 it stretches
them rather far to claim that their omissions positively demonstrate a
shared point of view. Delegates may have already accepted a more expansive presidential role before actively considering the Treaty Clause,160 perhaps within the Committee on Postponed Parts.161
Moreover, even if the Convention did not sing the virtues of presidential diplomacy, there are indications that the delegates desired to temper the
Senate.162 The evident concern for maintaining the political independence
159. As has been widely observed, the fact that such records were kept secret speaks volumes about
the practical impact of the views expressed on ratification, as well as about the expectations of the participants. Hamilton was among those rejecting the relevance of decisions made at the convention. See
Alexander Hamilton, Opinion of the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a National Bank (1791), in
8 T HE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97, 111 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1965) [hereinafter HAMILTON
PAPERS]. James Madison opined that state conventions were a better guide. See James Madison, Speech
on the Jay Treaty (April 6, 1796), in 6 MADISON W RITINGS, supra note 141, at 263, 272. But see infra
note 169 (noting the frailties in state convention records). For modern expressions of skepticism as to
the value of convention records, see, for example, RAKOVE, supra note 158, at 16-18 (suggesting that
records of the ratification debates are superior to those of the Convention); H. Jefferson Powell, The
Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. CHI. L. R EV. 1513, 1531-42 (1987) (“[T]he records
of the Constitution’s framing and ratification vary wildly in their reliability . . . .”); H. Jefferson Powell,
The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 H ARV. L. R EV. 885, 903-04 (1985) (arguing that the
Framers expected that future interpreters would rely on the intrinsic language of the Constitution, not
extra-textual records). But cf. Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and
Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 139 (1996) (“The Constitutional Convention is
surely among the best places to begin an examination of original understanding.”).
160. See Rakove, supra note 129, at 246.
161. The President’s role materialized in the Committee, which left no record of its proceedings.
But subsequent discussions in the South Carolina assembly provide some insight into its deliberations.
General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, who had been a delegate to the Convention (but not a Committee member), in seconding a point made by Major Pierce Butler (who had served on the Committee),
confirmed that, after a wide-ranging debate, the Committee “agreed to give the President a power of
proposing treaties, as he was the ostensible head of the Union, and to vest the Senate (where each state
had an equal voice) with the power of agreeing or disagreeing to the terms proposed”—in part, apparently, to avoid vesting the Senate with both the impeachment power and the responsibility for treaties. 4
ELLIOT’S DEBATES 263-65 (Burt Franklin ed., 1968) (1888). It cannot be known whether these comments accurately reflected the prevailing views in the committee. See Jack N. Rakove, Making Foreign
Policy—The View from 1787 , in FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CONSTITUTION 1, 9-10 (Robert A. Goldwin
& Robert A. Licht eds., 1990); Rakove, supra note 129, at 242-43. The point remains, however, that
whatever meaning(s) the Committee attached to the Treaty Clause, it may have been thoroughly discussed, and hotly contested, in proceedings not reflected in surviving records.
162. See supra text accompanying note 149 (discussing Madison’s August 23 remarks). The same
concern for establishing a check on the Senate and the states was reflected in Gouverneur Morris’s
failed amendment, which would have made Senate-negotiated treaties binding only on approval by both
the House and Senate. See 2 F ARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 382-83 (Madison’s notes) (“The
Senate shall have power to treat with foreign nations, but no Treaty shall be binding on the United
States ‘which is not ratified by a Law.’”); Rakove, supra note 129, at 240-41. Contrary to Bestor, see
Bestor, Respective Roles, supra note 132, at 109, 110; Bestor, Separation of Powers, supra note 132, at
635-36, their concern was precisely that Senate control of treaties would too closely resemble the state-
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of the President from the Senate also suggests a strong role for the President in their shared undertakings. On balance, as Jack Rakove notes, it is
difficult to read the Convention proceedings and conclude that the President was added to the Treaty Clause “simply to serve as the agent of the
Senate or to avoid violating the principle of the unitary executive.”163 Indeed, precisely contrary to any presumption of continuity, the President
seems to have been added to the mix largely because leaving treaties to the
Senate alone would too closely resemble the ineffective treaty regime administered by the Continental Congress.
b. Pre-constitutional experience and its diagnosis. As discussed
further below, some of the most common complaints against the preconstitutional conduct of foreign affairs focused on state interference with
federal treaty policy—not only their refusal to abide by completed treaties,
but also the dissipation of American bargaining leverage through
independent state foreign policies.164 There were also failings in the
operation of the national legislature, but these too could largely be traced to
the influence of the federal system. Dependent upon state concessions, the
Continental Congress was deprived of significant regulatory authority over
trade matters, as well as a stable income. The legislature’s operation was
also impaired by the inevitable parochialism of its delegates; the members
increasingly agreed on the need for centralization, but the persistent
regional divisions contributed to delay and outright inaction on important
foreign policy matters.165 As Professor Rakove has concluded, “[n]othing
contributed more directly to the calling of the Constitutional Convention
than the conviction that Congress was no longer capable of managing
external affairs in a satisfactory manner.”166
The potentially disastrous delays attending the peace with Great Britain were a clear and embarrassing signal that post-Revolution America
would find it difficult to maintain a united front.167 But the contemporary
driven mechanism of the old Congress, see infra text accompanying notes 187-93.
163. Rakove, supra note 129, at 250.
164. See infra text accompanying notes 261-302.
165. See M ERRILL JENSEN, T HE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE
CONFEDERATION 1781-1789, at 399-421 (1950); see also Frederick W. Marks III, Power, Pride, and
Purse: Diplomatic Origins of the Constitution, 11 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 303, 303-04, 308 (1987) (suggesting that Jensen and other historians routinely underestimated the role of foreign relations difficulties
in spurring constitutional reform).
166. Rakove, supra note 129, at 268; accord REGINALD HORSMAN, T HE DIPLOMACY OF THE NEW
REPUBLIC, 1776-1815, at 23-24 (1985) (describing congressional ineptness in foreign relations); cf.
ROSSITER, supra note 137, at 50 (noting sympathetically that “the years between 1774 and 1789 should
be judged as a period of useful (if also nearly fatal) experiment rather than of inglorious folly”).
167. Professor Rakove notes:
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episode that loomed largest at the Convention concerned the unsettled
rights to navigate the Mississippi River—an issue the Framers tried to resolve through the two-thirds rule for Senate consent,168 but which nonetheless threatened the Constitution’s ratification in Virginia and helped scotch
it in North Carolina.169 By the time of the Convention, the United States
In 1779, Congress had needed seven months to set its peace terms, even though [the French]
had continually pressed for prompt action. For those members of Congress who believed
that the premier object of American foreign policy was the preservation of a warm alliance
with France, this deadlock had loomed as a threat to the nation’s security as well as an embarrassing example of habitual congressional indecision.
Rakove, supra note 129, at 275; see also ROSSITER, supra note 137, at 50 (citing as emblematic the fact
that the completed Treaty of Paris, “almost a ‘steal’ for the United States, lay unratified [for nearly two
months] before a Congress that could not muster the nine state delegations necessary for approval”).
See generally H ORSMAN, supra note 166, at 23-24 (citing routine delay and inaction and concluding
that “in the years from 1783 to 1789 Congress was to be inept in its conduct of foreign policy”).
Given the Continental Congress’s obvious liabilities, and Jay’s departure from its instructions in
negotiating peace with the British, the conclusion of Professors Ackerman and Golove that Congress
“had managed foreign relations with considerable skill”—and their citation of the peace treaty as a
leading example—begs elaboration. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 121, at 808; see also Bestor,
Separation of Powers, supra note 132, at 563-65 (describing the successes of the Continental Congress).
168. See, e.g., SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, A D IPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 80 (1936);
Eli Merritt, Sectional Conflict and Secret Compromise: The Mississippi River Question and the United
States Constitution, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117, 162 (1991); Charles Warren, The Mississippi River and
the Treaty Clause of the Constitution, 2 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 271, 271-72 (1934); cf. Lofgren, supra
note 132, at 254; Rakove, supra note 129, at 274-75. Even those in favor of tempering the two-thirds
requirement spoke of vindicating U.S. interests on the issue. Gouverneur Morris, for example, wanted
to exempt treaties of peace so as to make it easier to wage war on “account of the Fisheries or the Mississippi, the two great objects of the Union.” See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 548
(Madison’s notes).
169. It is dangerous to rely on the state convention records, particularly Virginia’s, for anything
definitive. See James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary
Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1986). But the records indisputably show the prominence of the
navigation issue, of which there is abundant confirmation elsewhere. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 168,
at 297 (estimating, through a page count, that the Mississippi issue consumed one-tenth of the Virginia
convention); Letter of John Marshall to Arthur Lee (Mar. 5, 1787), in 1 P APERS OF JOHN MARSHALL
205, 206 (Herbert A. Johnson et al. eds., 1974) (citing Patrick Henry’s declaration of March 1787 that
“he would rather part with the confederation than relinquish the navigation of the Mississippi”); infra
notes 174, 178, 187 (citing authorities). Both conventions also had tangible results. The Virginia convention, reacting to what John Dawson termed “a diabolical attempt . . . to surrender the navigation of a
river,” 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1493 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY], recommended to the first new Congress that it consider an amendment providing in relevant respect that “no treaty, ceding, contracting,
restraining or suspending” rights in “navigating the American rivers, shall be made, but in cases of the
most urgent and extreme necessity, nor shall any such treaty be ratified without concurrence of three
fourths of the whole number of the Members of both Houses respectively.” Id. at 1554. North Carolina
proposed a substantively identical amendment. Both were considered and rejected by the Senate on
September 8, 1789. See Warren, supra note 168, at 299-300. The Mississippi dispute also played a role
in generating opposition in Kentucky and Tennessee. See, e.g., JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE
ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1781-1788, at 245 (1961); Jon Kukla, Yes! No! And
If . . . Federalists, Antifederalists, and Virginia’s “Federalists Who are For Amendments”, in
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had attempted for nearly a decade to secure a guarantee of navigation rights
from Spain.170 With the exception of one period when the United States was
desperately seeking Spain’s assistance against Great Britain, American negotiator John Jay’s orders had instructed him to insist on the American
right to free navigation. 171 But negotiations went nowhere. Hemmed in, Jay
requested that a secret committee be appointed “with power to instruct and
direct me on every point and Subject relative to the proposed treaty with
Spain.”172 Called instead before the full assembly, he proposed that the
United States seek advantageous commercial terms with Spain by agreeing
to forbear navigation on the Mississippi for a period of twenty-five or thirty
years.173
ANTIFEDERALISM: THE LEGACY OF GEORGE MASON 43, 49 (Josephine F. Pacheco ed., 1992).
170. For excellent historical summaries, see Michael Allen, The Mississippi River Debate, 17851787, 36 TENN. HIST. Q. 447 (1977); Editor’s Note: The Debate in the Virginia Convention on the
Navigation of the Mississippi River, 12-13 June 1788, in 10 D OCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 169,
at 1179. For thorough discussions of the legal import, see Merritt, supra note 168, and Warren, supra
note 168.
171. Jay’s original instructions in 1779 required that he insist on unfettered American navigation
rights. See Instructions from Congress to Jay (Oct. 4, 1780), in 1 CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC
PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 434, 435 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 1890) [hereinafter JAY PAPERS]. In 1781, Congress instructed John Jay to concede those rights if absolutely necessary to secure Spanish assistance,
see 19 JCC, supra note 144, at 151-54 (Feb. 15, 1781), and though the gambit proved unsuccessful,
Congress let those instructions linger long after the exigencies ceased. See Editor’s Note: The Debate in
the Virginia Convention on the Navigation of the Mississippi River, 12-13 June 1788, in 10
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 169, at 1180-81. In 1784, Congress reverted to its prior instructions, see 27 JCC, supra note 144, at 529-30 (June 3, 1784), even as Spain upped the ante by closing the
lower Mississippi to Americans. See HORSMAN, supra note 166, at 35. Congress reiterated those instructions to Jay, now Secretary for Foreign Affairs, when Spain rekindled negotiations in 1785. See 29
JCC, supra note 144, at 658 (Aug. 25, 1785). Jay was told “particularly to stipulate the right of the
United States to their territorial bounds, and the free Navigation of the Mississippi, from the source to
the Ocean, as established in their Treaties with Great Britain,” and reminded to “neither conclude nor
sign any treaty, compact or convention, with the said Encargado de Negocios, until he hath previously
communicated it to Congress, and received their approbation.” Id.
The United States argued that it had inherited, via revolt, the navigation rights Great Britain had
established with France under the Treaty of Paris of 1763. See 18 JCC, supra note 144, at 935-47 (Oct.
17, 1780) (final version of instructions to Jay); Draft of Letter to John Jay, Explaining His Instructions
(Oct. 17, 1780), in 2 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 127, 127-35 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E.
Rachal eds., 1962) [hereinafter MADISON PAPERS]. The merits of this claim were far from certain; the
Treaty of Peace of 1783 subsequently attempted to claim free navigation for both Great Britain and the
United States, but by then Great Britain had complicated matters by returning Florida to Spain. Nevertheless, U.S. negotiators steadfastly maintained that Spain would merely be recognizing preexisting
U.S. rights. See E DWARD S. CORWIN, FRENCH POLICY AND THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE OF 1778, at 22932, 281-83 (1916) (discussing pre-1783 American claims); ARTHUR PRESTON WHITAKER, THE
SPANISH-AMERICAN FRONTIER: 1783-1795, at 9-13 (Bison Book 1969) (1927) (discussing post-1783
claims).
172. Letter of John Jay to the President of Congress (May 29, 1786), in 30 JCC, supra note 144, at
323 (May 31, 1786).
173. See 31 JCC, supra note 144, at 480 (Aug. 3, 1786). Jay submitted a more substantial report
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In the resulting furor, 174 Congress voted 7-5, on strictly sectional lines,
to withdraw the portion of Jay’s instructions prohibiting negotiation on
Mississippi-related matters.175 Charles Pinckney protested that the new instructions were unconstitutional, since they had drawn less than the nine
states necessary under the Articles to assent to treaties (and less than the
nine states that had authorized the original instructions).176 Though Pinckney and his allies were unsuccessful, his accompanying message was unmistakable: Congress might ordinarily feel obliged to approve treaties consistent with its instructions, but not if the instructions were approved or
amended by a mere seven states.177 Jay was formally left free to sacrifice
the Mississippi until the fall of 1788,178 but it is clear that any such treaty
would have failed in Congress.179 Jay eventually reported that Congress’s
later that month. See id. at 537-52 (Aug. 22, 1786) (reprinting report of Aug. 17, 1786).
174. “A bomb tossed into the hall of Congress and about to explode would scarcely have produced
greater consternation.” BURNETT, supra note 146, at 655. Madison, writing to Jefferson shortly afterward, considered Jay’s proposal unlikely to succeed, but he worried that “an unsuccessful attempt by
six or seven [states] will favor the views of Spain and be fatal I fear to an augmentation of the federal
authority.” Letter of Madison to Jefferson (Aug. 12, 1786), in 9 M ADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at
93, 96-97. He echoed these concerns in a letter to his father later that year. See Letter of Madison to
James Madison, Sr. (Nov. 1, 1786), in 9 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 153-54.
175. See 31 JCC, supra note 144, at 574-96 (Aug. 29, 1786).
176. See id. at 597 (Aug. 30, 1786).
177. See id. at 598, 598-600. Pinckney had earlier delivered a substantial speech on the merits of
the Mississippi question, in response to Jay’s remarks before Congress. See Notes on Debates in the
Continental Congress: Pinckney’s Speech, in 31 JCC, supra note 144, at 933-48.
178. The Virginia legislature, egged on by James Madison, continued to agitate. See Resolutions
Reaffirming American Rights to Navigate the Mississippi (Nov. 29, 1786) (editorial note), in 9
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 181-82. In Congress, William Pierce successfully moved that Jay
be required to report on the state of negotiations. See 32 JCC, supra note 144, at 147 (Apr. 4, 1787).
Soon after, Madison unsuccessfully moved to transfer negotiations with Spain to Madrid, where they
would fall to Thomas Jefferson, the Minister at the Court of France. See Resolution to Transfer Negotiations with Spain to Madrid (Apr. 18, 1787), in 9 M ADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 388; Notes on
Debates (Apr. 18, 1787), in 9 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 389-90. And, on April 25, Madison
moved that Jay be informed, in essence, as to the legal nullity of the seven-state instruction. See Notes
on Debates (Apr. 25, 1787), in 9 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 404. But there matters stood until September 1788, when Congress restated its dedication to maintaining free navigation and referred
the matter to the government taking office under the new Constitution. See 34 JCC, supra note 144, at
530-35 (Sept. 16, 1788).
179. See, e.g., H ENDERSON, supra note 146, at 396 (“It was understood by all that, barring a radical
change of attitude in the South, the proposed treaty could never be consummated.”). Even Madison accepted that a treaty was unlikely. See Letter from Madison to Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1787), in 3 THE
EMERGING NATION: A D OCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
UNDER THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 1780-89, at 452-53:
The Spanish project sleeps. A perusal of the attempt of seven states to make a new treaty
by repealing an essential condition of the old satisfied me that M r. Jay’s caution would revolt
at so irregular a sanction. . . . [I]t appears that the intended sacrifice of the Missisipi [sic]
will not be made . . . .
Accord Letter from Madison to Jefferson (Aug. 12, 1786), in 3 E MERGING NATION, supra, at 258-59
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fracture impaired his ability to negotiate with Spain and made it wisest not
to conclude a treaty.180
For some modern commentators, the Mississippi River episode is
thought to have demonstrated to Jay’s peers the importance of subordinating diplomatic agents to legislatures—particularly so as to secure minority
interests—thus supporting a narrow interpretation of the President’s role
under the Treaty Clause.181 Many, indeed, blamed Jay for evading his prior
instructions.182 It seems unlikely, however, that they considered the episode
as a caution against executive-led diplomacy: Jay had earlier demonstrated
the virtues of defying instructions,183 and even his own diplomatic career
(stating that a treaty would likely fail in Congress). His concerns, instead, stemmed principally from the
risks posed to the constitutional movement. See id. Madison’s later efforts to change negotiators and
shift the negotiations abroad appear to have been designed largely to keep at a remove discussions that
might have imperiled a new Constitution, rather than designed to defend against actual concessions to
the Spanish. See Merritt, supra note 168, at 142-43. Southerners were also concerned that the Mississippi negotiations foreshadowed secession by the commercially minded eastern and middle bloc, giving
them independent reason to thwart further attempts at division. See H ENDERSON, supra note 146, at
394-96.
180. See Letter from Jay to the President of Congress (Apr. 11, 1787), in 3 JAY PAPERS, supra note
144, at 240, 243; 32 JCC, supra note 144, at 184, 187-88 (Apr. 13, 1787). Jay’s April 12 report, which
focused on domestic conflicts between Americans and the Spanish, cautioned “that a Treaty disagreeable to one half of the Nation had better not be made, for it would be violated, and that a War disliked
by the other half, would promise but little success, especially under a Government so greatly influenced
and affected by popular Opinion.” Id. at 204.
181. See, e.g., Bestor, Separation of Powers, supra note 132, at 619 (arguing that the 1786 negotiation crisis left the executive branch with little authority in independently determining the content of foreign treaties).
182. See, e.g. , H ORSMAN, supra note 166, at 36 (claiming that westerners were enraged with Jay
because he advocated a treaty hostile to their interests); Allen, supra note 170, at 463 (stating that Jay
was “denounced” by westerners). Monroe was particularly relentless in circulating accusations. See,
e.g., Letter from Monroe to Jefferson (June 16, 1786), in 3 EMERGING NATION, supra note 179, at 203
(accusing Jay of “evading his instructions”); Letter from Monroe to Jefferson (July 16, 1786), in 3
EMERGING NATION, supra note 179, at 236 (stating his “conviction . . . that Jay ha[d] manag’d this negociation [sic] dishonestly”). Monroe also led a more public charge against Jay in the Virginia ratifying
convention, albeit in a long speech excoriating Congress’s treatment of the issue. See 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 169, at 1231-35 (statement of Monroe) (criticizing Jay); id. at 1236
(statement of William Grayson) (same); id. at 1247 (statement of Patrick Henry) (same). But see id. at
1240 (statement of Madison) (defending Jay).
183. At Jay’s prompting, the American delegates to the Treaty of Paris negotiations had defied instructions that matters be cleared with the French before anything was signed. Jay seems to have been
warranted in suspecting that the French (and their American sympathizers in Congress) did not necessarily have America’s best interests at heart. See, e.g., R ICHARD B. M ORRIS, T HE PEACEMAKERS: T HE
GREAT POWERS AND AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 204-05, 208-17 (1965) [hereinafter MORRIS,
PEACEMAKERS]; RICHARD B. MORRIS, WITNESSES AT THE CREATION: HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY,
AND THE CONSTITUTION 85-91 (1985) [hereinafter MORRIS, WITNESSES]; JACK N. RAKOVE, THE
BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
264-74, 321-22 (1979); Rakove, supra note 129, at 270-71, 275. Though Jay and the commissioners
were subsequently criticized in Congress and by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Robert Livingston,
they received private demonstrations of support from some of the same persons criticizing them in pub-
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was not substantially affected by the Mississippi imbroglio.184 It is also notable that nothing more specific was done to reduce such risks under the
Constitution. Simply requiring the Senate’s “advice and consent” addressed
none of the South’s grievances. Congress’s decision in 1786 to relieve Jay
of responsibility for clearing every proposed negotiating term before communicating it to Spain seemed equally permissible under the new Constitution. The Senate also remained free to instruct negotiations via a simple
majority, a committee, or perhaps even something less.185 The only hint of a
solution to the problem of executive deviation appears outside the Treaty
Clause, through the mechanism of impeachment.186
In the end, it was impossible to blame Jay without blaming the Congress that had instructed him187—and the Senate’s resemblance to the Conlic. See MORRIS, PEACEMAKERS, supra, at 442-44.
It is difficult even to generalize about Jay’s conduct on the Mississippi question. In negotiating
with the French, Jay had helped defend America’s right to western lands and the Mississippi. See
HENDERSON, supra note 146, at 302-04, 322-23. Nor could his early negotiations with the Spanish be
faulted. Jay advised Congress against offering to concede on the Mississippi in order to secure Spanish
assistance. See Letter from Jay to the President of Congress (Nov. 6, 1780), in 4 T HE REVOLUTIONARY
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 112, 148 (Francis Wharton ed., 1889) [hereinafter R EVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE] (advising that “we should endeavor to be as
independent on the charity of our friends as on the mercy of our enemies”). Afterward, Jay read the
U.S. willingness to make such a cession exceedingly narrowly. See M ORRIS, WITNESSES, supra, at 8182. He was commended by Robert Livingston, on behalf of the Congress, for his tactics, see Letter from
Robert R. Livingston to Jay (Apr. 16, 1782), in 2 J AY PAPERS, supra note 171, at 187, 188, and given
increased latitude in his dealings with the Spanish, see Letter from Robert R. Livingston to Jay (Apr.
27, 1782), in 2 JAY PAPERS, supra note 171, at 202, 206.
184. As Secretary for Foreign Affairs, a position he held during the later negotiations with the
Spanish (and afterwards), Jay earned increased autonomy from congressional control. See J ENSEN, supra note 165, at 365-66; MORRIS, FORGING, supra note 144, at 194-95; HENRY MERRITT WRISTON,
EXECUTIVE AGENTS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 21 (1929). When Jay was later appointed as
envoy to Great Britain, Republican opposition focused primarily on other matters, such as the fact that
he had not first resigned his position as Chief Justice. See JERALD A. COMBS, T HE JAY TREATY:
POLITICAL BATTLEGROUND OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 127 (1970); STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC
MCKITRICK, T HE AGE OF FEDERALISM 394-95 (1993); H AYDEN, supra note 135, at 68-70; Letter from
Jay to Mrs. Jay (May 12, 1794) (editor’s note), in 4 JAY PAPERS, supra note 171, at 21 n.1.
185. But see Bestor, Respective Roles, supra note 132, at 117 (arguing that “it is the advice of the
Senate as an organized body, not the advice of individual senators (over coffee and doughnuts at the
White House, perhaps) which the Constitution calls for”).
186. Alexander Hamilton argued that, while principal security in the Treaty Clause consisted of the
“JOINT AGENCY” of the President and Senate, the latter might punish a President for misconduct in “deviati[ng] from the instructions of the Senate, or a want of integrity in the conduct of the negotiations
committed to him;” he also held out the possibility of punishing “a few leading individuals in the Senate.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 66, at 406 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also 2
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 137, at 52-54 (Madison’s notes) (statement of Gouverneur Morris)
(advocating for a strong executive to check the legislature).
187. Jay spent over half of his appointed ambassadorships under explicit instructions to offer navigation rights under the appropriate conditions. As a result, popular criticism was scarcely limited to Jay.
See RAKOVE, supra note 158, at 255 (suggesting that southern delegates learned both to be wary of ex-
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tinental Congress made it seem part of the problem, rather than a solution.188 Improving legislative operations was complicated,189 and the advantages of the executive alternative must have been apparent.190 Discussion at the Constitutional Convention and afterward wrestled with whether
a two-thirds rule would protect minority state interests as well as the Articles of Confederation had, but no one seemed to believe that Senate control
over the nation’s emissaries had actually been increased by the Constitution.191 The result was put most plainly by George Nicholas in the Virginia
convention: it was “Congress, under the existing system,” that had threatened invasion of navigation rights;192 the representation of minority interests in the Senate would be no less than in the previous Congress; and finally, in the new system, at least the President would serve as a check.193
3. The New Constitution and the Horizontal Scope of the Treaty
Power. As Nicholas indicated, one advantage of involving the President
ecutive discretion and to realize “the virtues of executive independence”); WHITAKER, supra note 171,
at 76-77 (describing Jay as “intimidated by the widespread denunciation of Congress’ decision, which,
though taken in secret session, soon became public property”); Allen, supra note 170, at 463 (describing “the great public outcry . . . over Congress’s August 29 reversal of Jay’s instructions,” as well as
“[d]enunciations of Jay pour[ing] in from all over the country”). A circular from Pennsylvanians to the
people of Kentucky blamed Jay, but the resulting Kentucky circular omitted mention of Jay and seemingly blamed Congress. See THOMAS MARSHALL GREEN, THE SPANISH CONSPIRACY 109-10 (1891).
188. See JACK N. RAKOVE, DECLARING RIGHTS 111 (1998) (describing how the August 1787 Convention debates “brought a reaction against the Senate, which many framers saw increasingly as a replica of the Continental Congress (because of the equal vote and its election by the state legislatures).
This reaction worked to the advantage of the presidency.”); Rakove, supra note 129, at 274 (citing a
supporter of the two-thirds requirement as “reply[ing] that the Navigation of the Mississippi after what
had already happened in Congress was not to be risqued in the Hands of a meer [sic] Majority”).
189. No one was terribly sure which voting rules would be most effective; in the end, the Convention defeated proposals that would have subjected a treaty to consent by two-thirds of all the members
of the Senate, apparently with the help of Virginia’s delegates. See 2 F ARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note
138, at 548-49 (Madison’s notes); see also Warren, supra note 170, at 295 (“All these efforts were to
make it as difficult as possible for any combination of Northern States to ratify a treaty which should
bargain away the navigation of the Mississippi.”). As previously noted, moreover, making peace treaties
more difficult might deter Congress from waging war on behalf of navigation interests. See 2
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 548 (Madison’s notes) (statement of Gouverneur Morris).
190. See RAKOVE, supra note 158, at 267 (explaining that divisive congressional debates over the
Newfoundland and Mississippi instructions allowed the Framers “readily [to] appreciate the diplomatic
and political advantages of allowing the president a significant initiative in the conduct of foreign relations”); see also Rakove, supra note 129, at 275 (articulating the lessons the Framers may have drawn
concerning “the dangers of allowing foreign policy to be made exclusively by a Senate that would bear
an unfortunate resemblance to the existing Congress”).
191. At the Virginia ratifying convention, critics doubted the adequacy of both the new and the old
systems. See 10 D OCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 172, at 1244 (statement of William Grayson)
(June 13, 1788); id. at 1246 (statement of Patrick Henry) (June 13, 1788).
192. Id. at 1249 (statement of George Nicholas) (June 13, 1788).
193. See id. at 1249-52 (statement of George Nicholas) (June 13, 1788).

1178

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:1127

was to enhance the minority-state check in the Senate. References to the
President’s value as a check on the Senate abound in the Convention
records,194 period correspondence,195 pamphlets and articles,196 and the
ratification debates.197 The Virginia debates saw fit to emphasize the
President’s role in thwarting any attempt to give away navigation rights.198

194. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 540 (Madison’s notes) (citing Rufus
King as arguing in opposition to the two-thirds requirement, on the grounds “that as the Executive was
here joined in the business, there was a check which did not exist in Congress where The [sic] concurrence of 2/3 was required”); id. at 540-41 (stating that Gouverneur Morris asserted the need for the
President’s inclusion in peace treaties because of the President’s status as “the general Guardian of the
National interests”).
195. In one of his many important letters to George Nicholas, Madison explained that
the circumstance most material to be remarked in a comparative examination of the two
systems, is the security which the new one affords by making the concurrence of the President necessary to the validity of Treaties. This is an advantage which may be pronounced
conclusive. At present the will of a single body can make a Treaty. If the new Government
be established no treaty can be made without the joint consent of two distinct and independent wills. The president also being elected in a different mode, and under a different influence from that of the Senate, will be the more apt and the more free to have a will of his
own.
Letter from Madison to George Nicholas (May 17, 1788), in 11 M ADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at
44, 48.
196. See, e.g., T HE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 452 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(describing “the additional security which would result from the co-operation of the executive” and the
“the joint possession of the power in question, by the President and Senate”); Letter from “Civis”
[David Ramsay] to the Citizens of South Carolina (Feb. 4, 1788) (alteration in original), in 2 THE
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND
LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 147, 150 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) [hereinafter
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION] (“Neither the senate nor president can make treaties by their separate
authority.—They both must concur.—This is more in your favor than the footing on which you now
stand.”). Even the Anti-Federalists, who were wary (though not uniformly so) of a strong executive,
considered the Senate’s role in treaty-making to be an even worse aspect of the treaty power, as it “represented for many of them all that was wrong with the Constitution.” HERBERT J. STORING, W HAT THE
ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 48 (1981); accord MAIN, supra note 169, at 138-39, 141.
197. See RAKOVE, supra note 158, at 266-67; Rakove, supra note 129, at 246. The best exponent of
this view in the ratification debates was James Wilson of Pennsylvania, who defended the Senate
against the charge that it would control treaty-making, observing that “[t]he Senate can make no treaties; they can approve of none unless the President . . . lay it before them.” 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 169, at 480 (statement of James Wilson) (Dec. 4, 1787); accord id. at 491 (statement of
James Wilson) (Dec. 4, 1787) (“With regard to their power in forming treaties, they can make none,
they are only auxiliaries to the President.”); see also 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 161, at 119-20
(statement of William Davie) (July 28, 1788) (arguing that the treaty power is divided equally between
the President and the Senate).
198. See 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 169, at 1130 (statement of George Nicholas) (June
10, 1788) (“The consent of the President is a very great security.”); 10 id. at 1241 (statement of Madison) (June 13, 1788) (“[T]he President[] must concur in every treaty which can be made.”); id. at 1251
(statement of George Nicholas) (June 13, 1788) (refuting Patrick Henry’s argument that “the concurrence of the President to the formation of treaties will be no security”). But see id. at 1246 (statement of
Patrick Henry) (June 13, 1788) (“[T]he President as distinguished from the Senate, is nothing. They will
combine and be as one.”).
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Involving the President, in other words, made it harder to produce unwise
treaties.199
Inviting the President also improved the American prospects for success in any bargaining that was undertaken. As John Jay ably explained in
The Federalist No. 64, the President enjoyed clear advantages in negotiation—principally greater “secrecy” and “dispatch” than even the Senate
could manage—that would “tend to facilitate the attainment of the objects
of the negotiation.”200 Hamilton argued, as well, that increasing the President’s power would increase his credibility and standing in foreign negotiations, which would in turn inure to the nation’s advantage.201
The Senate, it must be stressed, was thought to have advantages of its
own—such as in defining, or at least in helping to define, the “objects of
the negotiation.” 202 But emphasizing those virtues was perfectly consistent
199. Cf. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42
INT’L ORG. 427, 456-58 (1988) (explaining the role of independent chief negotiators in exercising veto
power over international agreements).
200. As Jay elaborated:
Those matters which in negotiations usually require the most secrecy and the most dispatch
are those preparatory and auxiliary measures which are not otherwise important in a national view, than as they tend to facilitate the attainment of the objects of the negotiation.
For these the President will find no difficulty to provide; and should any circumstance occur
which requires the advice and consent of the Senate, he may at any time convene them. Thus
we see that the Constitution provides that our negotiations for treaties shall have every advantage which can be derived from talents, information, integrity, and deliberate investigations, on the one hand, and from secrecy and dispatch on the other.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 393 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphases added); see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 452 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (insisting that “decision,
secrecy, and dispatch” are compatible with the President as an individual negotiator, but that they are
incompatible with “a body so variable and so numerous” as the House or the Senate); 4 ELLIOT’S
DEBATES, supra note 161, at 119-20 (William Davie) (arguing that negotiations between nations require
the “secrecy, design, and despatch” characteristic of the executive). Jay is sometimes misunderstood to
have trivialized these advantages by suggesting that they were “not otherwise important in a national
view,” THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 393 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), but his suggestion that
they were important in achieving the ends of negotiation seems critical. See id.
201. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 452 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
202. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 393 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also Bestor,
Separation of Powers, supra note 132, at 620-23 (interpreting Jay’s The Federalist No. 64); Rakove,
supra note 129, at 253-54 (same). In general, the Senate was regarded as a more appropriate body for
the exercise of those components of the treaty power resembling legislative activities. Responding to
the objection that the Treaty Clause improperly intermixed powers, Hamilton argued that the power to
make treaties was neither strictly legislative nor executive in nature and that the Constitution properly
employed both the Senate and the President:
The qualities elsewhere detailed as indispensable in the management of foreign negotiations
point out the executive as the most fit agent in those transactions; while the vast importance
of the trust and the operation of treaties as laws plead strongly for the participation of the
whole or a portion of the legislative body in the office of making them.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 451 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also Bestor,
Separation of Powers, supra note 132, at 663-65 (interpreting Hamilton’s The Federalist No. 75);
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with an understanding that involving the President was a significant innovation in the process of advice and consent. Whether advice should be
sought was plainly left to the President’s judgment,203 and because the Senate would not always be available for consultation,204 the President would
almost invariably take the initiative in defining certain objects of negotiation. Finally, the fact that the President would take the lead in designating
diplomatic agents was scarcely overlooked.205
It is critical to recognize, moreover, that the overall diminution in legislative authority was not so significant as to warrant concern or occasion
objection. The Mississippi experience had demonstrated that, whatever the
procedure for instruction, the Senate’s control over treaty approval could
ultimately check any diplomatic excesses. What is more, any potential decrease in congressional control over negotiation—its power of “advice”—was offset by its increased autonomy with respect to treaty ratification—its power of “consent.” As the debate over Jay’s instructions
indicated, Congress might have felt obligated to ratify treaties negotiated in
accordance with legislative instructions,206 but it scarcely felt the same
Rakove, supra note 129, at 254 (noting that “the most striking feature of Hamilton’s essay is that he
seems almost to strain to justify any presidential involvement”). As Bestor assumes, and Rakove explicitly concludes, the views Hamilton expressed as Publius during the process of ratification are more
significant than the views he expresses in the Pacificus-Helvidius debates with Madison in 1793. See
infra text accompanying note 220.
203. See T HE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 393 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[A]lthough the
President must, in forming [treaties], act by the advice and consent of the Senate, yet he will be able to
manage the business of intelligence in such manner as prudence may suggest.”).
204. See 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 169, at 562 (statement of James Wilson) (Dec. 11,
1787) (asking whether, given the duration and distance involved in bilateral negotiations, Congress
would necessarily be in session during an entire negotiation); cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 519 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that the President’s assumption of executive
functions meant Congress would no longer incur the expense of sitting year-round and that “[e]ven the
management of foreign negotiations will naturally devolve upon him, according to general principles
concerted with the Senate, and subject to their final concurrence”).
205. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 538-40 (Madison’s notes). This afforded
greater Senate control than Hamilton’s earlier proposal, under which the President would have the sole
power to appoint “the heads or chief officers of the departments of Finance, War, and Foreign Affairs,”
with the Senate involved in the appointment of “all other officers,” specifically including “Ambassadors
to foreign Nations.” 1 id. at 292.
206. See SAMUEL B. C RANDALL, T REATIES, T HEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 33 (1904) (“Congress, in which were combined the negotiating and ratifying functions, recognized an obligation to ratify what it had authorized.”). Indeed, the commission of American envoys frequently included solemn
promises to foreign sovereigns that Congress would abide by the envoy’s signature. For example, Jay
was commissioned to negotiate with Spain as
our minister plenipotentiary, [with] full power, general and special, to act in that quality, to
confer, agree and conclude . . . a treaty of commerce; and whatever shall be so agreed and
concluded for us and in our name, to sign, and thereupon make a treaty of commerce; and to
transact every thing that may be necessary for completing, securing and strengthening the
same, in as ample form, and with the same effect, as if we were personally present and acted
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about treaties negotiated contrary to diplomatic instructions.207 Early in his
first term, President Washington asserted to the Senate that U.S. practice
now distinguished between negotiation and signature, on the one hand, and
ratification, on the other, and he indicated that only the latter would be
binding.208 President Washington’s argument—which went unquestioned
therein; hereby promising, in good faith, that we will accept, ratify, fulfil and execute whatever shall be agreed, concluded and signed by our said minister plenipotentiary; and that we
will never act, nor suffer
any person to act, contrary to the same, in whole or
in part.
15 JCC, supra note 144, at 1117 (Sept. 28, 1779); accord 29 JCC, supra note 144, at 561-562 (July 20,
1785) (commissioning Jay to negotiate with Spain). The American practice does not appear to have
been unique. See id. at 562-64 (reprinting, in translation, the commission of Don Diego de Gardoqui of
Spain).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 176-77. Pinckney’s proposition was not in fact well settled
at that time, see 5 M OORE, supra note 124, § 743 (collecting authorities), nor was it necessarily well
understood in the states, see 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 172, at 1236-37 (statement of
William Grayson) (purporting to recall the “dilemma of either violating the Constitution by a compliance [by permitting seven states to prevail], or involving us in war by a non-compliance”). It also did
not necessarily imply the same liberty where the party instructing the negotiator was simply different
than the party responsible for ratification. The Convention touched on this in debating whether the
House should have a hand in approving treaties; at least two delegates considered awkward the prospect
of having ministers instructed by a different body than would be responsible for ratification, but they
did not appear to have contemplated that it would change the legal status of American negotiations. See
2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 392 (Madison’s notes) (Nathaniel Gorham); id. at 393
(Madison’s notes) (William S. Johnson); id. at 395 (James McHenry’s notes ) (Nathaniel Gorham).
The Senate later queried Jay as to whether they were bound, “either by former agreed stipulations, or negotiations entered into by our Minister at the Court of Versailles, to ratify” the Consular
Convention with France, which had been negotiated under the Continental Congress. 1 JOURNAL OF
THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 7 (July 22, 1789)
(1828) [hereinafter SENATE EXECUTIVE JOURNAL]. Jay replied, in essence, that although it was a bad
treaty, it conformed with the scheme Congress had proposed and had conveyed through Jefferson to
France with a promise to ratify any conforming convention—a promise reiterated in Jefferson’s commission—and that approval was therefore indispensable. See 33 JCC, supra note 144, at 425-26 (July
27, 1787) (Jefferson’s commission); 1 S ENATE EXECUTIVE JOURNAL, supra, at 7-8 (July 27, 1789) (reprinting Jay’s letter of July 25, 1789). See generally H AYDEN, supra note 135, at 6-9 (concluding that
both Jay and the Senate felt compelled to approve the treaty as it was negotiated).
208. Washington’s letter, which was focused on developing a common understanding of the procedure to be followed in Indian treaties, advised:
It is said to be the general understanding and practice of nations, as a check on the mistakes
and indiscretions of ministers or commissioners, not to consider any treaty negotiated and
signed by such officers as final and conclusive until ratified by the sovereign or government
from whom they derive their powers. This practice has been adopted by the United States respecting their treaties with European nations, and I am inclined to think it would be advisable to observe it in the conduct of our treaties with the Indians; . . . being formed on our
part by the agency of subordinate officers, it seems to be both prudent and reasonable that
their acts should not be binding on the nation until approved and ratified by the Government.
It strikes me that this point should be well considered and settled, so that our national proceedings in this respect may become uniform and be directed by fixed and stable principles.
Letter from Washington to the Senate, reprinted in 30 W RITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 406, 40607 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) [hereinafter WASHINGTON WRITINGS]. The Senate did not directly
address the merits of the practices described by Washington, but it did follow his recommendations. See
CURRIE, T HE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS, supra note 135, at 26-28; HAYDEN, supra note 135, at 11-
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by the Senate—was more prescient than accurate as a reading of international law,209 but it was unimpeachable in its understanding of the structural
change in the treaty power. Under the Constitution, the U.S. position during
negotiation and ratification might differ for perfectly legitimate reasons: if
the Senate instructed and dictated the course of negotiations, the President
might decline to ratify; if the President were in charge of negotiations, on
the other hand, the Senate might signal disagreement when it came time for
consent.
The new treaty power, in consequence, liberated the Senate’s power of
consent by permitting it to judge the merits of completed treaties with a
relatively fresh eye.210 Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution thus could
unselfconsciously emphasize the Senate’s treaty power without diminishing
the new authority conferred on the President. Even in the event that the
Senate failed to participate in directing negotiations—whether due to constraints on its authority, a desire not to intervene, or presidential circumvention—its consent power would suffice to derail unwanted presidential
initiatives. The premise, then, that presidential authority was inconsistent
with claims of Senate authority—or at least should have provoked a greater
hue and cry—is fundamentally misguided.211
16.
209. See, e.g., HAYDEN, supra note 135, at 153-56 (describing a diplomatic contretemps with Great
Britain over the U.S. obligation to ratify an entire treaty). But Washington’s view became increasingly
prevalent over the course of the nineteenth century. See Michael J. Glennon, The Senate Role in Treaty
Ratification, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 257, 275-76 n.115 (1983) (citing J. MERVYN JONES, RATIFICATION
AND FULL POWERS 12, 74-78 (1949)). Compare Porto Rico—License to Construct Wharf, 23 Op. Att’y
Gen. 551, 558 (Oct. 17, 1901) (noting President Monroe’s position, but explaining that “[n]ow, the general maxim that public conventions do not become obligatory until ratified is firmly established,” at
least in view of the clear division of the U.S. treaty-making power), with Bruce Stein, Note, The Framers’ Intent and the Early Years of the Republic, 11 H OFSTRA L. R EV. 413, 456 (1982) (“According to
international law, the ‘monarch cannot, in honor, refuse to ratify a Convention made by a minister with
full powers, unless it can be proved that the minister had remarkably and openly deviated from his instructions.’” (quoting W. STULL HOLT, TREATIES DEFEATED BY THE SENATE 26 (1964))).
210. Cf. HAYDEN, supra note 135, at 32 (reprinting a resolution pledging ratification that was “of a
type adopted several times by the Senate during the early administrations” and observing that “[l]ater
Senates did not bind themselves thus in advance, and would have deemed such a promise incompatible
with their right to withhold their assent from any provision of a treaty submitted to them”).
211. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 66, at 402-03 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (“The Senate, it is observed, is to have concurrent authority with the executive in the formation of
treaties and in the appointment to offices . . . .”); 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 172, at 563
(statement of James Wilson) (Dec. 11, 1787) (“Neither the President nor the Senate solely can complete
a treaty; they are checks upon each other and are so balanced, as to produce security to the people.”); 10
id. at 1391-92 (statement of Francis Corbin):
[The treaty power] is . . . given to the President and the Senate (who represent the States in
their individual capacities) conjointly.—In this it differs from every Government we
know.—It steers with admirable dexterity between the two extremes—neither leaving it to
the Executive, as in most other Governments, nor to the Legislative, which would too much
retard such negotiations.
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Early practice was highly consistent with this depiction.212 President
Washington, entrusted by Congress with a new diplomatic relations apparatus,213 seems to have conscientiously explored means of securing Senate
advice,214 yet he clearly considered himself free to proceed without the
212. Practices in the Washington administration may illuminate both because of their proximity to
1787 and because of the attention paid by the institutions involved toward the delicate, precedentsetting nature of their relations. See Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early
Versions and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. R EV. 211, 232 (1989). This is not to say, however, that the
mere existence of a practice determines its constitutionality. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,
546-47 (1969) (“That an unconstitutional action has been taken before surely does not render that same
action any less unconstitutional at a later date.”). The further one proceeds, however, the more substantial the objections become to employing post-ratification history. See Ramsey, Executive Agreements,
supra note 108, at 174 & n.171.
213. The creation of the new government’s Department of Foreign Affairs in 1789 made clear, for
example, that the President was to direct the department’s secretary in his duties, which were to be
“agreeable to the Constitution” and related to matters such as diplomatic instructions and negotiations
with foreign governments. An act for establishing an Executive Department, to be denominated the Department of Foreign Affairs, 1 Stat. 28 (1789). Representative Sedgewick, addressing the issue of the
President’s removal power, reasoned that “[i]f . . . the Secretary of Foreign Affairs is the mere instrument of the President, one would suppose, on the principle of expediency, this officer should be dependent upon him.” 1 A NNALS OF CONG. 522 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). More generally, this department
was among the few not defined in terms of carrying out congressional mandates, thus permitting the
President to “determine what should be done, as well as how it should be done.” THACH, supra note
138, at 160. See generally HUNT, supra note 146, at 54-78 (describing the creation of the Department of
Foreign Affairs).
214. Much has been made of Washington’s personal appearance before the Senate in 1789 in connection with the Treaty with the Creek Indians, when his failure to obtain instantaneous advice and consent on his proposed instructions led him to forswear any further appearance—and marked the last occasion that any President personally sought out the Senate’s counsel. See, e.g., CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS, supra note 135, at 24-26; id. at 24 (concluding that the episode demonstrates a mutual understanding that the Senate’s advice and consent includes “discussion in advance of
the course of action to be pursued”); HAYDEN, supra note 135, at 20-27 (recounting Washington’s unsuccessful visit to the Senate). But as Currie recognizes, Washington also sought counsel where it was
anything but obligatory, such as in his attempt in 1790 to solicit advice from the Supreme Court. See
CURRIE, T HE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS, supra note 135, at 25 n.136. In the case of treaties, Washington had just beforehand indicated uncertainty as to the nature of his constitutional obligation. See
Sentiments Expressed to the Senate Committee on the Mode of Communication Between the President
and the Senate on Treaties and Nominations (Aug. 8, 1789), in 30 WASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra note
208, at 373, 373-74; Sentiments Expressed to the Senate Committee at a Second Conference on the
Mode of Communication Between the President and the Senate on Treaties and Nominations (Aug. 10,
1789), in 30 W ASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra note 208, at 377, 378-79. The Senate’s response to both
sets of suggestions was wholly concerned with matters of form. See 1 SENATE EXECUTIVE JOURNAL,
supra note 207, at 19 (Aug. 21, 1789); see also ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 184, at 56 (noting the
Senate’s apparent acquiescence in Washington’s treaty with the Southern Indians). At the same time, as
Washington had already had cause to guess, the Senate was treating Indian treaties differently, and
might thus have regarded his initial consultation with them as constituting the entirety of their advice
and consent on the matter. See, e.g., Letter from Washington to the Senate (Sept. 17, 1789), in 30
WASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra note 208, at 406-08; 1 SENATE EXECUTIVE JOURNAL, supra note 207,
at 27-28 (Sept. 18, 1789); id. at 28 (Sept. 22, 1789); see also CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS, supra note 135, at 26-28 (describing the evolution of treaty-making practices with respect to
Indian tribes); HAYDEN, supra note 135, at 11-16 (same). It is difficult to conclude that President
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Senate’s permission.215 The Senate, in keeping with its new constitutional
role, felt equally at liberty to withhold consent from any resulting treaty,
but it did so on substantive grounds, not based on the President’s failure to
seek advice beforehand.216 Notably, the Senate acquiesced in President
Washington’s decision to take over instructing Jay in his negotiations with
the British,217 and when the sensitive negotiations with Spain were resumed, the Senate was provided with only partial instructions on navigation
rights,218 with the apparent result that Senate ratification was promised only
on the matters more specifically detailed.219 It is surely possible to lean too
Washington’s thinking about the Treaty Clause, or that of the Senate, was fixed in any meaningful
sense at the time he appeared before the Senate, as his subsequent change of practice would seem to
confirm.
215. On one occasion, the cabinet advised him that consulting the Senate would only tip off the
British. See HAYDEN, supra note 135, at 37-39; ABRAHAM D. S OFAER, W AR, F OREIGN AFFAIRS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS 96 (1976). On other occasions, Washington negotiated and
concluded Indian treaties without consulting the Senate and without any apparent exigent circumstances. See HAYDEN, supra note 135, at 34-37 (discussing a proposed treaty with the Wabash and Illinois Indians).
216. See HAYDEN, supra note 135, at 37 (“In no case did the [Senate] take exception to being . . .
ignored [by the President before and during his negotiations] . . . .”).
217. See id. at 71; Instructions to Jay as Envoy Extraordinary (May 6, 1794), in 4 JAY PAPERS, supra note 171, at 10, 10-21 (transmitting Jay’s instructions from the executive branch via Secretary of
State Edmund Randolph). The Senate did, however, provide informal counsel. See HAYDEN, supra note
135, at 72-73 (“[T]he Senatorial group still exercised a powerful if not a predominant influence” in instructing Jay before he left for England, although their input was passed on through “informal conferences.”).
218. After the Senate confirmed the appointment of commissioners, see 1 SENATE EXECUTIVE
JOURNAL, supra note 207, at 99 (Jan. 24, 1792), Spain expressed the desire to negotiate over commercial matters not described in the President’s nomination message. Washington returned to the Senate
with proposed instructions on those matters, see id. at 106 (Mar. 7, 1792), which the Senate approved,
see id. at 115 (Mar. 16, 1792). But the instructions sent to the commissioners on the original topics for
negotiation—including the infamous question of navigation rights to the Mississippi—were never provided to the Senate. See HAYDEN, supra note 135, at 56; see also Report on Negotiations with Spain
(Mar. 18, 1792), in 23 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 296, 296 (Charles T. Cullen et al. eds.,
1990) [hereinafter JEFFERSON PAPERS] (stating that the enclosed instructions from Secretary of State
Jefferson to President Washington would be provided to the commissioners appointed to negotiate with
Spain, but not stating that they would be provided to the Senate). See generally H AYDEN, supra note
135, at 54-57 (describing the appointment of the commissioners and the Senate’s role in this treatymaking endeavor). It should be emphasized, however, that the President had pledged to instruct the
commissioners as to “the foundation of our rights to navigate the Mississippi, and to hold our southern
boundary at the 31st degree of latitude, and that each of these [was] to be a sine qua non” of the treaty.
1 SENATE EXECUTIVE JOURNAL, supra note 207, at 107 (Mar. 7, 1792).
219. The President’s nomination of the commissioners described the topics for a treaty only in general terms, but pointedly “sav[ed] to the President and Senate their respective rights as to the ratification
of the same.” Id. at 96 (Jan. 11, 1792). The Senate confirmation repeated the proviso. See id. at 99 (Jan.
24, 1792). The Senate’s subsequent promise to advise and consent to a conforming treaty followed
Washington’s specific request for advice and consent, albeit with several additions to the treaty proposed by a Senate Committee. See id. at 106-09 (Mar. 7, 1792) (documenting Washington’s request and
the committee’s recommended additions); id. at 115 (Mar. 16, 1792) (documenting the Senate’s two-
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heavily on some early assertions of presidential authority—such as Hamilton’s defense of the neutrality proclamation of 1793220 or John Marshall’s
defense of President Adams’ conduct in the Jonathan Robbins incident.221
But both controversies and more workaday practices shared the premise
that the President could at least assume diplomatic authority in the absence
of Senate instruction or congressional constraint, and the Treaty Clause was
viewed as an important source of this authority.222
thirds acceptance of Washington’s March 7 proposal with the incorporated additions proposed by the
committee).
220. In any event, the exchange between Hamilton and Madison regarding President Washington’s
proclamation reveals little about either writer’s view concerning the Senate’s advice function. See, e.g.,
Powell, The Founders, supra note 128, at 1476 n.13 (“[I]t is unclear what weight to give [the exchange]
as expressions of the authors’ constitutional views.”).
221. Pursuant to a provision of the Jay Treaty, President Adams directed the delivery to the British
Consul of Jonathan Robbins (a/k/a Thomas Nash), who had been accused of murder during a mutiny
aboard a British frigate. Defending President Adams’s decision in Congress, then-Representative John
Marshall declared:
The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations. . . .
....
The Executive is not only the Constitutional department, but seems to be the proper department to which the power in question [that is, the interpretation and execution of treaty
obligations] may most wisely and most safely be confided.
The department, which is entrusted with the whole foreign intercourse of the nation, with
the negotiation of all its treaties, with the power of demanding a reciprocal performance of
the article, which is accountable to the nation for the violation of its engagements with foreign nations, and for the consequences resulting from such violation, seems the proper department to be entrusted with the execution of a national contract like that under consideration.
10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613-14 (1800). Justice Sutherland emphasized some of the broader aspects of
Marshall’s rhetoric. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (“The
President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation . . . . He alone negotiates.”); see also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942) (“Power to [settle the claims of U.S.
nationals] certainly is a modest implied power of the President who is the ‘sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations.’” (quoting Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at
320)). Yet, others have interpreted it more narrowly—either as consistent with the President’s essentially subordinate responsibilities for communicating with foreign governments and executing treaties,
or even as bespeaking the President’s subordination to Congress. See GLENNON, supra note 46, at 8
(“[T]he truth is that it probably never occurred to John Marshall . . . that the President, acting within the
Constitution . . . could disregard this congressional restriction.”); Louis Fisher, Evolution of Presidential and Congressional Powers in Foreign Affairs, in CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENCY, AND THE TAIWAN
RELATIONS ACT 20 (Louis W. Koenig et al. eds., 1985); Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution:
Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REV. 671, 690 (1998); see also Ruth
Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100 YALE L.J. 229, 351-52 & n.466
(1990) (citing, but disagreeing with, authorities).
222. Marshall, for example, clearly considered that the President’s authority in any particular situation would be augmented in the event of Senate inaction. Thus, he conceded that “Congress, unquestionably, may prescribe the mode, and Congress may devolve on others the whole execution of the
contract [i.e., treaty]; but, till this be done, it seems the duty of the Executive department to execute the
contract by any means it possesses.” 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 614 (1800). As Professor Powell observed,
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Early practices also began to disclose the negative, or dormant, dimension of the treaty power—that is, the notion that the assignment of
treaty functions to the Senate and President entailed the prohibition of
practices interfering with these functions. For example, the House’s attempt
to obtain documents relating to the negotiation of the Jay Treaty was resisted on the ground that releasing the documents would interfere with the
President’s exercise of authority under the Treaty Clause. As President
Washington explained, such disclosures would be “extremely impolitic,”
potentially endangering future negotiations or causing other harms.223 But
he also clearly claimed that these policy ends were protected by the Constitution, and spoke in almost legalistic terms of avoiding a precedent for
future encroachments.224
Whatever the incident’s significance for the relative authority of the
Senate and President, it clearly demonstrated President Washington’s conviction, with the eventual acquiescence of the House,225 that other institutions had no right to intrude on the executive’s negotiating authority. The
class of prohibited encroachments was not limited to rival attempts to enter
[t]he most likely interpretation . . . . is that [Marshall’s] general assumptions about the constitutional distribution of authority over foreign affairs were similar to those of Jefferson in
1790, Washington’s cabinet in the various events of 1793-94, and many speakers during the
1796 House debates . . . : Whatever authority Congress or the Senate may have to limit or
control presidential discretion, the President ordinarily has responsibility for the direction of
United States foreign policy and the initiation of diplomatic efforts. As in the 1793 discussions, furthermore, Marshall drew connections between the President’s authority over foreign affairs and his power to direct “the force of the nation.”
Powell, The Founders , supra note 128, at 1527-28; see also id. at 1532 (drawing the conclusion that
“one interpretive option in Founding-era constitutionalism was to read the Constitution to accord the
President independent authority in the area of foreign affairs”).
223. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 760 (1796).
224. See id. at 760-61; see also Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (Mar. 7,
1796), in 20 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 159, at 68 (“A discretion in the Executive Department how
far and where to comply in such cases is essential to the due conduct of foreign negotiations . . . .”).
225. Representative William Smith opined:
The Constitution had assigned to the Executive the business of negotiation with foreign
Powers; this House can claim no right by the Constitution to interfere in such negotiations;
every movement of the kind must be considered as an attempt to usurp powers not delegated, and will be resisted by the Executive; for a concession would be a surrender of the
powers specially delegated to him, and a violation of his trust.
5 A NNALS OF CONG. 440 (1796); see also id. at 745 (noting, in favoring disclosure, that “the power
claimed by the House was not that of negotiating and proposing Treaties; it was not an active and operative power of making and repealing Treaties; . . . it was only a negative, a restraining power on those
subjects over which Congress had the right to legislate”) (Rep. Albert Gallatin). But cf. HAYDEN, supra
note 135, at 51-52 (describing how Washington consciously kept the House and Senate equally informed during his three-year negotiation of the Treaty with Algiers of 1795, in accord with Jefferson’s
views about proper conduct with treaties requiring substantial legislation); id. at 60-61 (discussing
measures by Washington to brief both houses during early negotiations with Great Britain preceding
Jay’s appointment).
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into binding foreign commitments. Even the President had no such power
under the Treaty Clause. His agreement with a foreign power, while not to
be casually discarded,226 did not bind the nation until the Senate had consented and the treaty was ratified.227 The Treaty Clause did, however, ordinarily contemplate that the President would be entitled to engage in preparatory acts without interference. An 1816 report by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, which advised against a proposed resolution recommending that the President pursue a treaty with Great Britain on specific
terms, asserted that the President’s constitutional responsibility as the U.S.
representative to foreign nations meant that he “must necessarily be most
competent to determine when, how, and upon what subjects negotiation
may be urged with the greatest prospect of success,” and that any interference necessarily diminished that responsibility.228
Whether or not the Committee’s minimalist view of the Senate’s role
was constitutionally inevitable229—and certainly both the Senate and Con226. Thus, Jefferson felt confident in claiming that the President was “the only channel of communication between this country and foreign nations[;] it is from him alone that foreign nations or their
agents are to learn what is or has been the will of the nation, and whatever he communicates as such,
they have a right and are bound to consider as the expression of the nation . . . .” Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Edmond C. Genet (Nov. 22, 1793), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 256 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh eds., 1903) [hereinafter JEFFERSON WRITINGS].
227. If the President possessed genuinely unilateral authority, it arose from an extra-textual source
independent of the Treaty Clause. For a thorough discussion of the original understanding of the President’s ability to enter into executive agreements, see Ramsey, Executive Agreements, supra note 108,
passim. The line between the President’s authority under the Treaty Clause and his ability to forge sole
executive agreements is far from clear, but it would appear that as the latter power grew more certain,
the emphasis on making the President choose between the procedures increased. Compare
Frelinghuysen v. Key, 110 U.S. 63, 75 (1884) (permitting the President, while a treaty was pending before the Senate, to act in accord with the agreement “until the diplomatic negotiations between the two
governments on the subject are finally concluded”), with SEC v. International Swiss Invs. Corp., 895
F.2d 1272, 1275-76 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding that the Inter-American Convention “has no force until
ratified by a two-thirds vote of the Senate,” at least as against conflicting Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and given stated presidential intention to treat the Convention as requiring ratification rather than
as an executive agreement).
228. See Foreign Relations Comm. Report of Feb. 15, 1816, in 8 COMPILATION OF REPORTS OF THE
COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE 1789-1901, S. DOC. NO. 56-231, at 24
(1901).
229. Justice Sutherland took the report’s language at face value. See United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (adopting a lengthy quote from the report’s discussion
of the President’s role as a representative in international relations). Others, however, dispute its relevance. Michael Glennon, for example, construes the Committee’s report as referring to “the President’s
sole power to communicate, not the power to do its job or that of the Senate or Congress,” GLENNON,
supra note 46, at 24, when in fact the Committee was plainly addressing the broader question of
whether it should employ advice to direct foreign relations. Raoul Berger simply gives the report the
back of his hand, citing contrary views expressed in an earlier report and a subsequent speech by Rufus
King, notwithstanding the fact that the 1816 report demurred to a resolution introduced by King. See
Berger, supra note 46, at 30-31. For thorough discussions of the report and its implications, see
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gress as a whole have deviated on occasion230—its assumption that there
was presidential authority not to enter into foreign engagements was uncontroversial. Even those with reservations about the federal treaty authority at least endorsed the constitutional authority of the President to derail
unwise international commitments. 231 Indeed, the treaty power unavoidably
invests the President with a variety of means to terminate the national intercourse with a foreign power, even without relying on the more extreme
option of derecognition. 232 And there appears to be no precedent for the notion that the Senate or Congress could compel the President to enter into
negotiations against his will.233 That challenge, instead, has come from below.
B. The Treaty Power’s Relation to State Authority
Much discussion of the relationship between federal treaty-making
authority and state power concerns the limits, if any, on the potential field
for federal treaties.234 Even broader reflections on the relationship between
foreign affairs and federalism are inclined toward this focus on the endgame of treaty-making, as with assertions that the federal interest in diploHAYDEN, supra note 135, at 199-208; Powell, The Founders, supra note 128, at 1528-33.
230. See, e.g., CRS, supra note 109, at 72-75 (describing nonbinding resolutions and binding legislation authorizing, calling for, or suggesting presidential negotiation on various topics).
231. See infra text accompanying note 269 (noting concerns that treaties not be too easily made).
An exception may be President Jefferson’s comment that the American “system” on treaties “was to
have none with any nation, as far as can be avoided,” in preference for more informal relations. Letter
from Jefferson to Philip Mazzei (July 18, 1804), in 11 J EFFERSON WRITINGS, supra note 226, at 38, 3839. It is not clear whether Jefferson was speaking of a constraint imposed by the Constitution, or a more
ephemeral party preference, but his comments do not indicate any indulgence for commitments entered
into without federal control.
232. The President has a variety of powers in this area:
It is on [the President’s] initiative and responsibility that the treaty–making process is undertaken; he determines what provisions the United States wishes to have embodied in the
treaty; he decides whether reservations or amendments that the Senate attaches to a draft
treaty are acceptable to him and should be submitted to the other parties to the treaty; and,
even if the Senate by two-thirds vote approves a treaty that he has negotiated, he may, influenced by change of heart or of political conditions, decide not to ratify it and at the last minute file it in his wastebasket.
HOLLIS W. B ARBER, F OREIGN POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES 30 (1953). The President may also determine whether to recognize a foreign government as the subject for negotiations, but that authority has
not always been respected. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 43-45.
233. Indeed, there is precedent to the contrary. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (“Into the field
of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.”); Earth Island
Inst. v. Christopher, 6 F.3d 648, 652-53 (9th Cir. 1993) (declining to enforce, on constitutional grounds,
a statutory requirement that the Secretary of State initiate certain negotiations with foreign countries to
achieve protection for sea turtles).
234. For an excellent elaboration and critique of the “nationalist view” of the treaty-making power,
which rejects any such limitations, see Bradley, The Treaty Power, supra note 29.
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macy is protected by the exclusive power to enter into binding treaties.235
But such accounts neglect the degree to which both the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution were concerned with establishing a federal
monopoly over the process of bargaining with foreign powers, not just its
results. State defiance of this monopoly was endemic at the beginning, and
was recognized as a threat to the successful negotiation—as well as avoidance—of preemptive federal treaties. Low-level defiance has persisted ever
since, but has only recently come to be viewed by some as legitimate,
largely because the standard view (or, as Jack Goldsmith puts it, “popular
lore”236) of state diplomacy as frustrating common ends has been lost.237
1. Text and Structure. Focusing on the Missouri v. Holland238
problem, Martin Flaherty recently opined that the constitutional clauses
granting the federal government “treaty-making and corollary powers . . .
are, on their face, as broad or broader as any other such provisions in the
document,”239 and that “[c]onversely, when the text does refer to states in
this area, it proclaims the exclusivity of federal power in no uncertain
terms.”240
Can it be that it was all so simple then? The “Power . . . to make Treaties” is certainly vested in the President, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate;241 treaties made “under the authority of the United States” are
surely part of the supreme law of the land;242 and states are expressly prohibited from “enter[ing] into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation.”243
But states may enter into an “Agreement or Compact” with a foreign
power, if so permitted by Congress,244 and it may be impossible for us to
recapture any clear distinction between such agreements and the prohibited
treaties, alliances, and confederations.245 The puzzling result, it has been
235. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1643-50, 1707.
236. Id. at 1644.
237. Cf. Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation? Federal Power vs. “States’ Rights” in Foreign
Affairs, 70 U. C OLO. L. R EV. 1277, 1311 (1999) [hereinafter Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation? ] (urging
recovery of “another reason for the Constitution that most of us learn in high school—that the national
government under the Articles of Confederation was hopelessly weak, especially in national affairs”).
238. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
239. Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation?, supra note 237, at 1305.
240. Id. at 1306.
241. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
242. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
243. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
244. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
245. See United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 459-63 & n.12 (1978)
(“The records of the Constitutional Convention . . . are barren of any clue as to the precise contours of
the agreements and compacts governed by the Compact Clause.”). For the sake of convenience, I will
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suggested, is that there is no distinction between the preparatory steps that a
state may take toward compacts and the federal government’s exclusive
exercise of treaty-making—each is free, in other words, to negotiate toward
its own legitimate ends.246
The Convention and ratification debates offer little insight, probably
because the Constitution’s prohibition on state treaty-making was thought
to be derived directly from the Articles of Confederation—a point emphasized by Publius.247 To Madison, the only differences were that the Constitution was “disembarrassed . . . of an exception under which treaties might
be substantially frustrated by regulations of the States,”248 and that the federal government was expressly given the power to appoint and receive not
refer to the class of “treaties, alliances, and confederations” as “treaties” and the class of “agreements or
compacts” as “compacts,” except where necessary to avoid confusion.
246. See infra text accompanying notes 333-58.
247. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (asserting
that the power to make treaties and the power to send and receive ambassadors “speak their own propriety. Both of them are comprised in the Articles of Confederation . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at
281 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The prohibition against treaties, alliances, and confederations makes a part of the existing articles of Union; and for reasons which need no explanation, is
copied into the new Constitution.”); David E. Engdahl, Characterization of Interstate Arrangements:
When Is a Compact Not a Compact?, 64 M ICH. L. R EV. 63, 80-81 (1965) (explaining that the Constitution expanded the prohibition against state treaty-making by eliminating the possibility of congressional
consent); Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1644 (“But the foreign relations provisions of
Article I, Section 10 were borrowed directly from the Articles of Confederation.”). Joseph Story’s account is worth quoting at length:
The prohibition against treaties, alliances, and confederations, constituted a part of the articles of confederation, and was from thence transferred in substance into the constitution. The
sound policy, nay, the necessity of it, for the preservation of any national government, is so
obvious, as to strike the most careless mind. If every state were at liberty to enter into any
treaties, alliances, or confederacies, with any foreign state, it would become utterly subversive of the power confided to the national government on the same subject. Engagements
might be entered into by different states, utterly hostile to the interests of neighbouring or
distant states; and thus the internal peace and harmony of the Union might be destroyed, or
put in jeopardy. A foundation might thus be laid for preferences, and retaliatory systems,
which would render the power of taxation, and the regulation of commerce, by the national
government, utterly futile. Besides; the intimate dangers to the Union ought not to be overlooked, by thus nourishing within its own bosom a perpetual source of foreign corrupt influence, which, in times of political excitement and war, might be wielded to the destruction of
the independence of the country. This, indeed, was deemed, by the authors of the Federalist,
too clear to require any illustration. The corresponding clauses in the confederation were still
more strong, direct, and exact, in their language and import.
3 STORY, supra note 124, § 1349 (footnotes omitted).
248. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 264-65 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Article IX
barred commercial treaties that would restrain the states “from imposing such imposts and duties on
foreigners, as their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of
any species of goods or commodities whatsoever.” See A RTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX. The “result [was] that . . . Congress could regulate trade by treaty, but could provide no effective check upon
conflicting state regulations—a deficiency which would cause Congress, its committees, and later secretaries of foreign affairs considerable embarrassment.” MORRIS, F ORGING, supra note 144, at 90; see
also infra text accompanying notes 266-67.
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just ambassadors, but also “other public Ministers and Consuls.”249 Such
additions, in his view, were consistent with the notion that “[i]f we are to
be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations.”250
To understand the Constitution, then, we must recover the meaning of
the Articles of Confederation. Article IX gave the United States the “sole
and exclusive right and power . . . of sending and receiving ambassadors
[and] entering into treaties and alliances.” 251 Article VI provided in relevant
part that “[n]o State without the consent of [Congress] . . . shall send any
embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into any conferrence
[sic], agreement, alliance, or treaty with any King prince or state.”252 Congressional consent was required, in other words, for any state desiring to
exercise those rights otherwise entrusted “solely” and “exclusively” to
Congress.253 From the presumptive prohibition—barring state activity unless permission were obtained—one can infer that consent needed to be
obtained beforehand.254 The same provision also required consent for the
249. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
250. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
251. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX.
252. Id. art. VI. I assume for purposes of this discussion that “any King prince or state” has the
same scope as the references to “foreign powers” in the Constitution. See infra note 499 and accompanying text (discussing state relations with foreign corporations). But see Timothy C. Blank, Significant
Development: A Proposed Application of the Compact Clause, 66 B.U. L. REV. 1067, 1076-78 (1986)
(speculating that the Constitution, by referring to compacts with “foreign powers,” expanded the reach
of the prohibition on state foreign relations activities articulated in the Articles of Confederation). The
Articles lacked any comparable provision for congressional review of interstate compacts, such as those
resolving boundary matters, but instead provided a special mechanism for dispute resolution. See
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX; Engdahl, supra note 247, at 81.
253. Though the text is unclear, it appears that the “consent” of Congress was required for “any
conferrence [sic], agreement, alliance, or treaty,” just as for the sending and receiving of an “embassy.”
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VI. Otherwise, states would seem to have lacked any provision for
making arrangements with foreign powers, and the new Constitution’s terms would have created a new
class of permissible state-based foreign relations—a result colliding both with the supposed lack of
meaningful change and the direction of constitutional reform as understood by Madison and others. See
Draft of ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (July 12, 1776), in 1 D OCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 169, at 79 (“No Colony or Colonies, without the Consent of the United States assembled, shall
send any Embassy to or receive any Embassy from, or enter into any Treaty, Convention or Conference
with the King or Kingdom of Great-Britain, or any foreign Prince or State . . . .”).
254. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1644 n.121 (assuming that “Article VI of the
Articles prohibited treaty-making by states without prior congressional consent” (emphasis added)); G.
Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 V A. L. R EV.
1, 12 (1999) (stating that “the states were required to seek the consent of Congress before entering into”
international agreements other than treaties). The July 12, 1776, draft was much clearer, providing in
Article V that “[n]o two or more colonies shall enter into any Treaty, Confederation or Alliance whatever between them, without the previous and free Consent and Allowance of the United States assembled, specifying accurately the Purposes for which the same is to be entered into, and how long it shall
continue.” Draft of ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (July 12, 1776), in 1 DOCUMENTARY
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diplomatic missions that might be thought a prerequisite for reaching
agreement. There, even more clearly, consent meant consent obtained beforehand, given the then-traditional means of instructing treaty negotiations. Consistent with this construction, Madison bemoaned the existence
of interstate compacts made “without previous application [to Congress] or
subsequent apology” as an “encroachment on the federal authority.”255
Because the Constitution lacks the Articles’s express requirement of
consent for state embassies, it is unclear whether consent was supposed to
be a prerequisite for negotiating or even for entering into compacts.256 But
the widespread assumption that the Constitution continued the Articles’s
bar on independent state diplomacy is more than tenable.257 The formal assignment to the President of control over diplomatic matters was intended
to expand federal authority, not contract it,258 and was perceived by MadiHISTORY, supra note 169, at 79 (emphasis added). The substance of this provision was substantially
preserved in the final Article VI, except that the “previous and free” qualifiers to “consent,” and the
reference to the “Allowance” of the United States, were eliminated. There is no surviving explanation
of the change.
255. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 316 (Madison’s notes).
256. Like the Articles, the Constitution does not specify when “consent” is required for agreements
or compacts, prohibiting states only from “enter[ing] into any Agreement or Compact . . . with a foreign Power.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
257. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 150 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing the embassy prohibition as an example of how “even the Articles of Confederation” diminished state independence and sovereignty); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 575-76 (1840) (“It was one of
the main objects of the Constitution to make us, so far as regarded our foreign relations, one people, and
one nation; and to cut off all communications between foreign governments, and the several state
authorities.”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 11 (1824) (“By the confederation . . . [n]o
state . . . could send or receive an embassy; nor make any treaty; nor enter into any compact with another State, or with a foreign power; nor lay duties, interfering with treaties which had been entered into
by Congress.”); infra text accompanying notes 339-58 (discussing Holmes); see also Bradford R. Clark,
Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1297-98 (1996)
(“[F]ew would argue that states possess authority to send and receive ambassadors, even though the
Constitution does not explicitly deny this power to the states.”); Ramsey, supra note 29, at 393-94 (“[I]t
seems unlikely that a state, or even a convention of states, could send or receive ambassadors on behalf
of the United States.”).
Professor Goldsmith criticizes the assumption that “this quintessentially international activity
should be anything other than an exclusive prerogative of the federal government.” Goldsmith, Federal
Courts, supra note 1, at 1707 & nn.367-68. He notes that “it is far from inconceivable that states retain
some authority to ‘send and receive ambassadors’”; to the extent that such activity “impinges on traditional diplomatic prerogatives,” the combination of the “express prohibition against states entering into
treaties or making compacts or waging war,” together with the preemptive force of federal enactments,
will sufficiently attenuate the possibility of state interference. Id. at 1707. For the reasons noted above,
though, it seems highly unlikely that the Constitution would have so substantially improved on the
authority of the states to conduct foreign affairs. See also infra Part III.B (discussing the adequacy of
positive substitutes for the dormant treaty theory).
258. The President was entrusted to “nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, [to] appoint Ambassadors [and] other public Ministers and Consuls,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2,
cl. 2, and “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers,” id. art. II, § 3. Although Hamilton, as
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son to be one of the many instances in which the new Constitution tended
to “obviate the necessity or the pretext for gradual and unobserved usurpations of power” by the states at Congress’s expense.259 The other assumptions of the Articles had not changed—under prevailing diplomatic practices, consent would ordinarily precede negotiation (at least),260 and would
certainly be necessary to preempt state attempts to engage in the prohibited
negotiation of treaties. Still, because the Constitution’s text is unclear on
this point, it is worth examining the problems to which the Articles and the
Constitution were responding.
2. Understanding at the Founding. The treaty powers assigned to the
federal government by the Constitution were designed to address specific
problems experienced under the Articles of Confederation. The clearest
problem was that states had failed to abide by federally negotiated
treaties.261 This sorely embarrassed the Continental Congress262 and had
Publius, stressed the essentially formal nature of these powers, his remarks were intended to minimize
the significance of this expansion relative to the Senate, not relative to the states. See THE FEDERALIST
NO. 69, at 420 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[I]t was far more convenient that it
should be arranged in this manner than that there should be a necessity of convening the legislature, or
one of its branches, upon every arrival of a foreign minister . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 518
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“As ambassadors and other ministers and agents in
foreign countries, the proposed constitution can make no other difference than to render their characters . . . more respectable . . . .”). See generally H ENKIN, supra note 1, at 37-39 (discussing the significance of the President’s powers in a horizontal context).
259. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 265 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Madison cited,
in particular, the ability to receive consuls from abroad, which had not been specifically provided under
the Articles.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 177, 206. This line of argument may seem inconsistent
with the preceding interpretation of the Treaty Clause, in which the Senate’s power of “advice and consent” was construed to permit Senate intervention after presidential negotiation—even notwithstanding
the additional prerogative of “advice,” which may be thought to emphasize the temporal priority of
legislative counsel. As indicated in the text, the varying interpretations of the Compact and Treaty
Clauses are best explained by the different problems confronting the Framers, which would have led
them to be more concerned about state freelancing and less confident concerning alternative means of
controlling it. As a purely textual matter, though, there is a patent difference between the Treaty
Clause’s grant of authority to the President, subject to advice and consent, and the Constitution’s prohibition of state authority subject to a permissive exception, particularly when the absolute bar on state
treaty-making is considered.
261. Treaties were not clearly designated as the supreme law of the land; even had they been, as
Frederick Marks has emphasized, “[t]here was no federal judiciary to decide cases in dispute between
federal and state governments, and no coercive force to back up such a judiciary had it existed.”
MARKS, supra note 144, at 3.
262. See DANIEL GEORGE LANG, FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE LAW OF
NATIONS AND THE BALANCE OF POWER 75 (1985) (“For men like Hamilton the inability of Congress to
fulfill its treaty obligations was embarrassing and troubling . . . .”); see also 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 138, at 316 (Madison’s notes):
The files of Congs. contain complaints already, from almost every nation with which treaties
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material consequences: for example, state failures to heed provisions of the
1783 Treaty of Paris were exploited by the British as a basis for their own
failure to withdraw militarily.263 The Supremacy Clause, together with the
Necessary and Proper Clause, was intended to allow the federal
government to ensure U.S. compliance with its international obligations.264
have been formed. Hitherto indulgence has been shewn to us. This cannot be the permanent
disposition of foreign nations. A rupture with other powers is among the greatest of national
calamities. It ought therefore to be effectually provided that no part of a nation shall have it
in its power to bring them on the whole.
263. See MARKS, supra note 144, at 5-11. British negotiators were fully aware that Congress generally lacked authority to enforce obligations against states. See MORRIS, F ORGING, supra note 144, at
364 n.5 (observing that Americans made clear to the British that “Congress lacked the power to enforce
treaty obligations”); M ORRIS, P EACEMAKERS, supra note 183, at 379-80 (describing the aggressive negotiation by the British of the Treaty of Paris and noting the states’ failure to abide by the treaty’s provisions for restitution for state seizure of British property); see also P ETER ONUF & N ICHOLAS ONUF,
FEDERAL UNION, MODERN WORLD: T HE LAW OF NATIONS IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTIONS 1776-1814, at
121 (1993) (contrasting the British refusal to negotiate trade concessions for America with a liberal
British treaty with France and concluding that this difference resulted from America’s inability to enforce its treaties). It is clear now that the British reluctance to vacate their forts was foreordained. See,
e.g., BEMIS, supra note 168, at 70-72 (discussing the relationship between Great Britain’s refusal to
abandon its posts and the states’ refusal to abide by the Treaty of Paris); ELKINS & M CKITRICK, supra
note 184, at 126 (stating that that the inability of Congress to enforce its treaties was a “settled excuse”
for British resistance to the withdrawal of troops demanded by the Treaty of Paris, and the resistance
was actually prompted by British concern over its control of the fur trade and over the military security
of Canada); MORRIS, FORGING, supra note 144, at 201-03.
At the time, though, Jay reacted to the British allegations of treaty infringements by drafting a
strong analysis of the incompetence of states to make, interpret, or breach any compacts whatsoever,
which Congress then adopted. See Letter from President of Congress to the State Governors (Apr. 13,
1787), in 3 E MERGING NATION, supra note 179, at 472, 473 (“Treaties must be implicitly received and
observed by every member of the Nation; for as State Legislatures are not competent to the making of
such Compacts or Treaties, so neither are they competent in that capacity, authoritatively to decide on,
or ascertain the construction and Sense of them.” (emphasis added)); see also M ORRIS, FORGING, supra
note 144, at 202 (describing Jay’s letter and the resulting congressional resolution as the foundation for
the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause).
264. See MARKS, supra note 144, at 14-15; Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation?, supra note 237, at
1312-15; see also, e.g., 1 F ARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 164, 316 (Madison’s notes); James
Madison, Preface to Debates in the Convention of 1787, in 3 F ARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at
539, 548. As Hamilton observed:
The treaties of the United States, under the present Constitution, are liable to the infractions
of thirteen different legislatures, and as many different courts of final jurisdiction, acting under the authority of those legislatures. The faith, the reputation, the peace of the whole Union, are thus continually at the mercy of the prejudices, the passions, and the interests of
every member of which it is composed. Is it possible that foreign nations can either respect
or confide in such a government? Is it possible that the people of America will longer consent to trust their honor, their happiness, their safety, on so precarious a foundation?
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 151 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
As is made clear elsewhere in this discussion, Article VI supremacy does not by itself obviate the
need to accord preemptive force to the federal treaty power; among other things, satisfactory treaties
could not easily be attained were the states entitled to negotiate on their own behalf, or on behalf of the
United States. Professor Ramsey’s recent suggestion, in considering Representative Lee Hamilton’s
concerns about the Massachusetts Burma law, that “a treaty relating to sanctions would be drafted to
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These same experiences also suggested that America needed a means of
forcing other nations to comply with their obligations. 265 The power under
the Constitution to regulate domestic and foreign commerce was thought to
be essential in forcing other nations to cease discriminatory conduct against
U.S. commerce266 and in protecting other vital interests.267
remove state as well as federal sanctions and would preempt state law under Article VI,” see Ramsey,
supra note 29, at 382 n.148 (emphasis added), is correct only to the extent that a treaty could be so
drafted. But Representative Hamilton may have had in mind the federal anti-apartheid sanctions, which
preempted state sanctions neither when passed nor when repealed, or trade accords that have gone to
great length to exempt state laws from challenge. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-465, § 102, 108 Stat. 4809, 4815-19 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (1994)) (barring anyone
other than the United States, including private parties, from challenging U.S. or state action or inaction
based on its consistency with the statute, as well as providing a process by which the United States is to
consult with the states and provide notice to Congress before taking legal action against a state or local
government for noncompliance with the statute); Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1087 (1986) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 5001), repealed by South African Democratic Transition Support, Pub. L. No. 103-149, §§ 4(a)(1), (a)(2), (c)(1), (c)(2), 107 Stat. 1504 (1993)
(urging states, local governments, and private entities to repeal restrictions on economic interactions
with South Africa). Whether or not this poses a substantial additional hurdle to the exercise of national
power, it plainly shows that Article VI does not invariably obviate the need for other forms of federal
preemption.
Nor, conversely, can it fairly be said that the dormant treaty power would render “the treaty provisions of Article VI largely superfluous.” Ramsey, supra note 29, at 406. Not only is Article VI necessary in order to maintain the significance of Senate consent and presidential ratification, cf. id. at 406
n.232 (conceding that “Article VI still might serve to make treaties superior to federal law”), but it is
required to permit treaties to preempt state and local laws that do not interfere with the dormant treaty
power, yet are of national concern, see infra text accompanying notes 484, 527.
265. See, e.g., James Wilson’s Opening Address to Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 24,
1787), in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 196, at 791, 800 (citing the “lamentable history”
of America’s inability to retard imports (or at least gain revenue through tariffs), its inability to export,
and its inability to “perform treaties on our own part, or to compel a performance on the part of the
contracting nation”).
266. See Marks, supra note 165, at 308 (claiming that “commercial problems caused by inability to
retaliate effectively against foreign trade restrictions tended, more than anything else, to unite the new
nation” and pointing out that “by 1786 it was evident to all but a few that the states acting individually
would never achieve the uniformity necessary to retaliate against external constraints or to vest Congress with requisite power. This despite the fact that nearly all states agreed on the need to do so.”); see
also ALBERT ANTHONY GIESECKE, A MERICAN COMMERCIAL LEGISLATION BEFORE 1789, ch. 6 (1910)
(describing the prevalence and failings of state-level trade legislation); MARKS, supra note 144, at 6970, 80-83 (discussing disappointing attempts by individual states to mount retaliatory policies);
VERNON G. S ETSER, T HE COMMERCIAL RECIPROCITY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1774-1829, at
63-65 (1937) (concluding that the lack of uniformity permitted individual states to profit from restrictions adopted by neighboring states, allowed Great Britain to invoke restrictions on trade to only those
vessels carrying goods from that state, and gave rise to embarrassing conflicts); Letter from John Adams to John Jay (June 26, 1785), in 2 E MERGING NATION, supra note 179, at 672-73 (emphasizing the
need for uniform measures); Letter from Adams to Jay (July 19, 1785), in 2 E MERGING NATION, supra
note 179, at 699 (same). A congressional committee reported in 1784 that
unless the United States can act as a nation and be regarded as such by foreign powers, and
unless Congress for this purpose shall be vested with powers competent to the protection of
Commerce they can never command reciprocal advantages in trade and without such reciprocity our foreign commerce must decline and eventually be annihilated.
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The Framers were not content, however, merely to achieve universal
compliance with existing treaties as an end in itself; to the contrary, enforcement was also seen as a means of enhancing the federal government’s
power to create treaties. 268 Although some were concerned that treaties not
be too easily made,269 there was also an overwhelming consensus on the
26 JCC, supra note 144, at 318-19 (Apr. 30, 1784); see also Letter from Adams to Jay (May 8, 1785), in
2 E MERGING NATION, supra note 179, at 620, 623 (urging that “it behoves [sic] the United States then
to knit themselves together . . . form their foreign Commerce into a System, and encourage their own
Navigation and Seamen, and to these Ends their carrying Trade” and expressing the fear that “[w]e shall
never be able to do this, unless Congress are vested with full Power, under the Limitations prescribed of
15 Years and the Concurrence of Nine States, of forming Treaties of Commerce with foreign Powers”).
Jay was so convinced that he advocated delaying the conclusion of treaties where possible, and advocated limiting the duration of those treaties that were too far along, because the advent of a centralized
government would so improve the U.S. negotiating posture. See MORRIS, F ORGING, supra note 144, at
207-08. This argument was naturally invoked in attempts to gain support for the new Constitution. See
THE FEDERALIST NO. 11, at 85-86 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); T HE FEDERALIST
NO. 22, at 144 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). The American estimation of foreign
perceptions seems to have been accurate. See MARKS, supra note 144, at 83 (quoting a British magazine
that dubbed the American states as the “thirteen Dis-United States”); MORRIS, FORGING, supra note
144, at 194 (citing the British assurance that this dissention would prevent Americans from taking
measures against Great Britain); O NUF & O NUF, supra note 264, at 120 (citing the British perception of
this disharmony and sentiments that the Americans did not merit serious attention).
267. Jay, perhaps having the Mississippi mess in mind, was particularly attentive to this potential.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 4, at 47-48 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (assuring that “[i]n the
formation of treaties, [one government] will regard the interest of the whole, and the particular interests
of the parts as connected with that of the whole” and declaring that one government “can apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State governments or separate confederacies can possibly do, for want of concert and unity
of system”).
268. Thus, Chief Justice Marshall, elaborating the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause doctrine in
Brown v. Maryland, recounted that
[t]he oppressed and degraded state of commerce, previous to the adoption of the constitution
can scarcely be forgotten. It was regulated by foreign nations, with a single view to their
own interests; and our disunited efforts to counteract their restrictions were rendered impotent by want of combination. Congress, indeed, possessed the power of making treaties; but
the inability of the federal government to enforce them had become so apparent as to render
that power in a great degree useless.
Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 445-46 (1827); see also Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra
note 29, at 1230.
269. Such comments are occasionally invoked as a guide for interpreting the intended scope of the
treaty power. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 1, at 442 n.2 (quoting Convention participants in support of
a limited reading); Bradley, The Treaty Power, supra note 29, at 410-11 (same). But they were made for
a variety of other purposes. Gouverneur Morris made the point in advocating an amendment that would
have permitted treaties to be binding only where ratified by law—but he failed to persuade others at the
Convention, and he seemed in any event to be mainly concerned about treaties of alliance. See 2
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 392-93 (Madison’s notes). Madison, too, remarked that “it
had been too easy in the present Congress to make Treaties,” id. at 548—perhaps an allusion to the
Mississippi—but spoke for his own proposal to make treaties of peace easier, see id . at 540. Finally,
James Wilson projected that there would be few treaties, but he was concerned chiefly with minimizing
the case against the Senate by stressing how infrequently it would meet, and secondarily with the difficulties posed by European alliances. See James Wilson, Summation and Final Rebuttal (Dec. 11, 1787),
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need to maximize U.S. leverage through unified, centralized treaty negotiations.270 This was understood to require not only greater substantive federal authority, but also the means to prudently exercise it. The goal of becoming “one nation” for foreign affairs,271 rather than a “thirteen-headed
sovereign,”272 was to be promoted internally by replacing state-centered decisionmaking with the representation of state interests in the Senate.273 Externally, the new Constitution would dispel any foreign uncertainty about
where legislative competence lay.274
An indispensable assumption of this new scheme was that the Constitution would strengthen the principle of federal exclusivity that the Articles
of Confederation had already attempted to instill. The risk that states would
reciprocate the occasional interest of foreign nations in establishing formal
diplomatic relations was not considered great—on that score, an occasional
admonition from the national government was generally thought sufficient.275 There remained the risk, however, that individual states would sap
in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 196, at 831, 851.
270. See C RANDALL, supra note 206, at 50; LANG, supra note 262, at 80-81 (discussing this need
as highlighted by the weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation); Marks, supra note 165, at 308
(noting that “by 1786 it was evident to all but a few that the States acting individually” would never be
able to maximize American bargaining power). See generally BEMIS, supra note 168, ch. 5 (describing
dissatisfaction with negotiations during the Jeffersonian period and the War of 1812); MARKS, supra
note 144, ch. 2 (describing the rise of nationalist sentiment regarding commercial authority); id. at 14651 (describing a Convention debate on this topic).
271. See, e.g., T HE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (declaring that “[i]f we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 16, 1786), in 10 J EFFERSON PAPERS,
supra note 218, at 603 (instructing that national government should “make us one nation as to foreign
concerns, and keep us distinct in Domestic ones”).
272. Paul, supra note 221, at 730.
273. Thus, under the Constitution, it was no longer necessary to prevail upon at least nine states in
order to secure congressional approval for a treaty or to pursue certain commercial matters through the
wholly independent agencies of the 13 states. See MORRIS, F ORGING, supra note 144, at 91 (detailing
problems of “indifference and irresponsibility” that plagued the delegates to the Continental Congress);
Paul, supra note 221, at 730-31 (detailing the weaknesses of the Union and their effects on America’s
place in the world). The fact that the Senate was expected to defend state interests has been emphasized
in the recent literature. See Bradley, The Treaty Power, supra note 29, at 412; Goldsmith, Federal
Courts, supra note 1, at 1645. However, the difference between the federal expression of state interests
and independent state action has perhaps not been sufficiently appreciated—nor has the intended function of the President in checking state preferences. See supra text accompanying notes 193-99.
274. For representative expressions of uncertainty, see Letter from W.S. Smith to John Jay (Apr. 1,
1787), in 5 R EVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 183, at 459-60 (“‘[W]ith respect to the American Governments, . . . we do not know whether they are under one head, directed by
many, or whether they have any head at all.’” (quoting Lord Grenville)); id. at 460; Letter from Comte
de Moustier to Comte de Montmorin (Apr. 21, 1788), in 3 E MERGING NATION, supra note 179, at 761,
762 (expressing uncertainty about Congress’s competency).
275. Foreign interest in conducting 13-part relations seems to have been easily rebuffed. In 1781,
John Adams resisted a proposal for separate negotiations between Great Britain and each of the 13

1198

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:1127

the national government’s negotiating authority through less direct means.
In addition to their authority over foreign commerce,276 states engaged foreign governments on matters as prosaic as loans277 and as fundamental as
political independence.278 As Madison put it, shortly before the Constitutional Convention, “[e]xamples of [encroachments by the states on the federal authority] are numerous and repetitions may be foreseen in almost
every case where any favorite object of a State shall present a temptation.”279
These activities imperiled the national interest in a number of regards.
State trading policies, even if unilateral, risked impairing common negotiating efforts. Seemingly benign decisions, like the efforts by some states to
resume trade with Great Britain upon the cessation of hostilities, had been
“disastrous” for ongoing efforts by U.S. negotiators to achieve commercial
states. As he reported to the French, such an approach would breach the Articles of Confederation, and
it would be a “public disrespect and contempt offered to the constitution of the nation” for any foreign
power to so circumvent the Congress. Letter from John Adams to Vergennes (July 21, 1781), in 4
REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 183, at 595. According to Adams,
“[t]here is no method . . . to convey anything to the people of America but through the Congress of the
United States, nor any way of negociating [sic] with them but by means of that body.” Id. at 596; see
also MARKS, supra note 144, at 123 (discussing the demand by Great Britain “for thirteen ambassadors
from the United States”); M ORRIS, FORGING, supra note 144, at 66-67; Letter from Jay to Adams (Aug.
3, 1785), in 2 EMERGING NATION, supra note 179, at 720 (“There is no Reason to suspect that the different States even wish to send Ministers to foreign Powers in any other Way than the one directed by
the Confederation.”); Letter from Adams to Jay (May 8, 1785), in 2 E MERGING NATION, supra note
179, at 621 (noting settled authority under the Articles and viewing the contrary view of British officials
as attributable either to misunderstanding or a desire for delay). For one account of an inadvertent
breach by a Swedish consul, and a swift reaction by Jay, see Gary D. Olson, The Soderstrom Incident:
A Reflection upon Federal-State Relations Under the Articles of Confederation, 55 N.Y. HIST. S OC’Y
Q. 109 (1971).
Rufus King’s assessment at the Convention was not inaccurate:
The states were not “sovereigns” in the sense contended for by some. They did not possess
the peculiar features of sovereignty. They could not make war, nor peace, nor alliances, nor
treaties. Considering them as political Beings, they were dumb, for they could not speak to
any foreign Sovereign whatever. They were deaf, for they could not hear any propositions
from such Sovereign.
1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 138, at 323 (Madison’s notes).
276. See supra note 266.
277. See MARKS, supra note 144, at 4.
278. Vermonters, for example, who had intrigued with the British throughout the Revolutionary
War in order to gain independence from New York and New Hampshire, were bought off only by false
promises of statehood near the close of the war, and they continued to deal directly with Great Britain
through the 1780s. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 137, at 86-87 (concluding that this and similar controversies helped weaken the Articles of Confederation). Jay was also suspicious of ties between Vermont
and Canada, and he suspected that Shay’s Rebellion of 1786 had been assisted by the British in Canada.
See HORSMAN, supra note 166, at 34.
279. James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in THE MIND
OF THE FOUNDERS: S OURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 83, 83 (Marvin Meyers
ed., 1973).
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concessions as part of the general peace. 280 Conversely, separate attempts at
retaliation came to be regarded not only as ineffectual, but also as posing
the risk of diplomatic contretemps and counterattack against the entire nation.281 Most generally, the Framers saw the coordinated conduct of foreign
policy as indispensable for rescuing America’s diplomatic dignity and domestic unity. Separate state conduct threatened to perpetuate the low esteem in which U.S. ministers, and the nation as a whole, were held
abroad,282 with material effect on the prospects for securing commercial
280. MARKS, supra note 144, at 151; see also L ANG, supra note 262, at 76 (discussing Sheffield’s
view that individual American states would compete for British trade, making the treaty unnecessary);
Letter from Chevalier de la Luzerne to Comte de Vergennes (Apr. 15, 1783), in 2 E MERGING NATION,
supra note 179, at 89, 89-90 (forecasting, and criticizing, the premature rush of different states for British trade); R AKOVE, supra note 146, at 346 (pointing out that “some delegates already believed that the
country had to be protected from its own lust for British goods”).
Other state attempts to grant concessions to particular nations with generosity backfired because
of treaty rights already fashioned for others. See 33 JCC, supra note 144, at 676, 678-83 (Oct. 13, 1787)
(adopting resolutions apologizing to the Netherlands for Virginia measures that favored import of
French brandies and reprinting the views of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs); see also id. at 522-26
(reprinting a committee report concerning those Virginia measures); infra text accompanying notes
297-300. Jefferson had anticipated this problem. See Answers to Démeunier’s First Queries (Jan. 24,
1786), in 10 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 218, at 11, 15-16.
281. Hamilton remarked that “[s]everal States have endeavored by separate prohibitions, restrictions, and exclusions to influence the conduct of [Great Britain] in this particular,” and he warned that
“the want of concert, arising from the want of a general authority and from clashing and dissimilar
views in the States, has hitherto frustrated every experiment of the kind, and will continue to do so as
long as the same obstacles to a uniformity of measures continue to exist.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at
144 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). He also noted the prospect of embarrassment:
“The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States, contrary to the true spirit of the Union,
have, in different instances, given just cause of umbrage and complaint to others . . . .” Id. at 144. Hamilton warned that “it is to be feared that examples of this nature, if not restrained by a national control,
would be multiplied and extended till they became not less serious sources of animosity and discord
than injurious impediments to the intercourse between the different parts of the Confederacy.” Id. at
144-45; see also T HE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(proposing that “the peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a PART. The Union will
undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members.”); Madison, supra note
279, at 84 (noting that “those disputes with other nations, which being among the greatest of public calamities, it ought to be least in the power of any part of the community to bring on the whole”); cf. T HE
FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 265 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (criticizing the Articles of
Confederation for “leav[ing] it in the power of any indiscreet member to embroil the Confederacy with
foreign nations”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 281 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (explaining that under the Constitution, letters of marque required licenses from the federal government
even following declaration of war, an amendment “fully justified by the advantage of uniformity in all
points which relate to foreign powers; and of immediate responsibility to the nation in all those for
whose conduct the nation itself is to be responsible”).
282. See Marks, supra note 165, at 313-19 (attributing low esteem and low national pride to independent state conduct of foreign relations). With a divided sovereignty, America had a hard time persuading foreign governments to conduct the most basic diplomatic relations. At the time of the Convention, Great Britain had still not sent an ambassador to America, but the United States felt that until
the new Constitution was adopted it lacked the wherewithal to reciprocate the slight. See 33 JCC, supra
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advantage.283 Foreign intrigue with states and private citizens was also
widely regarded as a serious threat to the union.284
This spectrum of concerns was again well illustrated in the matter of
the negotiations over the Mississippi. Notwithstanding concerns about the
direction of negotiations,285 southerners were by no means sure that they
desired the treaty-making power of Congress to be impaired. Under the
status quo, the northern states, with their lesser attachment to western emigration and greater emphasis on foreign commercial opportunity, would
use the issue to divide the nation in two.286 Accordingly, many insisted that
the only way to ensure access to the Mississippi was through a treaty negotiated by a unified federal power. Responding in the Virginia convention to
Patrick Henry’s warning that the new government would give away American rights, Madison declared:
No treaty has been formed, and I will undertake to say, that none will
be formed under the old system, which will secure to us the actual enjoynote 144, at 520-21 (Sept. 24, 1787) (report of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs) (cautioning that returning the slight “would eventually produce more inconveniences than advantages”); Letter from Adams to Jay (Feb. 14, 1788), in 3 EMERGING NATION, supra note 179, at 723 (complaining of being
treated with “dry Decency and cold Civility abroad”).
283. Hamilton and Jay, as Publius, hammered these points home . See THE FEDERALIST NO. 4, at 49
(John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (explaining that foreign nations would respect a united America,
but “[i]f, on the other hand, they find us either destitute of an effectual government . . . or split into
three or four independent and probably discordant republics or confederacies . . . what a poor, pitiful
figure will America make in their eyes!”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 5, at 53 (John Jay) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (warning of the same); THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 107 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (claiming that “[t]he imbecility of our government even forbids [foreign
powers] to treat with us. Our ambassadors abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty.”); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 149 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (cautioning that “[a]
nation, with which we might have a treaty of commerce, could with much greater facility prevent our
forming a connection with her competitor in trade, even though such a connection should be ever so
beneficial to ourselves”). Onuf and Onuf relate that “Revolutionary diplomats sought, but failed, to negotiate treaties that would secure national independence, foster trade and promote a more lawful world,”
and that “Britain refused to negotiate a commercial treaty with the erstwhile colonists that would reopen
lucrative West Indian markets.” ONUF & O NUF, supra note 264, at 95. They also add that “Spain’s refusal to acknowledge American rights to the free use of the Mississippi precipitated sectional divisions
that threatened the union.” Id. Finally, “[c]onstitutional reformers recognized that advantageous treaties,
particularly with Britain and Spain, were the sine qua non of union. They also knew that the creation of
a strong union was an essential precondition for success in negotiating such treaties.” Id.
284. See MARKS, supra note 144, at 100-01(detailing the fear of subversive activity).
285. See supra text accompanying notes 168-93; see also Letter from Madison to James Madison,
Sr. (Nov. 1, 1786), in 9 M ADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 153-54 (expressing such concerns and a
fear that the entire project might be frustrated).
286. See HENDERSON, supra note 179, at 394-95 (detailing thoughts of disunion); Drew R. McCoy,
James Madison and Visions of American Nationality in the Confederation Period: A Regional Perspective, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL
IDENTITY 226, 243 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987) (noting Monroe’s conviction that the eastern
states would convince the middle states to join them in forming a permanent “northern bloc”).
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ment of the navigation of the Mississippi. Our weakness precludes us
from it. We are entitled to it. But it is not under an inefficient Government that we shall be able to avail ourselves fully of that right.—I most
conscientiously believe, that it will be far better secured under the new
Government, than the old, as we will be more able to enforce our right.287

Madison’s emphasis on the “inefficiency” and “weakness” of the existing government is vague, as is the means by which the new government
would resolve these matters,288 but Madison and his contemporaries clearly
viewed unity, and the appearance of authority, as instrumental to successful
negotiations with the Spanish. All this was plainly threatened by the attempts of westerners and foreign powers to circumvent the national monopoly on negotiations. Beginning in the mid-1780s, Tennessee, Kentucky,
287. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 169, at 1225 (statement of Madison) (June 12, 1788).
As Madison put it in private correspondence, “[w]hat ought to be desired therefore by the Western people is not so much that no treaty should be made, as that some treaty should be made which will procure
them an immediate and peaceable use of the river.” Letter from Madison to George Nicholas (May 17,
1788), in 11 M ADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 49; accord 10 D OCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
169, at 1242 (statement of Madison) (June 13, 1788); Letter from Madison to George Nicholas (Apr. 8,
1788), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 169, at 707; Letter from Madison to John Brown
(Apr. 9, 1788), in 9 D OCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 169, at 711-12; Letter from Madison to Jefferson (Aug. 12, 1786), in 9 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 97; see also 9 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 169, at 1117 (statement of Marshall) (demanding “[h]ow shall we attain [the Mississippi]? By retaining that weak Government which has hitherto kept it from us?”); An Address from
an American (Tenche Coxe) to the Members of the Virginia Convention (May 21, 1788), in 9
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 169, at 832, 835-36:
[S]uch is the effect of our distracted politics, and of the feebleness of our general government, that foreign powers openly declare their unwillingness to treat with us, while our affairs remain on the present footing . . . . [Yet, as with Great Britain and France,] [t]he Court
of Spain too, however they might be influenced by a firm and respectable union, will never
listen to our demands for the navigation of the Mississippi, while we remain in our present
unconnected situation. We are no object even of respect to them much less of apprehension;
and should the present constitution be rejected, they will laugh at all future attempts to continue or invigorate the union. Our Minister at that Court expects to effect no arrangements
there, without an efficient government being first adopted here.
Accord Resolution of the Inhabitants of Pittsburgh, P ITTSBURGH GAZETTE, Nov. 17, 1787, reprinted in
1 D EBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 196, at 324, 324 (citing as the one specific advantage of
Constitution its improvement on “the weakness of Congress” to negotiate with Spain and Britain so as
to obtain the advantages of the Mississippi trade to obtain compliance with foreign treaty obligations to
surrender defensive outposts). But see 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 169, at 1211 (statement
of Patrick Henry) (June 12, 1788) (warning that “[t]he navigation of the Mississippi, which is of so
much importance to the happiness of the people of this country, may be lost by the operation of [the
Constitution]”).
288. It would have been hard to state with confidence that sectionalism in Congress would cease, or
that Spain would soon rethink its decision to close the Mississippi. The reopening of the Mississippi in
1788, and Spain’s eventual capitulation in Pinckney’s Treaty of 1795, in fact owed more to Spain’s difficulties in Europe and to westward emigration than to any constitutional evolution in the United States.
See Allen, supra note 170, at 466-67 (concluding that “European diplomacy ultimately combined with
American expansion and Spanish setbacks in the old Southwest to bring about a victory for the United
States in the Mississippi affair”).
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and Georgia separatists alternately threatened, and conspired with, the
Spanish in attempts to obtain commercial privileges and access to the Mississippi.289 Others sought French intervention with Spain,290 and even the
British tried their hand at influence.291 Such efforts were frequently at odds
with one another and complicated bilateral negotiations: Spain was entreated by some, for example, not to capitulate on Mississippi navigation,
so as better to foment western revolt.292 These intrigues could substantially
be resolved by entering into a satisfactory treaty, but it was also abundantly
clear that stamping out such divisive attempts at foreign relations was a
precondition for any optimal treaty. 293 It is striking that, in the midst of partisan debate over federal prerogatives, there was little or no argument that
subnational entreaties were permissible or appropriate under the Articles of
Confederation.
Ostensibly unilateral acts were viewed in exactly the same light. In
1787, for example, Virginia had to officially disavow the reprisals by its
sometime-agent General George Rogers Clark against the property of
289. For accounts of these fascinating and complicated episodes, see SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS,
PINCKNEY’S TREATY: AMERICA’S ADVANTAGE FROM EUROPE’S DISTRESS, 1783-1800 chs. 6-7 (reprint
1965) (1960) (focusing on the Spanish conspiracy with Kentucky and Tennessee); HORSMAN, supra
note 166, at 37 (focusing on the dealings of Tennesseans and Kentuckians); WHITAKER, supra note 171
(same); Allen, supra note 170, at 466 (detailing Spain’s plan to gain the loyalties of western Americans); see also G REEN, supra note 187 (focusing on Kentucky); The Spanish Conspiracy in Tennessee,
3 TENN. HIST. MAG. 229 (1917) (focusing on Tennessee). Reginald Horsman described the significance
of these experiences:
The problem of conducting an effective foreign policy was only one ingredient in a complex
of motives that eventually led to a new constitution, but it was an important one. It was not
simply that many were disappointed with the inability of Congress to shape effective commercial agreements with Great Britain, Spain, or other powers, or that there was an obvious
inability to defend American interests against either the Indian tribes or foreign powers in
the Mississippi Valley, it was now strongly felt that the situation on the borders of the
United States threatened the very security and survival of the republic.
HORSMAN, supra note 166, at 37.
290. See HENDERSON, supra note 179, at 397-98 (describing contacts with Otto, a French charge
d’affaires).
291. See HORSMAN, supra note 166, at 33-34 (noting British attempts to recruit American citizens);
see also Letter from Madison to Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1787), in 9 M ADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at
320 (stating that “[i]t is hinted to me that British partisans are already feeling the pulse of some of the
West settlements”).
292. See THOMAS PERKINS ABERNATHY, W ESTERN LANDS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 330
(1937) (detailing one such entreaty, from General James Wilkinson, a Kentucky merchant).
293. Under Madison’s guidance, for example, Virginia censured lawless action against the Spanish
and Indians in the Kentucky district, but paired that resolution with one urging that the westerners be
given prompt satisfaction through the negotiation of a treaty with Spain guaranteeing navigation rights.
See Resolutions on Western Law Enforcement and Mississippi Navigation (editorial note), in 8
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 124. One of the most active conspirators, James Wilkinson, seems
to have believed that the new Constitution would spell the end of his intrigues. See ABERNATHY, supra
note 292, at 330, 347.
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Spanish subjects, in retaliation for Spanish policy on the Mississippi.294
Secretary Jay and Congress registered their disapproval even more
strongly,295 even complaining that Virginia’s communication of its disavowal to Spain had violated the federal government’s monopoly on communicating with foreign governments.296 Virginia’s preferential treatment
of French brandies also provoked controversy after the Dutch protested that
their most-favored-nation status under the bilateral treaty had been violated.297 A congressional committee reviewing the protest, unsure of
whether Virginia’s favors were gratuitous or compensatory, took the view
that any quid pro quo would violate the constitutional norm “that no State,
or part of the nation, shall have any part in making a treaty . . . between the
nation and a foreign power, but by its delegates in the national Council.”298
Secretary of State Jay’s report, which Congress later followed, considered
the Virginia policy gratuitous, but cautioned as to the disruptive effect of
unilateral state trade policies. Citing Article VI of the Articles of Confederation, Jay noted that “[t]his Article appears to have been calculated to
preserve uniformity, not only in our political, but also in our commercial
Systems. If no Individual State can contract with a foreign power, it fol294. See GREEN, supra note 187, at 78-80; WHITAKER, supra note 171, at 81, 97.
295. See 32 JCC, supra note 144, at 189-99 (Apr. 13, 1787) (reflecting Jay’s recommendations that
Congress formally declare its “displeasure” with the “offenders” and immediately punish them); id. at
231 (Apr. 24, 1787) (calling on the Secretary of War to intervene). Not incidentally, on the same day
Congress received Jay’s report, it ordered issuance of the strong reminder, also drafted by Jay, of the
states’ comprehensive lack of authority either to make or construe treaties. See supra note 263.
296. See 32 JCC, supra note 144, at 189-99 (Apr. 13, 1787) (reprinting Jay’s report of Apr. 12,
1787). Among the Virginia delegates reprimanded by Jay was Madison, who had, after communicating
the Virginia governor’s declaration, participated in what he described as a “free conversation” on the
subject of the western temper and the Mississippi. See GREEN, supra note 187, at 79-80 n.*; see also id.
at 81 n.* (noting that Madison urged prosecution of Clark under state law).
In another episode involving the Mississippi, the Georgia state assembly created a district called
Bourbon County in territory claimed not only by Georgia, but by Spain and the United States as well.
Four justices of the peace from Georgia were instructed to negotiate with Spain, but one exceeded his
authority, threatened Spain, and was expelled by the Spanish governor. After receiving Spanish protests, Congress condemned the activities and apologized to Spain. See ABERNATHY, supra note 292, at
312-13, 323; WHITAKER, supra note 171, at 55-58; Letter from Madison to Monroe (June 21, 1785)
(editorial note), in 8 M ADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 308 n.2. Madison, seeking further information, professed to “willingly suppose that no State could be guilty either of so flagrant an outrage on the
fÉderal [sic] Constitution, or of so imprudent a mode of pursuing their claims against a foreign Nation.” Letter from Madison to Monroe (June 21, 1785), in 8 M ADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 30607.
297. See, e.g., SETSER, supra note 266, at 64.
298. Accordingly, it drafted a resolution providing that “no individual state can constitutionally,
without the Consent of the [Congress], make any compensation for privileges or exemptions granted in
trade Navigation or Commerce by any foreign power to the United States or any of them.” 33 JCC, supra note 144, at 526 (Sept. 24, 1787). Moreover, any simple grant of privileges or exemptions would
have to be extended to any nation given most favored nation status under U.S. treaties. See id.
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lows that the States individually can grant no privileges otherwise than
gratuitously.”299 Put simply, even implicit exchanges with foreign powers
ran afoul of the federal monopoly on treaty negotiations.300
Madison understood this point completely, 301 and there was no consideration of weakening this norm under the proposed Constitution. If anything, the experience of the Framers pointed to the importance of insisting
on the federal prerogative. By extending the federal treaty monopoly to
commercial matters previously reserved to the states,302 the Constitution
eliminated any pretext state and local authorities may have had for engaging in bargaining with Spain and the other relevant foreign powers.

299. Id. at 682-83 (Oct. 13, 1787).
300. Professor Ramsey’s recently published work cites a number of state enactments discriminating
against foreign nations, some seeking a quid pro quo of some kind. Addressing the thesis that the Constitution barred all state activities impacting foreign affairs, he observes that “the framers plainly knew
of the states’ propensity to legislate with foreign policy objectives,” but took no obvious action to enshrine any new principle of exclusivity. Ramsey, supra note 29, at 390 n.181 (citing Pennsylvania,
Massachusetts, and Virginia laws); see also GIESECKE, supra note 266, ch. 6 (describing the ubiquity of
state-level trade legislation discriminating against foreign nations and other states under the Articles of
Confederation); SETSER, supra note 266, at 62-63 (same).
During the relevant period, the national government lacked the ability to effectuate treaty relations on such trade matters, though they gained this ability under the new Constitution. See supra text
accompanying note 250. As Professor Ramsey recognizes, “many of these particular laws would have
been precluded by the specific provisions of the Constitution.” Ramsey, supra note 29, at 390 n.181.
Though I have not examined the history of each state enactment in detail, they were generally ineffective and counterproductive, and were considered one of the strongest reasons to expand the scope of the
federal treaty power and, more generally, to unify negotiations with foreign nations. See supra text accompanying notes 265-74; see also Virginia General Assembly, House of Delegates, Broadside of Nov.
14, 1785 (Early American reprints, No. 19352) (urging Virginia delegates to the Continental Congress
to regulate trade and import tariffs, given that the United States “require[s] uniformity in their commercial regulations, . . . for obtaining in the ports of foreign nations a stipulation of privileges reciprocal to
those enjoyed [in U.S. ports], for preventing animosities, . . . among the several States . . . and for deriving from commerce such aids to the public revenue as it ought to contribute”); ROBERT L.
BRUNHOUSE, T HE COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1776-1790, at 152, 172, 181 (Octagon
Books 1971) (1942) (describing the state interest in investing the national government with authority
over trade and revisions to the general tariff act of 1784-85, including the failure of discriminatory tariffs due to the diversion of trade to neighboring states).
301. Madison was keenly aware of the French brandies controversy, carefully setting out the dispute as to the issues of treaty construction and noting Jay’s conclusion that, in Madison’s terms, “the
states have no right to form tacit compacts with foreign nations.” Letter from Madison to Jefferson
(Mar. 19, 1787), in 9 M ADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 320-21; see also Letter from Madison to
Edmund Randolph (Feb. 18, 1787), in 9 M ADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 271, 272-73 (describing
the controversy); Letter from Virginia Delegates to Randolph (Mar. 25, 1787), in 9 M ADISON PAPERS,
supra note 171, at 333 (same). There is cause to think that the issue of state encroachment was a foremost concern for Madison as he prepared for the Convention. See Letter from Virginia Delegates to
Randolph (Mar. 25, 1787) (editorial note), in 9 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 171, at 333-34 n.2.
302. See supra notes 248, 265-66 (describing the dissatisfaction with Article IX of the Articles of
Confederation).
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At the same time, the Constitution expanded the range of impediments
the states could pose to the actual execution of federal authority. The Framers’ argument was not merely that the federal government needed sufficient
authority to adopt binding law; instead, they also perceived that achieving
results under that authority required unified expression.
3. The New Constitution and the Vertical Scope of the Treaty Power.
The new Constitution scarcely did away with the problems federalism
posed for foreign relations.303 Some of the more egregious early episodes,
like the occasional refusal by states and localities to comply with ratified
treaties and foreign affairs statutes, 304 are better understood as intransigence
than as illustrating a constitutional understanding. But states also enacted a
number of measures that caused acute diplomatic complications—laws
discriminating against aliens305 or foreign corporations,306 as well as general
303. Indeed, various Mississippi intrigues continued to fester. See generally ARTHUR PRESTON
WHITAKER, T HE MISSISSIPPI QUESTION: 1795-1803, at 189-217 (1934) (discussing various foreign relations issues that persisted after ratification). President Washington and his Secretaries of State, for
example, doggedly sought Kentucky’s assistance in quashing French-led threats against the Spanish
territory, laying particular stress on the delicacy of ongoing negotiations. See A Message from the
President of the United States to Congress, Transmitting Certain Documents Relative to Hostile Threats
Against the Territories of Spain, in the Neighbourhood of the United States (May 20, 1794), (Doc. No.
271), in 22 N ATIONAL STATE PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 1789-1817 (pt. II) 255, 256, 257, 262,
265-66 (Eileen Daney Carzo ed., 1985). In Washington’s farewell address on September 17, 1796, he
stressed the need for the American west to depend upon
the Atlantic side of the Union, directed by an indissoluble community of interest as one nation. Any other tenure by which the West can hold this essential advantage, whether derived
from its own separate strength or from an apostate and unnatural connection with any foreign power, must be intrinsically precarious.
WHITAKER, supra, at 120.
304. See Palumbo, supra note 4, at 37-48 (discussing American defiance of the 1807 Embargo
Act); Shuman, Courts, supra note 20, at 164 (discussing defiance, by the governor of South Carolina, of
President Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation of 1793 and the violation by New England towns of
the 1807 Embargo Act).
305. For discussion of the prolonged controversy surrounding discrimination by the western states
against the Japanese, see PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES,
1913, at 625-53 (1920) (collecting diplomatic correspondence relating to the dispute); Goldsmith, Federal Courts , supra note 1, at 1655 (citing Theodore Roosevelt’s concern on this issue); Spiro, DemiSovereignties, supra note 29, at 140-41 (intimating that similar anti-alien statutes in effect at that time
were less likely to have engendered diplomatic complications); Palumbo, supra note 4, at 168-88. Compare, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 653-56, 662 n.17 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring) (noting
foreign and, derivatively, federal protests concerning land laws), with Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S.
392, 396-97 (1927) (upholding a Cincinnati ordinance prohibiting aliens from obtaining licenses to run
pool and billiard rooms based on the Equal Protection Clause and an 1815 commercial treaty with Great
Britain).
306. The highest-profile cases involved the retaliation against German companies for Prussia’s
treatment of American insurance companies. See S. DOC. NO. 54-140 (1897) (collecting diplomatic
correspondence relating to the dispute); PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1899, at 284 (1901) [hereinafter PAPERS] (collecting further diplomatic correspondence, in-
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provisions, like the Negro Seamen laws, that adversely affected both U.S.
and foreign citizens.307
These conflicts may cast light on the contemporary understanding of
the federal monopoly. With the exception of Chy Lung v. Freeman, 308 there
was relatively little suggestion that the overseas repercussions of state activities like these would, by themselves, violate the Constitution. As Professor Goldsmith insists, this casts doubt on any strong claim that a fullblown, judicially enforced dormant foreign relations doctrine preceded
Zschernig.309 At the very least, cases like Chy Lung should be seen in light
cluding the ultimate readmission of American companies to Prussia and Prussian companies to New
York); Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1656-57 (same); Palumbo, supra note 4, at 48-50
(discussing the 1896 conflict between Prussia and New York). The British complained about similar
legislation, in that case enacted without any apparent retaliatory animus. See P APERS, supra, at 345-48
(collecting correspondence).
307. For general historical accounts of this legislation, see Philip M. Hamer, British Consuls and
the Negro Seamen Acts, 1850-1860, 1 J. S. HIST. 138 (1935) [hereinafter Hamer, British Consuls];
Philip M. Hamer, Great Britain, the United States, and the Negro Seamen Acts, 1822-1848, 1 J. S.
HIST. 3 (1935) [hereinafter Hamer, Great Britain]. For legally oriented commentary, see CORWIN,
NATIONAL SUPREMACY, supra note 2, at 125-29; CARL B. SWISHER, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: T HE TANEY PERIOD, 1836-64, at
378-81 (1974) (detailing cases challenging the Negro Seamen Acts); Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra
note 1, at 1655 n.163 (same); Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law
(1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1873-78 (1993) (discussing the constitutional debate surrounding these acts as well as the subsequent legislation of immigration law).
308. 92 U.S. 275 (1875). In Chy Lung, the Court found unconstitutional a California law permitting
a state commissioner to demand indemnification bonds for certain vaguely described classes of passengers disembarking at California ports. See id. at 276. Justice Miller, in an opinion for a unanimous
Court, speculated that were California to apply the law to British passengers, Great Britain would retaliate against the nation as a whole. See id. at 279. As he emphasized, since the Constitution “has forbidden the States to hold negotiations with any foreign nations . . . and has taken the whole subject of these
relations [as reserved for the federal government],” the Framers could not be held to have “done so
foolish a thing as to leave it in the power of the States to pass laws whose enforcement renders the general government liable to just recriminations that it must answer, while it does not prohibit to the States
the acts for which it is held responsible.” Id. at 279-80.
309. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1625-30 (citing Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S.
429 (1968), as one of the first cases to establish a dormant foreign relations doctrine). Although Professor Spiro properly cautions that we should not expect nineteenth-century case law to neatly express a
federal exclusivity principle, and notes that certain episodes “demonstrate a . . . constitutional understanding that the states were severely constrained in their foreign relations activities,” see Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1230, I am less confident that such an understanding was “prevalent,”
id., or that it amounts to anything so broad as Zschernig. Construing cases like Holmes v. Jennison , 39
U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840), and Chy Lung as suggesting that a well-formed dormant foreign relations
doctrine existed in the nineteenth century requires disregarding other cases, like Blythe v. Hinckley, 180
U.S. 333 (1901), and downplaying the most notable episodes of that era, like the Negro Seamen Acts
and alien discrimination episodes, in which state actions having significant foreign relations effects
were tolerated. But see Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1228-41 (arguing that the dormant
foreign relations doctrine has “firm roots” in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
At the same time, I do not share Professor Goldsmith’s confidence that the notion of dormant
foreign relations preemption debuted in the 1960s and therefore was absent from the debate over the
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of others, like Blythe v. Hinkley,310 in which the Court gave the proverbial
back of its hand to a particularly attenuated claim that states could not
touch matters open for international adjustment. The Court elsewhere indicated that state authority touching on foreign affairs grounds would only be
restricted upon final treaty ratification.311
alien discrimination acts. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1655 (observing that “no one
suggested that [the anti-alien acts] should be preempted under a dormant foreign relations theory”). For
example, in a 1914 note intended for the State Department, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs
argued that California lacked the authority over international affairs necessary to enact its so-called
Alien Land Law restricting the ownership of land by foreign citizens. See Letter from the Japanese
Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador (June 9, 1914), reprinted in PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1914, at 426 (1922) [hereinafter 1914
FOREIGN RELATIONS PAPERS]. And in a later court case, the California Supreme Court found no conflict between a provision of California’s Alien Land Act and a 1911 treaty between the United States
and Japan, but after invalidating the law as violating the Equal Protection Clause, the court opined that
the underlying objective of discouraging immigration was “international in character, and [was] a matter to properly to be disposed of by the federal government.” In re Tetsubumi Yano’s Estate, 206 P.
995, 1001 (Cal. 1922). Finally, some of Elihu Root’s observations at the 1907 meeting of the American
Society for International Law hint at a dormant federal relations power. See Elihu Root, The Real
Questions Under the Japanese Treaty and the San Francisco School Board Resolution, 1 A M. J. I NT’L
L. 273, 283 (1907) (emphasis added):
Since the rights, privileges, and immunities . . . to be accorded to foreigners in our country
and to our citizens in foreign countries are a proper subject of treaty provision and within the
limits of the treaty-making power, and since such rights, privileges, and immunities may be
given by treaty in contravention of the laws of any state, it follows of necessity that the
treaty-making power alone has authority to determine what those rights, privileges, and immunities shall be.
310. 180 U.S. 333 (1901). In Blythe, the Court considered “extraordinary” the claim that “in the
absence of any treaty whatever upon the subject, the State had no right to pass a law in regard to the
inheritance of property within its borders by an alien.” Id. at 340. Blythe was later cited in Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947), in support of the proposition that a dormant preemption claim concerning a
state reciprocal inheritance law was “equally farfetched.” Id. at 517. Blythe is also cited by Professor
Goldsmith as grounds for doubting the tenure of any such doctrine. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts,
supra note 1, at 1653 n.157. There is, however, a critical difference between Blythe and cases like
Clark. In Blythe, the complainant argued that California had overstepped its authority by permitting
“any person, whether citizen or alien,” to inherit property, thereby permitting the defendant, a British
subject, to take property otherwise available to the complainant. See Blythe, 180 U.S. at 336-37 n.1
(quoting statutes referred to in the original complaint, including Cal. Civ. Code § 671); id. at 340-41.
The claim that California had intruded on matters of foreign relations by failing to discriminate against
an alien does indeed seem “extraordinary.” Id. at 340. Such a statute functions very differently, in any
event, from those having the effect of bargaining with foreign powers in a fashion reserved to the federal government. The California Supreme Court, in consequence, construed Blythe to be making the
unusual claim that
the very silence of our treaties with Great Britain upon the question is the equivalent of an
express denial to its subjects of the right to inherit within our republic, and that therefore a
conflict arises and [the California law] becomes void as an illegal attempt to encroach upon
the treaty making power of the general government.
Blythe v. Hinckley, 127 P. 431, 436 (Cal. 1900), aff’d, 180 U.S. 333 (1901).
311. See, e.g. , People of New York ex rel. Cutler v. Dibble, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 366, 371 (1858)
(concluding that a New York state law prohibiting trespass upon Indian reservations was valid unless it
conflicted with the express terms of a federal treaty). Another early case, People v. Gerke, 5 Cal. 381
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There was greater consensus, however, on Chy Lung’s major premise
that state bargaining with foreign powers—if not all state activities having
foreign effect—would unconstitutionally violate the dormant treaty
power.312 Few episodes provided a good opportunity to test that doctrine, or
to explore the parameters of the state conduct so precluded. Where there
were strong claims of conflict between a state law and a federal statute
treaty, or the Equal Protection Clause, dormant federal authority objections
may have seemed beside the point.313 Moreover, federal authority over the
(1855), held that a federal treaty could supersede state law on the inheritance of property, but also suggested that states retained some power with respect to foreign affairs issues. See id. at 385. While
Gerke’s dicta indicated that “mutual concession . . . can only be effected” by the federal government,
not by unilateral state acts, and thus seems to support a federal monopoly, the California Supreme Court
clearly contemplated that state policies like those in question would continue in force until preempted
by federal treaty. Id. Among commentators, it is perhaps particularly notable that Professor Corwin’s
brief for national power routinely expresses the rule in this fashion, albeit without expressly addressing
the issue of the dormant treaty power. See CORWIN, N ATIONAL SUPREMACY, supra note 2, at 21-165
(discussing the relationship between the national treaty power and state police powers).
312. See Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 280 (asserting that the Constitution “has forbidden the States to hold
negotiations with any foreign nations . . . and has taken the whole subject of these relations upon herself”). An 1897 memorandum from Senator Hale encapsulated an altogether plausible view of the distinction:
[A] State of the Union, although having admittedly no power whatever in foreign relations,
may take action uncontrollable by the Federal Government, and which, if not properly a casus belli, might nevertheless as a practical matter afford to some foreign nation the excuse of
a declaration of war. We may instance the action which might have been taken by the State
of Wyoming in relation to the Chinese massacres, or by the State of Louisiana in relation to
the Italian lynchings, or by the State of New York in its recent controversy with German insurance companies with relation to the treatment of its own insurance companies by Germany.
S. DOC. NO. 54-56, at 5 (1897); see also QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN
RELATIONS 265 & n.8 (1922) (citing the Hale memorandum, and adding that “[t]he intention of the
Constitution is undoubtedly to render the states incompetent to make political decisions which affect
foreign nations in more than the most remote degree, yet state laws have occasionally given rise to international controversy”).
313. For example, Justice Johnson’s opinion on the South Carolina Negro Seamen Act cited several
other grounds for considering it illegal. See Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 495 (C.C.D.S.C.
1823) (No. 4366) (Johnson, J., riding circuit) (holding that a South Carolina law violated the dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause and the 1815 commercial treaty with Great Britain, but that it lacked jurisdiction to order redress). Attorney General William Wirt agreed with Justice Johnson on the merits, see
1 Op. Att’y Gen. 659, 661 (1824) (opining that South Carolina’s Negro Seamen Act was unconstitutional), but a successor, John Berrien, came to the opposite conclusion, see 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 426, 442
(1831). Berrien’s successor, Roger B. Taney, wrote an unpublished opinion claiming that the federal
government lacked the power to deprive slave-holding states of their authority over blacks within their
jurisdiction. See SWISHER, supra note 307, at 380 & nn.8-9 (citing and discussing Attorney General
Taney’s opinion). A majority of the House Committee on Commerce issued a report that sided with
Justice Johnson and argued that the South Carolina act and others like it encroached on Congress’s foreign Commerce Clause powers, but the House as a whole took no action. See generally H. R. R EP. N O.
27-80, at 1-7 (1843) (arguing that the South Carolina act violated the dormant Commerce Clause); see
also Hamer, Great Britain, supra note 307, at 22 (noting that the House voted to take no action on the
Commerce Committee’s report). The U.S. Attorney in Charleston subsequently volunteered his conclu-
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recurring subjects of controversy—slavery,314 insurance, 315 and the right of
aliens to real property316—was also truncated at the relevant times. By the
sion that the South Carolina law violated the treaty, see CHARLESTON COURIER, Dec. 15, 1851, at 1; see
also Hamer, British Consuls, supra note 307, at 157 & n.65, but the British ultimately decided not to
court further controversy, see id. at 157-59 (noting that by 1852 the British had adopted a more conciliatory approach to relations with South Carolina).
Case law addressing alien land laws also illustrate a limited conception of the dormant treaty
power, focusing instead on Equal Protection Clause issues and potential conflicts with already-existing
treaties. See, e.g., Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326, 334 (1923) (upholding against equal protection and express treaty-based challenges a provision of the same law preventing aliens ineligible for citizenship
from purchasing shares in corporations dealing in agricultural land); Webb v. O’Brien, 263 U.S. 313,
326 (1923) (upholding against similar challenges a provision of the same law prohibiting sharecropping
contracts with Japanese aliens); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225, 233 (1923) (upholding against
similar challenges a provision of California’s Alien Land Law prohibiting the leasing of agricultural
land to Japanese aliens); see also Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 224 (1923) (upholding against
similar challenges a provision of a Washington state statute preventing Japanese aliens from acquiring
leases for agricultural land). But see Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (striking down a Seattle pawnbroking license ordinance as applied to lawfully admitted Japanese aliens as conflicting with
a federal treaty and noting that while the treaty-making power “does not extend ‘so far as to authorize
what the Constitution forbids,’ it does extend to all proper subjects of negotiation between our government and other nations” (quoting Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890))). For further discussion,
see Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1653-54 nn.157 & 159 (discussing the relationship
between anti-alien state laws and the Equal Protection Clause and dormant treaty power); Spiro, DemiSovereignties, supra note 29, at 141 (arguing that in deciding Chy Lung on equal protection grounds,
the Court missed “a classic opportunity to deploy the foreign relations rationale for constraining state
activity”).
314. At the time of the Negro Seamen Act controversies, the federal government was powerless to
enforce far less ambiguous dictates against South Carolina, and the federal government’s power was to
wane further as South Carolina and other states sought to secede. See Hamer, British Consuls, supra
note 307, at 138, 148-49 (noting the federal government’s lack of effective action against the Negro
Seamen Acts and also noting the House of Representative’s refusal to act on the Commerce Committee’s report on the illegality of the Acts); Hamer, Great Britain, supra note 307, at 28 (noting that the
federal government was unable to take effective action to block the Negro Seamen Acts); see also supra
note 313 (describing Attorney General Taney’s opinion that the federal government lacked the power to
block the Negro Seamen Acts). An 1831 opinion by Attorney General Berrien also illustrates the widespread perception that the federal government had limited power to temper the slave-holding states. See
2 Op. Att’y Gen. 426, 426-27 (1831). Berrien’s opinion reconciled the South Carolina Negro Seamen
Act with the 1815 commercial treaty with Great Britain principally on the ground that Congress was
“under a constitutional obligation to respect” state exercises of police powers like quarantine laws “in
the formation of treaties, and in the enactment of laws,” and that treaties should be interpreted in light
of those principles. Id.; see also id. at 432 (noting that treaty privileges were conferred “subject always
to the laws and statutes of the two countries”).
315. Insurance policies were not then considered articles of commerce, and so they were for the
most part beyond the scope of national regulation. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183
(1868) (holding that insurance policies “are not articles of commerce in any proper meaning of the
word”); see also Philip L. Merkel, Going National: The Life Insurance Industry’s Campaign for Federal Regulation After the Civil War, 65 BUS. H IST. R EV. 528, 528 (1991) (noting that in the mid- to
late-nineteenth century, insurance was regulated almost entirely by state law); Mark J. Roe, Foundations of Corporate Finance: The 1906 Pacification of the Insurance Industry, 93 C OLUM. L. R EV. 639,
664 (1993) (discussing the historical limitations on the federal government’s ability to regulate insurance).
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late nineteenth century, Supreme Court case law more consistently indicated that the treaty power might support federal regulation where purely
domestic authority would otherwise be lacking,317 but lingering doubts
likely clouded the perceived scope of any dormant treaty power.318 Finally,
316. Here it is enough to say that the scope of federal authority was open to controversy. See Bradley, The Treaty Power, supra note 29, at 419-20 (distinguishing various Supreme Court treatments of
treaties according aliens equal property rights); Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 29, at 142 nn.8586 (speculating that judicial tolerance of alien land laws may have been predicated upon the traditional
view that such matters were “largely within the state’s exclusive regulatory preserve”); see also Raymond Leslie Buell, Some Legal Aspects of the Japanese Question, 17 AM. J. INT’L L. 29, 38-39 n.53
(1923) (concluding that the federal government could use its treaty power to assure the property rights
of aliens); Thomas Reed Powell, Alien Land Cases in the United States Supreme Court, 12 CAL. L.
REV. 259, 267-68 (1924) (presuming that the federal government had plenary authority to override the
California land law); Root, supra note 309, at 279 (noting that “certain implied limitations arise[] from
the nature of our government and from other provisions,” but opining that “those implied limitations do
not in the slightest degree touch the making of treaty provisions relating to the treatment of aliens
within our territory”).
Perhaps the most illuminating discussion of the federal government’s perceived ability to modify
alien’s property ownership rights through treaty is contained in the correspondence of Secretary Bayard,
who opined:
Were the question whether a treaty provision which gives to aliens rights to real estate in the
States to come up now for the first time, grave doubts might be entertained as to how far
such a treaty would be constitutional. A treaty is, it is true, the supreme law of the land, but
it is nevertheless only a law imposed by the Federal government, and subject to all the limitations of other laws imposed by the same authority. While internationally binding the
United States to the other contracting powers, it may be municipally inoperative because it
deals with matters in the States as to which the Federal government has no power to deal.
That a treaty, however, can give to aliens such rights, has been repeatedly affirmed by the
Supreme Court . . . and consequently, however much hesitation there might be as to advising
a new treaty containing such provisions, it is not open to this Department to deny that the
treaties now in existence giving rights of this class to aliens may in their municipal relations
be regarded as operative in the States.
Letter from Mr. Bayard, Secretary of State, to Mr. Miller (June 15, 1886), in 5 M OORE, supra note 124,
at 178-79. Bayard’s ambivalence was symptomatic of the uncertainties surrounding the exercise of state
police powers with respect to aliens. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 307, at 1893 (concluding that the
“mysterious line between the exercise of the police power and the regulation of commerce left indeterminate room for state control of immigration” and that this indeterminacy was not entirely resolved by
the introduction of foreign affairs concerns in Chy Lung, 92 U.S. 259 (1876), and The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)).
317. See Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1890) (noting the broad scope of the treatymaking power and citing cases to that effect); see also In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 463 (1891) (“The
treaty-making power vested in our government extends to all proper subjects of negotiation with foreign
governments.”).
318. See, e.g. , Geofroy, 133 U.S. at 267 (noting that “[i]t would not be contended that [the treaty
power] extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the
government or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of the latter, without its consent”).
Numerous commentators have discussed the scope of the dormant treaty power. See, e.g., T HOMAS M.
COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
117 (102 (Andrew McLaughlin ed., 3d ed. 1898) (claiming that “[t]he Constitution imposes no restriction upon [the treaty power], but it is subject to the implied restriction that nothing can be done under it
which changes the constitution of the country, or robs a department of the government or any of the
States of its constitutional authority”); CORWIN, N ATIONAL SUPREMACY, supra note 2, at 42-165 (dis-
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any judicially enforced doctrine was surely less appealing in light of the
political branches’ apparent conviction that the treaty power should not (or
could not, for political reasons) be used to invade areas in which the states
traditionally reigned sovereign.319
Nevertheless, both critics and defenders of the national government’s
prerogatives converged on one critical proposition: if the national government lacked the authority to forge international agreements, then such
authority existed nowhere, as states were powerless to conduct international relations on behalf either of themselves or the United States.320 This
cussing assertions in the case law and commentary that state sovereignty places limitations on the treaty
power); P UTNEY, supra note 124, at 158-59 (arguing that the treaty power is limited by the reserved
powers of the states); HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING POWER
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 284-341 (1915) (discussing the limits that the state
police power places on the federal treaty power); WRIGHT, supra note 312, at 73-74 (same); Bradley,
The Treaty Power, supra note 29, at 409-22 (discussing the subject-matter and states’ rights limitations
on the treaty power during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries); William Draper Lewis, Treaty
Powers: Protection of Treaty Rights by the Federal Government, 34 A NNALS AM. ACAD. P OL. & S OC.
SCI. 313 (1909) (noting some uncertainties in the scope of the dormant treaty power); William E.
Mikell, The Extent of the Treaty-Making Power of the President and Senate of the United States, 57 U.
PA. L. R EV. 435, 559 (1909) (discussing whether the states’ reserved rights place a limit on the federal
treaty power); White, supra note 254, at 9-10, 21-26 (describing the limitations of the unenumerated
federal foreign relations powers when they conflict with reserved state authority).
319. This is illustrated by Secretary of State Hay’s response to promptings for a bilateral treaty to
preempt state laws discriminating against British fire insurance companies, in which he recounted that
[T]he negotiation of such a treaty would probably be futile . . . [owing to] the indisposition
of the people of the United States to suffer encroachment upon the ordinary and constitutional exercise of the legislative functions of the respective States by the making of treaties
which are passed on by only one branch of the Federal Congress but which have the force of
supreme law.
Letter from John Hay, Secretary of State, to Reginald Tower (July 19, 1899), in 1914 FOREIGN
RELATIONS PAPERS, supra note 309, at 347-48; see also Letter from John Hay, Secretary of State, to
Reginald Tower (Apr. 27, 1899), in 1914 FOREIGN RELATIONS PAPERS, supra note 309, at 346 (concluding that “[l]egislation such as that enacted by the State of Iowa is beyond the control of the executive branch of the General Government, and even did this legislation contravene any existing treaty . . .
the remedy would lie in an appeal to the courts of law”); cf. Manchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Herriott, 91 F.
711 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1899) (dismissing a Fourteenth Amendment challenge by British fire insurance
companies to a discriminatory Iowa state law).
320. The argument was precisely stated by the Attorney General’s opinion on the droit d’aubaine,
the antiquated principle that some states had invoked to prevent aliens from inheriting real property:
[I]n the matter of foreign negotiation, the States have conferred the whole of their power, in
other words, all the treaty-powers of sovereignty, on the United States. Thus . . . if the power
of negotiation be not in the United States, then it exists nowhere, and one great field of international relation, of negotiation, and of ordinary public and private interest, is closed up,
as well against the United States as each and every one of the States.
8 Op. Att’y Gen. 411, 415 (1857); see also 1 C HARLES HENRY BUTLER, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER
OF THE UNITED STATES § 22, at 39 (1902) (arguing that the resting of treaty-making power in the national government “absolutely prohibit[s]” a state from “performing any functions of sovereignty beyond its own boundaries, except through the medium of the Central Government”); R OBERT T. DEVLIN,
THE TREATY POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 141, at 138 (1908) (describing the federal government as “the only government recognized by the Constitution as possessing a
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did not limit state activities to those with purely internal effects, but it did
mean that the solution to matters of international controversy could lie only
with the central government. In sum, states might legislate or opine on innumerable subject-matters to the extent otherwise permissible under federal
law, but could not, in so doing, abridge the federal government’s monopoly
on treating with foreign powers.
Episodes like the Negro Seamen Act controversies usefully illustrated
the distinction between permissible state effects and impermissible state
bargaining.321 As it did later in the alien land controversies,322 the federal
national character” and thus possessing “all the powers that relate to intercourse with other nations”);
FRANKLIN PIERCE, F EDERAL USURPATION 254 (1908) (arguing that while expansive federal power is
undesirable, it is clear that within subject-matter limitations “the whole of the treaty-making power was
conferred upon our national government”); 3 STORY, supra note 124, § 1349 (describing the breadth of
the prohibition on state treaty-making); 2 JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER, T HE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 822 (1899):
The treaty-making power between the United States and foreign nations was given, as we
have seen, to the President and Senate as representing all. The relations of each State, therefore, to foreign powers was fully met by this power to make treaties between the United
States and foreign countries. To make peace and avert conflict, it was the wise policy of the
Constitution to give the exclusive treaty-making power to the President and Senate as representing all the United States, and to exclude any one State from entering into any such international obligation.
See also infra note 331 (citing Supreme Court case law); cf. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 60 (1825) (contending, with respect to argument
that legislation was necessary to effectuate treaty obligations, that “[h]aving felt the necessity of the
treaty making power, and fixed in the department in which it shall be rested, the people of course excluded from all interference with it, those parts of the government which are not described as partaking
of it”).
Perhaps the most striking endorsement of treaty power exclusivity came in John C. Calhoun’s
comments before the House of Representatives:
The enumeration of legislative powers in the Constitution has relation, then, not to the
treaty-making power, but to the powers of the states. In our relation to the rest of the world
the case is reversed. Here the states disappear. Divided within, we present, without, an exterior of undivided sovereignty. . . . Whatever, then, concerns our foreign relations, whatever
requires the consent of another nation, belongs to the treaty power—can only be regulated
by it; and it is competent to regulate all such subjects, provided—and here are its true limits—such regulations are not inconsistent with the Constitution.
4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 161, at 464 (emphasis added).
321. The Prussian matter is arguably an exception, given that the retaliatory regulation contemplated (and, in some cases, adopted) by the states concerned seems to be the kind of indirect negotiation
with foreign powers that should ordinarily be deemed unconstitutional. See supra text accompanying
note 306. At the same time, the states generally relied on the State Department to communicate their
threats to the government of Germany, and it apparently agreed with their position, even while cautioning against the disruptive effects of the tactic. See Letter from Mr. Uhl to Mr. Runyon (June 4,
1895), in S. D OC. N O. 54-140, at 3-4; see also Letter from Governor Morton to Mr. Olney (Dec. 3,
1895), in S. D OC. N O. 54-140, at 21 (observing that “the people of no state have diplomatic relations
with the Kingdom of Prussia save as they are represented by the General Government”).
322. The federal government jawboned California into temporarily suspending enforcement of its
anti-alien policies due to foreign policy considerations, but the President appeared to share California’s
premise that the laws, however unwise, were within the state’s constitutional authority. See Oyama v.
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government effectively conceded that, however much it might disagree
with South Carolina’s law, the mere fact of international controversy did
not oust state jurisdiction.323 South Carolina’s authority actually to negotiate with a foreign power, however, was another matter. The Secretary of
State reacted vigorously upon learning that South Carolina had begun negotiating with Great Britain, and there was virtually no attempt to defend
the state’s actions against the criticism that it was usurping a federal function.324
Congressional legislation also suggested something in the nature of a
federal monopoly on diplomacy. The Logan Act of 1799,325 for example,
broadly criminalized conduct by unauthorized U.S. citizens (including, on
the Act’s face, state officials) designed to influence foreign governments or
officials relative to disputes or controversies with the United States, or to
defeat its measures.326 Though very rarely invoked, the Act was predicated
California, 332 U.S. 633, 653-54 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring) (noting the temporary success of
presidential, gubernatorial, and corporate intervention in convincing California to limit enforcement of
its alien land law); id. at 662 n.17 (attributing California’s nonenforcement of its alien land law to a desire to remain consistent with federal policy).
323. See supra text accompanying note 307; see also supra note 313 and accompanying text; cf. H.
R. REP. NO. 27-80, at 3 (1843) (noting that the application of the Negro Seamen Acts to foreign vessels
had been suspended).
324. South Carolina and Great Britain took great pains to conceal their interactions, and when correspondence between the South Carolina governor and the British consul was leaked to the press, there
was considerable protest. See Hamer, British Consuls, supra note 307, at 153-56 (discussing the controversy). After the British ambassador was called in by Secretary of State Daniel Webster, he issued a
face-saving notice declaring that the British consul should have been clearer that he was “merely attempting, as a local agent, to procure a remedy for a grievance inflicted by a local law” (a misleading
description, it must be said, of the consul’s activities). Letter from Ambassador Bulwar to Daniel Webster, Secretary of State (Jan. 31, 1851), quoted in Hamer, British Consuls, supra note 307, at 153. Even
conservative southern newspapers were given pause—a Richmond paper objected that South Carolina
had “no political existence whatever in the eyes of foreign nations,” and a Savannah paper warned that,
were states to confer with foreign governments, “[t]he Federal Government . . . becomes a nullity, and
the Confederacy resolves itself into thirty-one separate and distinct sovereignties, each possessing the
right to treat with other Powers, form alliances, and declare war.” Id. at 151 (internal citations omitted);
cf. Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1235-36 & n.63 (noting the controversy as evidence of
foreign effects, but concluding that the “[t]he context . . . presented the rare case in which the domestic
consequences of suppressing state action outweighed any diplomatic complications prompted by its
persistence”). This was not effective, however, in suppressing British-state negotiations. See Palumbo,
supra note 4, at 205-10 (describing negotiations about the Negro Seamen Acts between British representatives and the government of South Carolina).
325. Act of Jan. 30, 1799, ch. I, 1 Stat. 613 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1994)).
326. The Act takes its name from Dr. George Logan, a well-known Pennsylvania state legislator
who undertook a negotiating mission to France. Logan’s mission caused something of an uproar and
incited Federalist supporters of the Act, who were openly skeptical that his mission to France was independent. See CRS, supra note 109, at 70-71 (discussing the background of the Logan Act); Kevin M.
Kearney, Comment, Private Citizens in Foreign Affairs: A Constitutional Analysis, 36 E MORY L.J. 285,
292-303 (1987) (same). In light of their suspicions, it is hardly surprising that congressional debate
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on the notion that the federal government, in particular the President,
should not be disturbed in the exclusive exercise of foreign relations327—and, as one proponent put it, on the view that if state governments
were constitutionally excluded from such activities, so too should private
citizens.328 Such views are surely probative of constitutional meaning, at
least to the same extent as Congress’s occasional tolerance of state-created
contretemps.329
flagged the issue of criminal liability for public officials. See 8 A NNALS OF CONG. 2504 (1798) (transcribing the statement of Rep. Harper that notes Logan’s membership in the Pennsylvania state legislature); id. at 2618 (noting the statement by Rep. Harper that assumes that the Act would encompass purposeful, but not inadvertent or incidental, conduct by a member of Congress); see also Goldsmith,
Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1708 (assuming that the Logan Act applies to public officials); Brad
Roth, The First Amendment in Foreign Affairs Realm: “Domesticating” the Restrictions on Citizen
Participation, 2 TEMPLE POL. & C IV. RTS. Q. 255, 265 (1993) (same); Matthew Schaefer, Sovereignty
Revisited: The “Grey Areas” and “Yellow Zones” of Split Sovereignty Exposed by Globalization:
Choosing Among Strategies of Avoidance, Cooperation, and Intrusion to Escape an Era of Misguided
“New Federalism”, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 35, 45 & n.46 (1998) (same); Kearney, supra, at 287-306
(same). There have since been occasional threats of prosecution against both Members of Congress, see
CRS, supra note 109, at 71-72 (noting that “[q]uestions concerns the Logan Act” have been raised in
relation to the activities of several members of Congress); Roger J. Miner, Crime and Punishment in the
Federal Courts , 43 SYRACUSE L. R EV. 681, 681-82 (1992) (noting that while the Logan Act is only
rarely applied, it has sometimes been applied to members of Congress), and state officials, see, e.g., 135
CONG. REC. 25, 481 (1989) (statement of Rep. Bentley) (“Many Governors are acting as their own State
Departments completely disregarding the constitutional prohibition against anyone save the Executive
having treaty-making powers. There is also the old Logan Act dating from the period of the War of
1812 which forbids citizens other than those charged with those specific constitutional powers to treat
with foreign governments.”); Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the
Debate, 27 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 459, 515 (1994) (noting threats by the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture
against the Texas Agriculture Commission for its offer of negotiating assistance and cooperation with
European Commission officials).
327. There was bipartisan endorsement of the notion that the authority for all governmental diplomacy rested exclusively with the President and his authorized agents. See 8 A NNALS OF CONG. 2586
(1798) (statement of Rep. Pinckney); id. at 2494, 2607 (statement of Rep. Griswold); id. at 2521 (statement of Rep. Smith); id. at 2588 (statement of Rep. Bayard); id. at 2594 (statement of Rep. Pinckney);
id. at 2617 (statement of Rep. Harrison). Albert Gallatin, the bill’s most vigorous opponent, submitted
that if the bill were intended to criminalize interference with the President’s constitutional authority, it
did not go far enough, since it addressed only matters of “controversy or dispute.” Id. at 2498. Gallatin
also argued that it was ridiculous to believe that an individual, acting on his own authority, could usurp
the President’s unquestioned monopoly on official authority. See id. at 2637-38. Not everyone agreed
with Gallatin. See id. at 2531-32 (statement of Rep. Harper) (emphasizing a broad understanding of negotiation and suggesting that even private acts less than negotiation could interfere with foreign relations as conceived by the executive).
328. See id. at 2496 (statement of Rep. Rutledge).
329. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1655 (noting that prior to the Supreme Court
decisions in the 1960s that clarified the federal government’s exclusive foreign relations power, “states
often acted in ways not prohibited by a federal enactment that either looked like the exercise of foreign
relations power or that stirred foreign relations controversy”); Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29,
at 1229 n.25 (“It is now generally accepted that institutions other than the courts contribute to constitutional lawmaking.”).
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In short, the persistence of state activities with foreign effect may cast
doubt on suggestions that the federal government alone could be “known”
to foreign nations in some factual or consequential sense. Yet there was
surprisingly little dissent—in an era where the bounds of federal authority
were hotly contested—to the proposition that the states must remain “unknown” as states to foreign nations.330 Well prior to Zschernig, case after
case observed that the federal government enjoyed a monopoly on the conduct of foreign relations, and that the states possessed no such power;331
330. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 228-29 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring):
The States are unknown to foreign nations; their sovereignty exists only with relation to each
other and the general government. Whatever regulations foreign commerce should be subjected to in the ports of the Union, the general government would be held responsible for
them; and all other regulations, but those which Congress had imposed, would be regarded
by foreign nations as trespasses and violations of national faith and comity.
331. See, e.g., United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 35 (1947) (“[P]eace and world commerce
are the paramount responsibilities of the nation, rather than an individual state . . . .”); Clark v. Allen,
331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947) (describing the “forbidden domain of negotiating with a foreign country”);
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) (“Power over external affairs is not shared by the
States; it is vested in the national government exclusively.”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63
(1941):
The Federal Government, representing as it does the collective interests of the forty-eight
states, is entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties. . . . [T]he interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference.
Accord id. at 68 (noting that international relations are “the one aspect of our government that from the
first has been most generally conceded imperatively to demand broad national authority”); United
States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (“[I]n respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines
disappear. As to such purpose the State . . . does not exist.”); Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. v. United
States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933) (“In international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and
trade the people of the United States act through a single government with unified and adequate national power.”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) (“The United States . . . are
vested by the Constitution with the entire control of international relations, and with all the powers of
government necessary to maintain that control and to make it effective.”); The Chinese Exclusion Case,
130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (“For local interests the several states of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.”);
Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (noting that the federal government “has the power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations: the responsibility for the character of those regulations, and for
the manner of their execution, belongs solely to the national government” and that “[i]f it be otherwise,
a single State can, at her pleasure, embroil us in disastrous quarrels with other nations”); Henderson v.
Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 273 (1875) (noting that regulation “must of necessity be national in
its character” when it affects “a subject which concerns our international relations”); The Legal Tender
Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 555 (1871) (Bradley, J., concurring) (“The United States . . . is the only
government in this country that has the character of nationality. It is invested with power over all the
foreign relations of the country, war, peace, and negotiations and intercourse with other nations; all
which are forbidden to the state governments.”); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 570 (1840)
(“All the powers which relate to our foreign intercourse are confided to the general government.”); id. at
575-76 (“It was one of the main objects of the constitution to make us, so far as regarded our foreign
relations, one people, and one nation . . . .”); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 414 (1821)
(“[T]he government which is alone capable of controlling and managing their interests in [war, making
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power was not used in the all-embracing modern sense of being able to affect others,332 but instead meant legal power or the authority to engage
other nations in their sovereign capacities. The only such authority was
conferred by the Treaty Clause on the national government and denied just
as emphatically to the states.
There was just one weak spot—what about the express license for
states to enter into foreign compacts and, it would seem to follow, to negotiate toward that end?333 If anything, early case law accentuated this problem by reading the class of “agreement[s] or compact[s]” quite broadly,
creating pressure to diminish the burden of requiring congressional consent.334 Thus, it was held that the form and timing of consent for interstate
compacts were almost entirely up to Congress,335 and that no consent was
necessary for compacts not increasing the relative political power of the
states.336 Modern commentary often assumes that foreign compacts are to
peace, and ‘all commercial regulations,’ id. at 413] is the government of the Union.”).
332. See, e.g., Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, F OREIGN AFFS., Jan.–Feb. 1997, at 50 (describing
the decline of nation-state autonomy and the increasing power of nonstate actors); see also Anne-Marie
Slaughter, The Real New World Order, F OREIGN AFFS., Sept.–Oct. 1997, at 183 (describing the disaggregation of power).
333. See U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the consent of Congress . . . enter
into any agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign power.”).
334. See, e.g., Holmes, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 571 (suggesting that “compact” and “agreement” have
broad meanings that are independent of each other and of the term “treaty”). The best description of this
dynamic is Engdahl, supra note 247, at 64-67 (discussing the scope of the terms “compact,” “agreement,” and “treaty”).
335. See Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 185, 209 (1837) (upholding a compact between Tennessee and Virginia that was consented to by Congress after the states reached agreement); Green v.
Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 85-87 (1823) (upholding a compact between Kentucky and Virginia that
Congress only consented to after the fact, and then only indirectly, in the course of recognizing Kentucky as a state); accord Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 4 G. & J. 1, 1-3
(Md. 1832) (discussing a compact between Virginia and Maryland, regarding the establishment of railroad companies, that became effective after Congress consented). Also noteworthy is the Court’s pronouncement in Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893), that “[t]he Constitution does not state when
the consent of Congress shall be given, whether it shall precede or may follow the compact made, or
whether it shall be express or may be implied.” Id. at 521. For a helpful digest of early compacts and
their history, including many instances in which congressional approval followed agreement between
the states, see Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution: A Study
in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 735-48 (1925), which contains a list of various compacts
between states dating from 1789 to 1925. As Frankfurter and Landis also indicate, the practice of seeking congressional approval for state compacts has its roots in colonial practice, where agreements between colonies typically required the approval of the Crown. See id. at 692-93.
336. See Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 218-19 (1803) (assuming the validity of a
boundary agreement between Virginia and Tennessee that largely codified the states’ preexisting
rights); Virginia, 148 U.S. at 519 (stating in dicta that the Compact Clause applies to agreements “directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States,
which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States”). The dictum from
Virginia has been adopted by modern courts as an accurate statement of the law. See, e.g., New Hamp-
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be treated likewise, so that the states might negotiate and reach agreement
with foreign powers before seeking consent, and perhaps even conclude
some binding agreements without ever submitting them for federal approval.337 If so, the resulting loophole seems to doom any argument that
might be mustered for a dormant treaty power and leave the case law profoundly conflicted well before the late-twentieth-century explosion in state
conducted foreign relations.
But just as the Court has for some time distinguished between foreign
and interstate commerce,338 its case law has differentiated foreign comshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369 (1976) (citing the above language from Virginia as part of the “test”
for whether an agreement between states requires the consent of Congress and applying such a test to
uphold a settlement agreement interpreting the language of an already-binding 1740 decree); see also,
e.g., Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 472 U.S. 159, 17576 (1985) (following the approach of the New Hampshire and Virginia cases); Cuyler v. Adams, 449
U.S. 433, 440 (1981) (same); United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 471
(1978) (same). But see Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 724-25 (1838) (assuming
that the prohibition on “any treaty, alliance, or confederation,” and the requirement of consent for “any
agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign power,” made consent a requirement for all
interstate boundary disputes).
337. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 43, § 302f (“By analogy with inter-State compacts, a
State compact with a foreign power requires Congressional consent only if the compact tends ‘to . . .
increase . . . political power in the States which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy
of the United States.’” (quoting Virginia, 148 U.S. at 503); HENKIN, supra note 1, at 155 (“Since the
same language applies to foreign compacts, one might extend and adapt the Court’s distinction [in Virginia v. Tennessee] to such agreements as well.”); id. at 156 n.†:
[S]ince the states may make foreign agreements with the consent of Congress (and some
even without such consent . . . ), they must have the right to negotiate with foreign governments or with their subsidiary units to achieve such agreements. It has not been suggested
that states must obtain Congressional consent to begin negotiations.
Accord Herbert H. Naujoks, Compacts and Agreements Between States and Between States and a Foreign Power, 36 MARQ. L. R EV. 219, 233 (1953) (assuming that interstate compacts should be subject to
the same congressional consent requirements and exemptions that govern compacts between states and
foreign nations); Schaefer, supra note 326, at 44 (same); Note, The Power of States to Make Compacts,
31 Y ALE L.J. 635 (1922) (same). But see Engdahl, supra note 247, at 88 (“Arrangements with foreign
powers must satisfy other constitutional requirements than those imposed by the compact clause.”);
Schaefer, supra note 326, at 45 (arguing that the fact that states can and do negotiate with foreign governments on some topics does not imply that “a state could begin negotiating with a foreign government
on any topic” (emphasis added)).
338. See supra text accompanying note 66; see also The Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 373 (1903)
(Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (distinguishing between interstate commerce power—“intended to secure
equality and freedom in commercial intercourse as between the States”—and the foreign commerce
power, which “clothed Congress with that power over international commerce, pertaining to a sovereign
nation in its intercourse with foreign nations, and subject . . . to no implied or reserved power in the
State”); Bowman v. Chicago & N.R. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 482 (1888):
It may be argued [that] the inference to be drawn from the absence of legislation by Congress on the subject excludes state legislation affecting commerce with foreign nations more
strongly than that affecting commerce among the States. Laws which concern the exterior
relations of the United States with other nations and governments are general in their nature,
and should proceed exclusively from the legislative authority of the nation.
But see The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 578 (1847) (“The power to regulate commerce
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pacts—precisely because of the exclusive federal treaty power. Holmes v.
Jennison,339 decided in 1840, concerned the governor of Vermont’s attempt
to extradite an alien prisoner to Canada in the absence of an extradition
treaty with Great Britain. An evenly divided Court dismissed the appeal,
but Chief Justice Taney, writing what was nearly a plurality opinion,340
would have held that Vermont’s conduct amounted to an implicit agreement with Great Britain—through the latter’s anticipated acceptance of the
extradited prisoner—that was unlawful in the absence of congressional
consent.
Understood solely as a Compact Clause case, Holmes courts paradox.
Chief Justice Taney’s expansive view of compacts seems strained341—at
least in part because it expanded the range of agreements to which Congress may consent.342 There was also no hint that Vermont’s conduct proamong the several States is granted to Congress in the same clause, and by the same words, as the
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and is coextensive with it.”).
339. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 538 (1840).
340. Chief Justice Taney’s opinion was joined by three other Justices, with the remaining four Justices writing separately. Justice Catron clearly leaned against any finding of a compact, absent proof of
a demand by Canada for Holmes—evidence that existed at the time, but was not reflected in the Supreme Court record. See id. at 594-98 (Catron, J., dissenting); Ex parte Holmes, 12 Vt. 631, 632-33
(1840) (quoting a letter from the government of Vermont that suggests that Canada requested Holmes’s
extradition); id. at 641 (noting that Justice Catron based his opinion on the lack of evidence that Canada
had demanded Holmes’s extradition and that therefore “[h]ad the return been as it now is [i.e. had Canada demanded Holmes’s extradition], it is to be inferred, from his [Catron’s] opinion that he would have
concurred with the other justices”). But having decided “that it is better for the country [that] this question should for the present remain open,” he voted to dismiss, taking care to note that he was not in any
respect bound in his future deliberations. Holmes, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 597. Justice Thompson’s opinion
rested primarily on the supposed inability of the Court to enforce its judgment. See id. at 585 (Thompson, J., dissenting). Justice Baldwin essentially ignored the compact question in favor of the view that,
absent a treaty, states retained police powers over the presence of “fugitives, vagabonds, criminals, or
convicts” that could not even be invaded by congressional statute, and he suggested too that Chief Justice Taney’s result would be politically infeasible for the Court to enforce. Id. at 614, 618-19 (Baldwin,
J., dissenting).
341. Compare Holmes, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 569, 572-74 (describing the breadth of the consent requirement), with id. at 579, 80 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (disputing the view of the Vermont-Canada
arrangement as a “compact”), and id. at 588 (Barbour, J., dissenting) (same), and id. at 595-96, 598
(Catron, J., dissenting) (same).
342. Chief Justice Taney understandably balked at viewing the informal arrangement at issue as a
treaty, id. at 571, but his opinion may be read to suggest that Congress could consent to less formal arrangements even on traditionally national issues like extradition. Though attempts to distinguish the
various subjects-matter appropriate to treaties and compacts were at odds, none appear to contemplate
that extradition would be an appropriate topic for compact. See St. George Tucker, Editor’s Appendix to
1 W ILLIAM BLACKSTONE, C OMMENTARIES 310 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803) (describing treaties as
“relat[ing] ordinarily to subjects of great national magnitude and importance” and “often perpetual, or
made for a considerable period of time,” while compacts “concern[] transitory or local affairs, or such
as cannot possibly affect any other interest but that of the parties”); 3 STORY, supra note 124, §§ 139597 (distinguishing “treaties of a political character,” “treaties of confederation,” and “treaties of cession
of sovereignty, or conferring internal political jurisdiction, or general commercial privileges,” from
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duced undesirable foreign effects, presumably because Canada favored extradition. Instead, Holmes is best understood as addressing state activities
germane to either foreign compacts or treaties—the process of obtaining
pacts rather than their eventual classification.343 As Taney explained, the
treatment of every form of pact in Article I signaled that
the framers of the Constitution . . . . anxiously desired to cut off all connection or communication between a state and a foreign power: and we
shall fail to execute that evident intention, unless we give to the word
“agreement” its most extended signification; and so apply it as to prohibit
every agreement, written or verbal, formal or informal, positive or implied, by the mutual understanding of the parties.344

There was no allegation of congressional consent, and so Taney was
not called upon to discuss issues of timing or procedure. But his description
of compacts and agreements as prohibited—and of the Framers’ intention
that “there would be no occasion for negotiation or intercourse between the
state authorities and a foreign government”—left no doubt but that consent
would be required for all compacts or agreements, and that it could tenably
be granted only before intercourse with a foreign government.345
The constitutional bases for Taney’s understanding were the federal
treaty power and the subordinate power to send and receive ambassadors. 346
compacts concerning “mere private rights of sovereignty; such as questions of boundary; interests in
land, situate in the territory of each other; and other internal regulations for the mutual comfort, and
convenience of States bordering on each other”); Engdahl, supra note 246, at 75-81 (suggesting that the
Framers followed Vattel in distinguishing between compacts that were “dispositive” in nature—e.g.,
boundary settlements and cessions—and all other, nondispositive arrangements that were treaties
strictly proscribed to the states); see also Abraham C. Weinfeld, What Did the Framers of the Federal
Constitution Mean by “Agreements or Compacts”?, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 453, 464 (1936) (concluding that
compacts “included (1) settlements of boundary lines with attending cession or exchanges of strips of
land, (2) regulation of matters connected with boundaries as for instance regulation of jurisdiction of
offenses committed on boundary waters, of fisheries or of navigation”). Today, the Court does not deny
that some such distinction was intended, only that it has been lost. See United States Steel Corp. v.
Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 459-64 (1978) (recounting the interpretations of the words
“treaty,” “compact,” and “agreement” by the Framers and the Court, and concluding that the distinct
meanings were lost by 1833 when perceived by Justice Story).
343. Cf. Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1230-32 (considering Chief Justice Taney’s
opinion as “expound[ing] a dormant theory of federal power over foreign relations”).
344. Holmes, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 572.
345. Id. at 573-74. Justice Catron, who would have concurred had the record reflected evidence of a
demand by Canada for Holmes, see id. at 595-96 (Catron, J., dissenting), was apparently of a like mind.
346. As the opinion put it,
[e]very part of [the Constitution] shows that our whole foreign intercourse was intended to
be committed to the hands of the general government: and nothing shows it more strongly
than the treaty-making power, and the power of appointing and receiving ambassadors; both
of which are immediately connected with the question before us, and undoubtedly belong
exclusively to the federal government. It was one of the main objects of the Constitution to
make us, so far as regarded our foreign relations, one people, and one nation; and to cut off
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For Justice Barbour, any such federal authority rested in the hands of the
political branches: where no agreement or compact, narrowly defined, had
been entered into, and no federal treaty nor legislative authorities had actually been exercised, the states were free to act. 347 To Chief Justice Taney, in
contrast, state diplomacy conflicted with federal authority that was “dormant” in the modern sense.348 The federal government’s power to appoint
and receive ambassadors, he argued, entailed not just the authority to
change officials but also the authority (vested, in the ordinary case, in the
President) to abstain from political communication with foreign nations.349
Therefore, because the treaty-making power contemplated the power to
conduct and refrain from all manner of foreign engagements, any state exercise of foreign relations would plainly invade that power.350
all communications between foreign governments, and the several state authorities. The
power now claimed for the states, is utterly incompatible with this evident intention; and
would expose us to one of those dangers, against which the framers of the Constitution have
so anxiously endeavoured to guard.
Id. at 575-76.
347. See id. at 588-94 (Barbour, J., dissenting) (quoting Chief Justice Taney to show that the actions of Vermont’s governor did not infringe on the treaty-making power because “‘[i]t is not the mere
existence of the power, but its exercise, which is incompatible with the exercise of the same power by
the states’” (quoting Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 196 (1819))); see also id. at 598
(Catron, J., dissenting) (“There being no agreement in the case; certainly none of the exclusive powers
secured to the general government . . . were violated.”). But see id. at 576-77 (arguing emphatically that
the treaty-making power could not be dormant and that it is vested wholly with the federal government,
even though the Constitution expresses no explicit prohibition on the states).
348. To Taney himself, however, “dormant” literally meant open to use by the states. See id. at 576
(“From its nature, [the treaty-making power] can never be dormant in the hands of the general government.”).
349. Chief Justice Taney argued:
[I]f the general government deemed it to be the true policy of the country to have no communication or connection with foreign nations, by ambassadors, other public ministers, or
consuls; and refused, on that account, to appoint any; could it be said that this power was
dormant in the hands of the government, and that the states might exercise it? Or if the general government deemed it advisable to have no such communications with some particular
foreign nation, could any state regard it as an unexercised power, and therefore undertake to
exercise it? We can readily imagine that there may be reasons of policy, looking to the
whole Union, that might induce the government to decline an interchange of ambassadors
with certain foreign countries. It is not material to the question in hand, whether that policy
be right or wrong. But assuming such a case to exist, can any state regard it as an unexecuted
portion of the power granted to the federal government; and, by appointing an ambassador or
consul, counteract its designs, and thwart its policy? There can be but one answer, we think,
given to this question.
Id. at 577. Elsewhere in the opinion, the Chief Justice emphasized the role of the President in exercising
this power . See id. at 570 (describing aspects of the President’s treaty-making power, such as acting
upon the Senate’s authorization to make treaties, and nominate and receive ambassadors, public ministers, and foreign officials).
350. Chief Justice Taney reasoned:
The argument which supposes this power may be dormant in the hands of the federal government, is founded, we think, in a mistake as to its true nature and character. It is not the
mere power to deliver up fugitives from other nations upon demand; but the right to deter-
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Chief Justice Taney’s Holmes opinion, not Justice Barbour’s, was regarded as authoritative,351 perhaps in part because Taney’s general prejumine whether they ought or ought not to be delivered, and to make that decision, whatever it
may be, effectual. It is the power to determine whether it is the interest of the United States
to enter into treaties with foreign nations generally, or with any particular foreign nations,
for the mutual delivery of offenders fleeing from punishment from either country; or
whether it is the interest and true policy of the United States, to abstain altogether from such
engagements, and to refuse, in all cases, to surrender them.
Id. at 576.
351. The Chief Justice’s opinion was certainly seen at the time to have carried the day. The Vermont Supreme Court subsequently ordered Holmes’s release, based on the combination of Taney’s
opinion for four Justices along with evidence that would have satisfied Justice Catron as to a compact’s
existence. See Ex parte Holmes, 12 Vt. 631, 635-37, 640-42 (1840) (holding that the governor of Vermont does not have the power to surrender a suspect wanted by a foreign country); see also Holmes, 39
U.S. (14 Pet.) at 595-96 (Catron, J., dissenting) (finding nothing in the record to support a prior agreement between the governor of Vermont and Great Britain that would have been a violation of the Constitution); id. at 598 (reporter’s note) (clarifying that even though no judgment was given, the Court
found no power by which the state could deliver the prisoner). Later cases have treated Chief Justice
Taney’s opinion as authoritative. See, e.g., United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 413-14 (1886)
(citing Taney’s opinion in Holmes with approval); Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. Federal Power
Comm’n, 124 F.2d 800, 808 (3d Cir. 1941) (citing Taney’s opinion to illustrate the broad meaning of
the terms “treaty,” “agreement,” and “compact”); In re Manuel P., 215 Cal. App. 3d 48, 67-69 (Ct. App.
1989) (incorporating Taney’s distinction between exercising the state’s police power and assisting a
foreign country in punishing those who have violated the foreign laws into recognizing California’s
right to remove a Mexican national); People v. Curtis, 50 N.Y. 321, 325 (1872) (“This subject [a compact between a state and foreign country] was so fully and elaborately considered by the Supreme
Court . . . in [Holmes v. Jennison] that an extended discussion here is unnecessary, if not inappropriate.”); 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 661, 661 (1841) (“I think, from the whole argument of the bench in the case of
[Holmes,] . . . we may consider it as law.”); see also COOLEY, supra note 318, at 102 (“An attempt by a
State to deliver a fugitive from justice to a foreign sovereignty, in response to a demand therefor, would
be an attempt to perfect and perform an agreement, and is therefore unauthorized.” (citing Holmes));
NATHANIEL C. T OWLE, A H ISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 160
(1871) (citing Taney’s opinion for the proposition that the Constitution “intended to cut off all negotiation and intercourse between the State authorities and foreign nations”); 1 DAVID K. WATSON, T HE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION 846 (1910)
(citing Taney’s Holmes opinion in support of his assertion that the Framers “anxiously desired to cut off
all connection or communication between a State and a foreign power”).
Where Holmes has been noted but disregarded, it has either been because of the mistaken view
that it was effectively overruled by Virginia v. Tennessee, see, e.g., Fraser v. Fraser, 415 A.2d 1304,
1305 (R.I. 1980) (finding that the Court had changed from the literal approach used in Holmes to a
“functional view” of the Compact Clause), or because Holmes dealt with the traditionally national area
of extradition, see, e.g., McHenry County v. Brady, 163 N.W. 540, 544 (N.D. 1917) (distinguishing the
right of extradition as a “national and governmental power” from an agreement regarding the construction of a drainage system between a state and a foreign country where the drain was in the United States
and the outlet in Canada). These attempts to lump foreign compacts with domestic compacts, and at the
same time isolate Holmes to a particular class of international problem, are transparently at crosspurposes. As explained below, Virginia v. Tennessee is consistent with the Holmes plurality, and the
Supreme Court has subsequently cited Chief Justice Taney’s opinion with approval. See New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 183 (1992) (citing, and distinguishing, the plurality opinion as inapplicable
to the collaboration of states in seeking federal legislation); id. at 198 (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (finding an informal “agreement” to an interstate compact, for estoppel purposes,
under the test articulated by the Holmes plurality).
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dice against theories of dormant national power made his departure in
Holmes seem truly obligatory.352 Taney’s specific suggestion that the states
are not free to negotiate foreign agreements without prior consent has survived considerable evolution in the Court’s Compact Clause doctrine.353 To
be sure, it has not always been adhered to in practice.354 But it is hard to at352. See CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 104, at 247-49 (praising
Chief Justice Taney’s “well-crafted opinion” and noting a “striking[]” contrast between the Chief Justice’s position concerning the competence of states to regulate commerce and the authority to enforce
Article IV’s Fugitive Slave Clause); 2 CHARLES WARREN, T HE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY, 1821-1855, at 338, 340 (1922) (describing Chief Justice Taney’s opinion as “superbly able”
and adding that “[t]he most striking feature . . . of Taney’s notable opinion was the fact that it sustained
the supremacy of the Federal Government, with a breadth and completeness which had been excelled
by no one of Marshall’s opinions”); see also FELIX FRANKFURTER, T HE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER
MARSHALL, T ANEY AND WAITE 55-56 (1937) (observing that Chief Justice Taney “never voted to invalidate a state statute because it offended the protection of the ‘dormant’ commerce clause”). But see,
e.g., The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 465-66 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting
limitations to the treaty power); The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 579-83 (1847) (denying that
the Commerce Clause abridges state power to regulate commerce within the state absent conflicting
federal legislation, or that state authority is limited to matters of “police powers”). In Holmes itself,
Chief Justice Taney observed that “[t]he state does not co-operate with a foreign government nor hold
any intercourse with it, when she is merely executing her police regulations.” Holmes, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.)
at 569.
353. In Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893), the Court departed from any broad construction
of Holmes in dicta, suggesting that consent was required only for compacts affecting “the political
power or influence” of particular states or “encroach[ing] . . . upon the full and free exercise of Federal
authority,” and further indicating that consent could in any event be more appropriately provided in
some cases after an agreement was reached. Id. at 520, 521.
As to consent, Virginia v. Tennessee did not cite Holmes, but is entirely consistent with Chief
Justice Taney’s view that foreign compacts invariably fall among those encroaching on federal authority and requiring consent. See, e.g., Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor v. Construction & Marine
Equip. Co., 928 F. Supp. 1388, 1401-02 (D.N.J. 1996) (applying both Virginia v. Tennessee and the
Holmes plurality opinion in holding that the state Waterfront Commission Act requires consent because
“[w]aterfront governance is closely related to interstate and foreign commerce, and unquestionably impinges on the supremacy of the federal government”); cf. 27 Op. Att’y Gen. 327, 332 (1909) (“The
State of Minnesota can not enter into a compact or agreement with Great Britain or the Canadian government whereby the dam can be constructed without the consent of Congress.”). As to the timing of
consent, the Court remarked that “the consent will usually precede the compact or agreement, as where
it is to lay a duty of tonnage, to keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, or to engage in war.” Virginia, 148 U.S. at 521.
354. A few foreign compacts have been entered into without prior consent. Congress has consented
to perhaps six or seven compacts ultimately entailing participation by Canada or its provinces. See
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, I NTERSTATE COMPACTS 1783-1977 (A R EVISED COMPILATION) 3,
5, 6, 8 (1977) (listing compacts and referring to the Champlain Basin Compact, which contained a provision for Canadian participation); HENKIN, supra note 1, at 153 (giving examples of congressional
authorization of compacts between foreign nations and states); see also Frankfurter & Landis, supra
note 335, at 743 (considering a flood-control compact possibly permitting cooperation with Canada). In
three compacts, Canadian participation (or at least the opportunity for Canadian participation) followed
congressional consent. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra, at 5, 6, 8 (listing compacts);
FREDERICK L. Z IMMERMAN & M ITCHELL WENDELL, T HE LAW AND USE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS
98-99 (1976) (noting the Northeastern Interstate Forest Fire Protection Compact, consented to by Con-
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tribute much significance to compacts where Congress was informed tardily or not at all, and the executive agencies have reliably resisted those
foreign compacts of which they were made aware.355
gress in 1949 with a provision authorizing joinder by Canadian provinces, later to attract Quebec and
New Brunswick); Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 335, at 743 (noting that the Flood Control Commission initially included only states, but that a North Dakota resolution moved to include Canada).
In other cases, compacts may never have received consent. See, e.g., Union Branch R.R. Co. v.
East Tenn. & Ga. R.R. Co., 14 Ga. 327, 333 (1853) (upholding the constitutionality of a state authorization for a railroad bridge); McHenry County v. Brady, 163 N.W. 540, 544 (N.D. 1917) (upholding the
constitutionality of an agreement between North Dakota counties and a Canadian municipality for the
construction of a transborder drain entered into with prior or subsequent congressional consent). See
generally 5 GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, D IGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 464, at 24-25 (1943)
(providing examples of interstate compacts and state-foreign agreements, while warning that agreements tending to increase state political power or infringing on the treaty power are either not allowed
or require consent); Raymond Spencer Rodgers, The Capacity of States of the Union to Conclude International Agreements: The Background and Some Recent Developments, 61 AM. J. INT’L L. 1021, 102428 (1967) (describing recent developments in the roles of both states and the federal government in the
“international sphere,” including references to several agreements between states and Canada, throughout which the Department of State has made an effort to stay involved); Schaefer, supra note 326, at 45
(examining the boundaries of state authority in foreign relations and noting that states have entered into
negotiations with Canadian provinces without congressional approval).
355. The Department of State has, when asked, rejected proposed compacts out of hand or insisted
on congressional consent. See 5 HACKWORTH, supra note 354, § 464, at 24-25 (citing 1924 advice
given by the State Department that it was unaware of the “conclusion of any treaty or agreement between a State of the United States and a foreign government”; its reply to a 1937 proposal to promote
trade between Florida and Cuba that it “did not contemplate the conclusion of special agreements or
pacts between separate states and foreign governments even if the consent of Congress to such special
agreements could be obtained”; and its view that congressional consent would be required for a California proposal of reciprocity arrangements with Mexico relating to motor vehicle registration); Rodgers,
supra note 354, at 1022-23 (describing the traditional view of the State Department’s denying the
power of the states to enter into foreign compacts without congressional consent—even in the case of
reciprocal exemption of motor vehicle registration and fees).
Similarly, the Department of Justice has advised that states must, at a minimum, obtain the permission of Congress before entering into any foreign compacts. See 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 661, 662 (1841)
(“[I]t is necessary to refer the whole matter to Congress, and submit to its wisdom the propriety of
passing an act to authorize such of the states as may choose to make arrangements with the government
of . . . any . . . foreign state . . . .”). In a later opinion, Attorney General Wickersham emphasized that
congressional permission was not only required, but could properly be obtained only in view of the
contemplated agreement. While this might be read to authorize prior negotiations, the point instead
seems to have been that a very general authorization would not by itself suffice. See 27 Op. Att’y Gen.
327, 332 (1909):
[W]hen such consent is given, Congress shall have in mind the particular matter consented
to; and certainly Congress did not intend by the general act in question to give its consent for
a State to enter into an agreement with a foreign power by which such power might occupy
the soil within the jurisdiction of the United States.
The State and Justice Departments were among the many federal agencies urging Congress to
reject the proposed inclusion of Canadian provinces in the Great Lakes Commission, in part on the
ground that it would interfere with the treaty power. See WELDON V. BARTON, INTERSTATE COMPACTS
IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 119 & n.65 (1967); Michael J. Donahue, Strengthening the Binational
Great Lakes Management Effort: The Great Lakes Commission’s Provincial Membership Initiative,
1998 T OLEDO J. G REAT LAKES’ L. S CI. & P OL’Y 27, 32-33. Their efforts resulted in language specifi-
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Critically, moreover, Holmes captured the norm against state bargaining as a rule that courts should enforce, one that was not just dependent
on state self-policing or intervention by the federal political branches.356
Such authority was defensible because it was rooted in specific textual
authority granted to the President and Senate and the specific preclusion of
state authority. 357 Consequently, Holmes suggested a narrower, more rigorous dormant preemption doctrine, one premised not on avoiding foreign effects but instead on prohibiting acts too closely resembling exclusive federal functions.358
As previously stressed, that doctrine was highly dependent upon contemporary notions of the treaty power’s limits,359 even in areas like immigration and foreign commerce.360 Nonetheless, to the extent that positive
cally withholding congressional consent to Canadian membership, declaring that consent would not
interfere with the work of federal agencies or the federal treaty-making power and reserving to Congress the right to “alter, amend or appeal” its consent. Great Lakes Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 90-419,
art. 9, 82 Stat. 414, 418-19 (1968). It appears that the Great Lakes Commission is undeterred. See
Donahue, supra, at 32-35 (describing the Commission’s interest in Canadian relations).
356. In my view, accordingly, Professor Goldsmith is mistaken in stressing that Chief Justice
Taney “always tie[d] the exclusivity point to a federal policy, inferred from the absence of federal extradition treaties, to prohibit all extraditions to foreign countries.” Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra
note 1, at 1650 n.147. While the Chief Justice cited what he “believed” to be federal policy, the point
seems to have been to illustrate that the federal government’s power to control extradition by treaty was
“as fully exercised by the decision not to surrender, as it could be by a decision the other way”; in either
case, “[t]he question to be decided is a question of foreign policy; committed, unquestionably, to the
general government.” Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 538, 577 (1840). Goldsmith similarly suggests that Chief Justice Taney’s argument regarding the exclusive federal power to appoint ambassadors
supposes that the power is exercised. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1650 n.147. But
Chief Justice Taney’s point again is that the power invariably conflicts with state diplomacy. See
Holmes, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 577. Some federal policy is presupposed, but only in the sense of a decision to act or not to act.
357. See supra text accompanying notes 344-45. Attempts, then, to determine whether Holmes and
its progeny rest on either a Compact Clause basis or a dormant preemption doctrine, see Goldsmith,
Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1651-52 & n.150, not only overlook the treaty power, but imply that
dormant preemption doctrine cannot have any textual basis—which, if true, would for many answer the
question of the doctrine’s validity before it was asked.
358. This seems consistent with the reading of Holmes in United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate
Tax Commission, 434 U.S. 452 (1978), in which the Court rejected a facial challenge to the Multistate
Tax Commission on the ground that conducting audits of foreign taxpayers would interfere with the
federal foreign relations power. See id. at 476-77. After noting that prior consent had always been required for matters involving foreign powers, see id. at 460 n.10, the Court explained how Chief Justice
Taney’s opinion in Holmes could be reconciled with dicta in Virginia v. Tennessee if his focus on matters with the “exclusive foreign relations power” of the federal government were properly understood.
See id. at 465 n.15.
359. See supra text accompanying notes 314-19.
360. In The License Cases, for example, Justice Daniel opined that
[e]very power delegated to the Federal Government must be expounded in coincidence with
a perfect right in the States to all that they have not delegated . . . . A treaty, no more than an
ordinary statute, can arbitrarily cede away any one right of a State or of any citizen of a
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political authority was permitted, dormant treaty power preemption followed.361 The obvious puzzle of why courts and scholars might find dorState.
The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 613 (1847) (Daniels, J., concurring). Foreign commerce was
not regarded distinctly. See id. at 578 (Taney, C.J., dissenting). This line of thinking was eventually
overcome, but it took some time. See Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 108-10, 115-18 (1890) (dismissing
the idea that a state may act when Congress does not exercise its power). In the interim, even those
cases recognizing the dormant Commerce Clause acknowledged exceptions for the exercise of state
police powers. Thus, in The Passenger Cases , the first to find a Commerce Clause violation in the absence of a federal statute, both sides of a divided Court—including Chief Justice Taney—recognized
limits to federal authority in a setting pertaining both to foreign commerce and immigration. See The
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 457 (1849) (opinion of Grier, J.) (distinguishing cases involving the “sacred law of self-defence, which no power granted to Congress can restrain or annul”); id. at
466 (Taney, C.J., dissenting) (“Any treaty or law of Congress invading [the right to expel dangerous or
immoral persons] . . . would be a usurpation of power which this Court could neither recognize nor enforce. I had supposed this question not now open to dispute.”).
361. In Hines v. Davidovitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), the Court stated: “[W]hether or not registration of
aliens is of such a nature that the Constitution permits only of one uniform national system, it cannot be
denied that the Congress might validly conclude that such uniformity is desirable.” Id. at 73. Since
Congress had acted in Hines, the Court did not have to decide whether “the federal power in this field,
whether exercised or unexercised, is exclusive.” Id. at 62. Hines legitimately calls into question whether
there was a dormant immigration preemption doctrine and arguably suggests that Zschernig was novel.
See H ENKIN, supra note 1, at 434 n.57; Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1653-54. But see
Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 29, at 138-41 (defending the pedigree of dormant foreign relations preemption); Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1227-41 (reviewing the historical foundations of federal exclusivity over foreign relations). But Hines also endorses Chy Lung’s concerns
about the ultimately federal responsibility for state acts. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 63-64 & n.12. More important, it takes the view that the Constitution “imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference,” see id. at 63, 62-68, and leaves
undisturbed Chy Lung’s conclusion that states were neither free to negotiate with foreign powers nor to
engage in equivalent acts, see Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (indicating that the Constitution “has forbidden the States to hold negotiations with any foreign nations . . . and has taken the
whole subject of these relations upon herself,” including the power to pass laws engendering diplomatic
controversy). Judge Feld, writing in Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 Fed. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No.
6,546), similarly noted, with respect to a San Francisco ordinance requiring the apparently offensive
treatment of Chinese prisoners, that
to [the national] government belong[s] exclusively the treaty-making power and the power
to regulate commerce with foreign nations, which includes intercourse as well as traffic, and,
with the exceptions presently mentioned, the power to prescribe the conditions of immigration or importation of persons. The state in these particulars, and with those exceptions, is
powerless, and nothing is gained by the attempted assertion of a control which can never be
admitted.
Id. at 256.
In commercial matters, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920), raised complex questions
of how to reconcile congressional authority over foreign commerce with Senate and executive control
over treaties respecting those matters, particularly if the treaty power might regulate matters out of congressional reach. See H ENKIN, supra note 1, at 209-11, 486-87 n.131. But see 2 BUTLER, supra note
320, §§ 361, 378, 388, at 64-65, 84-86, 185-87 (stating that the last in time of a conflicting treaty stipulation and act of Congress controls, thus implicitly assuming, prior to Missouri v. Holland, that congressional and treaty authority were coextensive). But it was plain, under those conditions, that enforcing a
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause entailed the judicial protection of the treaty power as well and that
the former’s scope might be enhanced by invoking treaty considerations. The clearest illustration was in
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mant preemption appropriate for other aspects of the burgeoning federal
authority,362 but not for the treaty power, results from underestimating the
rocky beginnings of any exclusive federal authority, and from ignoring the
centrality of treaty-related bargaining to the raison d’être of the foreign relations monopoly.
This evolving constitutional understanding was set back, of course, by
the narrowing of the dormant treaty power in Clark v. Allen, and was
hardly restored by the monopoly’s distension in Zschernig v. Miller. Clark
presented the question of whether state reciprocal inheritance legislation
unconstitutionally interfered with the dormant treaty power. The federal
government argued not only that the California statute violated a treaty
with Germany, but also that such laws unconstitutionally attempted to negotiate with foreign states by inviting them to “trade inheritance rights
abroad for inheritance rights in these states.”363 Describing the state’s program in those terms, and emphasizing the exclusivity of the federal government’s negotiating power, was perfectly in keeping with dormant treaty
power doctrine. But the brief confused matters by also citing possible interference with the federal treaty “program” and asserting that such laws
could only have adverse effects on foreign relations.364 The respondents accordingly disputed that state laws might be unconstitutional merely because
Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875), in which the Court adverted to international relations concerns bearing on municipal regulation of maritime passengers before concluding that “if
there be a class of laws which may be valid when passed by the States until the same ground is occupied by a treaty or an act of Congress, this statute is not of that class.” Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
362. Cf. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1648-49 & nn.139-40 (querying why dormant
preemption developed relative to, among other areas, the Commerce Clause, the power to tax federal
instrumentalities, and fugitive slave legislation, but not in relation to Congress’s bankruptcy power, its
“define and punish” power, and its copyright and patent powers).
363. Brief for Petitioner at 69-70, Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) (No. 626) [hereinafter Clark
Petitioner’s Brief]; accord Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Markham v. Allen, cert. granted sub nom.
Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) [hereinafter Clark Petition].
364. See Clark Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 363, at 69-75; see also Clark Petition, supra note 363,
at 8. Thus, the brief also suggested that the constitutionality of such an act depended on whether the
state “ha[d] the same objective as the existing reciprocal inheritance rights treaties and must, therefore,
be regarded as an indirect attempt to negotiate with foreign countries and as an attempted duplication of
the treaty-making program.” Clark Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 363, at 70. This would make any dormant treaty power doctrine depend on the actual content of federal policy, just like a more typical
“positive” preemption claim. Neither argument was helped terribly by the citation of dicta in Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), or People v. Gerke, 5 Cal. 381 (1855). Compare Clark Petitioner’s
Brief, supra note 363, at 70-71 (citing cases), with note 361 (discussing Hines), and note 311 (discussing Gerke). The brief also invoked Curtiss-Wright’s tenuous argument concerning the absence of state
authority, see Clark Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 363, at 70-71, claimed sweepingly that “all efforts of
a state to engage in foreign relations” are unconstitutional, id. at 70, and suggested that the California
statute was unconstitutional because its object—protecting the inheritance rights of Americans
abroad—was solely one that could be pursued by the federal government, see id. at 72.
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they had “some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries”—an argument incorporated (and even quoted) by the Supreme Court.365 While
noting the argument that California’s initiative might undercut national
objectives366 and endorsing the view that “negotiating with a foreign country” was solely a task for the federal government, the Court concluded simply that the state had not actually “entered th[at] forbidden domain.”367
The different result twenty years later in Zschernig could be viewed as
a return to first principles, insofar as the Court cited Oregon’s usurpation of
the federal negotiating function.368 In the main, though, Zschernig continued Clark’s ill-advised focus on foreign effects. The government revived
its position that the governing treaty resolved the question—a position necessarily diminishing its interest in vindicating dormant federal negotiating
authority369—and minimized any potential conflict with what it cast as the
“brooding omnipresence” of federal authority over foreign relations.370 The
365. See Brief for Respondents at 59 n.19, Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) (arguing that a state
acting within its own jurisdiction, whose actions do not conflict or hinder federal authority, should not
be held invalid); see also Clark, 331 U.S. at 517 (reasoning that actions that have some “incidental or
indirect effect in foreign countries” may be prohibited).
366. As the Court characterized it, the claim was that “by this method California seeks to promote
the right of American citizens to inherit abroad by offering to aliens reciprocal rights of inheritance in
California,” which was “said to be a matter for settlement by the Federal Government on a nation-wide
basis.” Clark, 331 U.S. at 516-17.
367. Id. at 517; see also id. (“What California has done will have some incidental or indirect effect
in foreign countries. But that is true of many state laws which none would claim cross the forbidden
line.”). Although the Court cited a number of cases as counterpoints, its primary support was Blythe v.
Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333 (1901). See Clark, 331 U.S. at 517; see also supra text accompanying note 310
(discussing Blythe).
368. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 439 (1968) (explaining that the Oregon statute “was to
serve as ‘an inducement to foreign nations to so frame the inheritance laws of their respective countries
in a manner which would insure to Oregonians the same opportunities to inherit and take personal property abroad that they enjoy in the state of Oregon’” (quoting Clostermann v. Schmidt, 332 P.2d 1036,
1041 (Or. 1958)).
369. In Clark, the Court had rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that the treaty covered personal property located in the United States that was left by an American citizen to a German national.
See Clark , 331 U.S. at 516; see also Virginia V. Meekison, Treaty Provisions for the Inheritance of
Personal Property, 44 A M. J. INT’L L. 313 passim (1950) (setting forth the State Department’s position
at length). In Zschernig, the Solicitor General opposed certiorari, but indicated that the threshold question would be the issue of treaty interpretation decided in Clark—indeed, after certiorari was granted,
he argued that this aspect of the decision should be overruled. See Memorandum for the United States at
5-8, Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (No. 730) [hereinafter Zschernig Memorandum]; Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (No. 21) [hereinafter Zschernig Amicus Brief]. The treaty issue may have been the more significant, given that similar
or identical language was used in 10 other treaties then in force. See id. at 4-5 & nn.3-4 (listing the treaties containing identical and similar provisions).
370. Zschernig Memorandum, supra note 369, at 6. In its brief, the United States simply asserted
that the Oregon statute did not unduly interfere with U.S. foreign relations, without even framing the
matter as a constitutional question. See Zschernig Amicus Brief, supra note 369, at 6 nn.5, 10 & 15.
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Court, as previously noted, disagreed, and distinguished Clark principally
on the ground that the potential for adverse foreign effects in Zschernig
was in fact demonstrable.371 The better distinction lay in the design of the
state statute at issue in Zschernig to effect change abroad—not just its tendency to generate ill will. The state court had opined that Oregon intended
its statute as “an inducement to foreign nations to so frame the[ir] inheritance laws . . . to insure to Oregonians the same opportunities” as they enjoyed in Oregon.372 To the Supreme Court, this bespoke a penchant for inquiring too closely into foreign concerns and intruding into “matters for the
Federal Government, not for local probate courts,”373 which it regarded as
posing too high a risk of adverse effect on foreign relations.374
The real import, instead, had been sketched by the government in
Clark and by the private appellants in Zschernig. However much distress
the Oregon law might cause U.S. foreign relations, and however much
Oregon might be legislating in an area susceptible to resolution by treaty,
the constitutional problem was that Oregon was implicitly “negotiating”
with foreign nations, and, in so doing, exceeding its authority under the
Constitution.375
371. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434-35 (noting that Oregon’s statute has “great potential for disruption and embarrassment”); see also id. at 443 (Stewart, J., concurring) (dismissing the argument that
state law does not conflict with the national interest today, while expressing a concern that it may in the
future and that this constitutional issue is too important to risk a variance of interpretation). But see supra text accompanying notes 92-93 (observing an absence of proof concerning foreign effect). The
same emphasis was suggested in Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973),
in which the Court struck down Connecticut’s refusal to admit a Dutch lawyer to the state bar on
grounds of citizenship. After outlining his disagreement with the majority, the Chief Justice consoled
that
the States may well move to adopt, by statute or rule of court, a reciprocal proviso, familiar
in other contexts; under such a reciprocal treatment of applicants a State would admit to the
practice of law the nationals of such other countries as admit American citizens to practice. I
find nothing in the core holding of Zschernig v. Miller . . . to foreclose state adoption of such
reciprocal provisions.
Id. at 733 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947)). The “core holding”
distinguishing Zschernig from Clark and Griffiths was likely thought to be Zschernig’s emphasis on the
foreign effects of judicial commentary, which one might fairly presume would be less prominent in barrelated matters.
372. Closterman, 332 P.2d at 1041, quoted in Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 438-39.
373. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 438; see also id. at 433 n.5 (claiming that in Clark the statute’s motive
had not been litigated, permitting the conclusion that “just matching of laws” was requested and that
representations by foreign officials as to their governments’ laws would suffice to establish reciprocity);
id. at 438-39 (citing Clostermann, 332 P.2d at 1042).
374. See supra text accompanying notes 49-57.
375. The appellants’ argument was somewhat distinct from the one made here. Rather than focusing on state encroachments on the negotiating function, the appellants suggested that Oregon’s proposal
had violated an absolute prohibition on entering into a compact with a foreign powers, asserting almost
as an afterthought that negotiating toward that end was also barred. See Brief of Appellants at 59-60,
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III. RECONSIDERING THE DORMANT TREATY POWER
Even if constitutional text and structure, as elaborated through the
nineteenth century, suggests the basic contours of a dormant treaty power,
revisionist scholarship argues that global changes warrant revisiting the
matter. The increasingly untenable distinction between matters of international and local concern, and the newly cosmopolitan nature of state and
local governments, is thought to have unsettled the Framers’ assumptions
about the proper functions of state government. Perhaps the states are so
thoroughly invested in the business of foreign nations that their excesses
will be checked by self-interest. If not, perhaps legitimate concerns about
federal supremacy can be adequately protected by the political branches,
thereby avoiding the obvious difficulties courts have had in evaluating the
potential costs of state interference in foreign relations—and, perhaps, their
insensitivity to its benefits.
To the extent that such arguments suggest partial “translations” of the
Constitution,376 they face daunting difficulties: if political conditions have
changed constitutional meaning, why have they not also undermined any
obligation to respect state sovereignty?377 But even if it is appropriate, under some circumstances, to adapt constitutional readings in light of changed
circumstances and experience, the claim that the state activities touching on
foreign relations may be blithely entrusted to legislative supervision is unpersuasive. The better course, instead, is to articulate a judicially manageable standard that respects the balance struck by the Constitution. As I argue below, an act-oriented prohibition on explicit or implicit state
bargaining with foreign powers—tailored to exempt state conduct bearing
little relationship to the original warrant for assigning the treaty power to
the federal government—is vastly superior to conventional approaches focusing on effects or purpose.

Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (No. 21). They also failed to emphasize the location of federal
authority in the Treaty Clause, instead relying on the Foreign Commerce Clause. See id. at 60-61.
376. For a comprehensive account of this practice, see Larry Lessig, Fidelity and Translation, 71
TEX. L. R EV. 1165 passim (1993) (arguing that originalism—that is, “fidelity to the text”—can at times
require changes in the interpretation of the Constitution). Of course, some degree of translation is always necessary. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 V A. L. R EV. 659, 672 (1987)
(“To converse with the founders, you need a translator.”).
377. Cf. Klarman, supra note 39, at 395-96 (considering analogous conundrums concerning how to
reconcile an original-intent interpretation of the Constitution with changing circumstances); supra text
accompanying note 40 (noting the possible partial “translation” of the dormant treaty power).
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A. Is the Dormant Treaty Power Antiquated?
1. A New International Function for States? The exclusive federal
authority to control foreign relations was premised on several simple
propositions. First, multiple entreaties robbed the nation of the uniformity,
credibility, and critical bargaining mass necessary to achieve advantageous
treaties and stave off adverse actions. Second, separate state action risked
retaliation against the nation as a whole. Finally, uniformity would enhance
national pride and dignity, thus indirectly assisting in foreign relations, and
serve as a bulwark against internal collapse due to conflicting interests.
These propositions were based on concrete experience under the Articles of
Confederation, and they were essentially uncontroversial.
Some conditions have changed dramatically—such as the need to ensure the internal stability and external credibility of the infant United
States—without provoking widespread reconsideration of the treaty
power.378 Other changes seem overstated. The federal government has not
really yielded its international role to the states.379 Failures to preempt state
foreign relations activities might signal genuine agreement with a state’s
position, an inability to intervene due to political or administrative constraints, or simply opposition to preemption as a matter of principle.380 And
even if concessions to states in recent treaties and implementing legislation
outweigh parallel incursions into state sovereignty—a point open to dispute381—they hardly suggest that states are at liberty to determine their own
constitutional privileges.
378. Cf. F RY, supra note 5, at 110-11 (contrasting the contemporary United States with problems
posed for Canada by Quebec separatism). But see id. at 1-3 (asserting political and economic vulnerability of post–Cold War America).
379. But see Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 29, at 861-70 (citing
examples of federal accommodation of state activities affecting international relations); Goldsmith,
Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1674-78, 1683 (same).
380. See Bradley, supra note 29, at 1098-99 (positing different explanations for presidential and
congressional passivity). Professor Spiro suggests that the federal government is almost always begrudging of any state intervention. See Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1258 & n.143 (disagreeing with Professor Bradley’s position that “state-level activity may now be unproblematic because
in some cases Congress may ‘agree’ with it”).
381. For emphasis on the loss of local sovereignty, see, for example, A.J. Tangeman, Comment,
NAFTA and the Changing Role of State Government in a Global Economy: Will the NAFTA FederalState Consultation Process Preserve State Sovereignty?, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 243, 244-46 (1996);
Joseph Wilson, Note, Section 102 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act: ‘Preserving’ State Sovereignty?, 6 MINN. J. G LOBAL TRADE 401, 402-03 (1997); William T. Waren, Balancing Act: Free Trade
and Federalism, STATE LEGISLATURES, May 1996, at 12 . For emphasis instead on the loss of U.S. sovereignty, see William J. Aceves, Lost Sovereignty? The Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreements,
19 F ORDHAM INT’L L.J. 427, 428 (1995). For analyses suggesting that sovereignty concerns are misplaced, see John H. Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance and Im-
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To be sure, many traditionally local issues now implicate foreign relations, domestic laws often have international repercussions, and states and
localities have higher international profiles.382 This much-ballyhooed leap
into globalization surely continues trends that began much earlier this century,383 and raises issues not unknown even under the Articles of Confederation: the controversy over navigation on the Mississippi, for example,
demonstrated how regional interests implicated foreign relations right in
our own backyard, and states have competed for overseas business since
they were colonies.384 However new and fundamental globalization may
plementation of the Uruguay Round Results, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 157, 170-88 (1997); Charles
Tiefer, Free Trade Agreements and the New Federalism, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 45, 47 (1998).
382. See, e.g., BRIAN HOCKING, LOCALIZING FOREIGN POLICY: NON-CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS
AND MULTILAYERED DIPLOMACY 8-30 (1993); Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1670-80;
Peter J. Spiro, New Players on the International Stage, 2 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 19, 31-32 (1997).
383. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 162 (1914):
With the growth of international trade relations, immigration, and other forms of international intercourse, the conditions of life within particular nations become of ever increasing
concern to their neighbors, with the result that treaty-making among the independent states
of the world tends to extend to matters earlier deemed to lie quite without its sphere.
Accord FISHER, supra note 46, at 59 & n.82 (“The framers made no such distinction and world events
since 1936 have increased the overlap between foreign and domestic affairs.”); Mark L. Movsesian, The
Persistent Nation State and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 18 CARDOZO L. R EV. 1083, 1092
(1996) (describing pre–World War I writings of Norman Angell and the International Polity movement). In an article cited in Zschernig itself, Arthur Selwyn Miller predicted the “obsolescence of the
nation-state as a form of social ordering,” contributing to his conclusion that “[t]he social milieu in
which the Constitution operates having changed so radically, the answers produced by the Founding
Fathers must be re-examined.” Arthur S. Miller, The Corporation as a Private Government in the
World Community , 46 V A. L. REV. 1539, 1570-72 (1960), cited in Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,
440-41 (1968). Just three years after Zschernig, Raymond Vernon declared that the concept of national
sovereignty seemed “curiously drained of meaning.” RAYMOND VERNON, S OVEREIGNTY AT BAY: T HE
MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S. ENTERPRISES 3 (1971); see also Bayless Manning, The Congress, the
Executive and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 306, 308-10 (1977) (describing
the interrelationship between issues on international and domestic agendas). The tendency to greatly
exaggerate the death of national sovereignty, and contemporary evidence indicating its continuing significance, may be cause for skepticism. See P AUL HIRST & G RAHAME THOMPSON, G LOBALIZATION IN
QUESTION: THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF GOVERNANCE 1 (1996) (writing
with a “mixture of scepticism [sic] about global processes and optimism about the possibilities of control of the international economy”); Movsesian, supra, at 1089 (arguing that “the decline of the nation
state has been greatly exaggerated”).
384. Compare Blaine Liner, States and Localities in the Global Marketplace, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSP., Spring 1990, at 11 (describing Virginia’s overseas effort in 1969 as a “stroke of genius” and “an historic and very lonely act”), with Harry N. Scheiber, International Economic Policies
and the State Role in U.S. Federalism: A Process Revolution?, in STATES AND PROVINCES IN THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY at 71 (Douglas M. Brown & Earl H. Fry eds., 1993) (noting the parallel
with eighteenth-century regulatory competition for European business). It remains the case, however,
that domestic relations are generally more significant. See Dani Rodrik, Sense and Nonsense in the
Globalization Debate , F OREIGN POL’Y, Summer 1997, at 21-22 (citing a study indicating that “trade
between a Canadian province and a U.S. state (that is, international trade) is on average 20 times
smaller than between two Canadian provinces (that is, intranational trade)” ).
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seem, we must also recall how suffused with international concerns even
“domestic” America was at its beginning, and how critical a role that context played in the founding.385
Even if today’s globalization is revolutionary, it is hard to determine
its constitutional import. The erosion of national boundaries might as readily argue for expanding federal authority on the ground that matters are increasingly of common interest—certainly the conventional translation in
our constitutional tradition.386 Globalization might also counsel in favor of
some intermediate approach, such as improving the channels by which
states can influence national policy.387 The constitutional significance of
globalization ultimately depends to a great degree on one’s extrinsic commitment to the virtues either of federal or state government.
One attempt to make sense of globalization emphasizes the diminishing prospect of state-induced externalities. Peter Spiro stresses that the federal monopoly has “constitutional pedigree” and rests on a wholly defensible thesis, the notion that externalities will prevent states from shouldering,
or even accurately predicting, the costs of their foreign relations activi-

385. See generally Marks, supra note 165, passim (emphasizing the significance of foreign relations issues at the Founding).
386. See, e.g., National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 58 n.14 (1st Cir.) (noting, in
response to commentary criticizing Zschernig, that “in an increasingly interdependent and multilateral
world, Zschernig’s affirmation of the foreign affairs power of the national government may be all the
more significant”), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999); CORWIN, supra note 383, at 171:
What with cable, steamship, wireless telegraphy, and inter-oceanic canals, the world to-day
is astonishingly small and the consequence is that the nations can no longer live unto themselves in the way that was earlier possible. . . . The development of uniform national legislation of social character, in pursuance of international agreement, is but another phase of the
broader development of international solidarity.
Accord FRY, supra note 5, at 110 (noting that “the ability to act quickly and decisively in an increasingly complex and interdependent world might favor the maintenance—or even the strengthening—of
authority in the nation’s capital”); Comment, Treaty-Making Power as Support for Federal Legislation ,
29 YALE L.J. 445, 449 (1920) (describing the “drawing together” of the world as the basis for increased
international and, derivatively, federal regulation). Compare Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1,
at 1672 (describing the new reach of public international law into “issues like environmental protection
and family law that in prior times were exclusively governed by domestic law”), with Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-35 (1920) (holding that the federal government’s authority to regulate migratory birds by treaty may be broader than its statutory authority), and Sarah H. Cleveland, The Plenary
Power Background of Curtiss-Wright, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1126, 1128-30 (1999) (describing the degree to which Missouri was anticipated). By analogy, much the same argument could have been made
about the impact of a burgeoning national market on constitutional notions of state authority, see Larry
Kramer, What’s a Constitution for Anyway? Of History and Theory, Bruce Ackerman and the New
Deal, 46 C ASE W. R ES. L. R EV. 885, 919-20 & n.88 (1996) (noting the original insignificance of interstate commerce), but the dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence does not seem to have been deterred—even without any of the traditional biases against states in foreign affairs.
387. For consideration, see KLINE, supra note 4, at 217-21.
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ties.388 According to Spiro, however, the emerging prospect of “targeted
retaliation”—the ability of foreign powers to respond directly against the
offending state, rather than against the nation as a whole—might warrant
reexamining of the traditional rule.389
His argument is somewhat tentative as to whether this evolution has
achieved constitutional significance,390 and appropriately so. Although
cases of targeted retaliation are not unknown,391 it is hard to find examples
demonstrating its sufficiency. 392 In fact, the controversies surrounding state
capital sentencing,393 the formative experience with the California taxing

388. See Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1246-47.
389. See id. at 1259-75.
390. See id. at 1261 (arguing that episodes of targeted retaliation “could mark the emergence of a
new doctrine of subnational responsibility, and the treatment of the states as demi-sovereigns under international law. . . . To the extent this development is perfected, the basis for federal exclusivity over
foreign relations slips away.”); see also id. (“[T]he case for shelving federal exclusivity hinges on the
innovation of targeted retaliation.”). But see id. at 1226 (asserting that “there is no justification for the
courts to enforce a default rule protecting federal exclusivity in the face of contrary state-level preferences”).
391. See KLINE, supra note 4, at 179 (citing the Japanese retaliation against Texas-based banks in
response to a Texas prohibition on foreign-bank branches, as well as Swiss constraints on Chicagobased banks in response to an Illinois law); Schaefer, supra note 326, at 51 n.67 (citing the example of
U.S. retaliation against Ontario beer concerns). Professor Kline’s 1983 study concluded that “there is
not yet any firm evidence that foreign countries act so as to hold individual states accountable for their
restrictive policies (although states that are relatively free from discriminatory regulations emphasize
that fact in their promotional pitches abroad).” KLINE, supra note 4, at 97.
392. Two of the three recent examples Spiro provides are speculative, and the states in question
seem to have been utterly unaffected by any prospect of retaliation. As Spiro observes, California’s
Proposition 187, which withheld public benefits from undocumented aliens, was immediately enjoined
(for reasons unrelated to the foreign relations power) and was the subject of relatively vague threats of
reprisal by Mexico. See Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1262-64. A few death penalty cases
have drawn clearer threats of investment or tourism boycotts, but they have been nonbinding and lowlevel, and they have had no discernible effect on the states. See id.
393. In the controversy surrounding the proposed execution of a Canadian citizen, the Canadian
foreign minister appealed directly to Secretary of State Albright, who sought to intercede with the
Texas governor on grounds of national interest—claiming that if the United States breached the Vienna
Convention, “it could not expect foreign governments to honour their obligation to grant access to
Americans facing imprisonment abroad.” David Usborne, Albright Plea to Spare Killer, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Dec. 10, 1998, at 19. After Albright’s request for a stay was refused, the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States formally requested the
State Department again to intervene. See Mike Ward, Human Rights Group Joins Call to Spare Canadian Killer, AUSTIN-AMERICAN STATESMAN, June 11, 1999, at B1.
The even more controversial execution by Virginia of a Paraguayan citizen also demonstrated
how foreign governments and international institutions did not rely on state-level pressure, but instead
pressured the United States, which again tried to intercede to protect what it regarded as the national
interest in ensuring the proper treatment of similarly situated Americans (not just Virginians) abroad.
See Jonathan I. Charney & W. Michael Reisman, Agora: Breard: The Facts , 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 666
passim (1998).
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method in Barclays,394 and the ongoing Massachusetts Burma controversy395 illustrate perfectly how foreign powers typically pursue both conventional diplomacy (including threats of reprisals) with the federal government and diplomacy targeted at the responsible state. Retaliation, in
other words, is not an either/or proposition; consequently, even if a state
cared for some reason to minimize externalities and could predict which
foreign powers might take offense, it might be hard-pressed to know
whether they would forego national-level diplomacy.396 It remains at least
as common for those powers electing between the options to impose national responsibility, which gives them the broadest range of possibilities
for recourse. 397 Put simply, the pattern since 1787 has shown more consistency than change and tends to vindicate the experience and concerns of the
Framers.398
At a minimum, though, the new incidence and diversity of state initiatives suggest that we should avoid generalizing about the federal interest
(or the lack of state interest) in foreign relations. Sister-city relationships
and simple purchase agreements, for example, seem different from treaties
of cession. As I have argued, case law and practice offer an appealing distinction between state laws having foreign effects and state laws interfering
with the exclusive federal control over diplomacy, and modern foreign relations provide no basis for unsettling that distinction. And even if the new
international profile of the states warrants reconsidering broad rules, á la
Zschernig, that broadly indict state activities having foreign effect, we
394. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74, 111-19. For an account describing the importance
of foreign efforts at both the federal and state levels, as well as the differing emphases of the Japanese
and British, see HOCKING, supra note 382, at 130-51.
395. See supra text accompanying notes 13, 15-23.
396. See Schaefer, supra note 326, at 51 & n.67 (noting that there is “no guarantee that [the targeted retaliation] will occur”). The targeted-retaliation thesis overlooks, in any event, the fundamental
perversity of externalities. States should systematically prefer acts that do not risk targeted retaliation,
without regard for externalities. A foreign power, correspondingly, should be most inclined toward targeted retaliation in those cases that do not implicate the national interest, and should tend to prefer national-level retaliation in those cases where more than the interests of the state are at stake. (If many
states impose economic sanctions, foreign opponents would be unlikely to commence a whirlwind tour
of state capitals, but instead would be encouraged to concentrate their energies on Foggy Bottom.) As a
result, targeted retaliation is least likely to deter, or resolve, those cases posing the greatest risk to the
national interest.
397. Minds accustomed to international trade remedies, in which, for example, EC discrimination
against bananas from U.S. growers is thought to be redressed by tariffs against Italian cheese, should
have no necessary attachment to redressing the original injustice allegedly suffered. While Spiro suggests that “the costs of disciplining the United States as a unit are often greater than foreign actors are
willing to bear,” Spiro, Foreign Relations , supra note 29, at 1267-68, the diversity of options would
seem to preserve the possibility of appropriately modulated, credible threats.
398. See, e.g., K LINE, supra note 4, at 16-19, 90-91, 98-99 (describing historical examples of fallout from state and local legislation); id. at 96-97 (dismissing the significance of state-level retaliation).
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should be cautious about discarding dormant federal preemption in its entirety simply because one or more versions are ill suited to marginal cases.
2. A New Domestic Function for States? Revisionist accounts of the
changed world of international relations tend to ignore the Framers’
argument that a federal monopoly is necessary in order to maximize and
apply American bargaining power—in modern terms, their “collective
action” argument. Here again, focusing on the new function of states in
international relations does not seem terribly rewarding. Modern doubts
about assuming a unitary state,399 and the feasibility of maintaining “one
voice” in foreign affairs,400 were equally within the Framers’
contemplation—indeed, it was their decision to deliberately fracture the
congressional monopoly on treaty-making and to vest part of that authority
in the presidency, an institution less responsive to state interests.401 The
Framers seem to have supposed that the possibility of achieving one (final)
voice, along with the theoretical appeal of the federal objective, was
enough to warrant a federal monopoly; and it is difficult to see how
changed circumstances have unsettled that judgment.
One might question, however, whether they were right in supposing
that consolidating the treaty power in the federal government conferred an
advantage in international bargaining. 402 Modern two-level game analysis 403
predicts that while domestic constraints may decrease the likelihood of a
mutually satisfactory accord—by limiting the range of outcomes to which
both parties can agree404—they increase the likelihood that any agreement
399. See Keisuke Iida, When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter?, 37 J. CONFLICT RESOL.
403, 403-04 (1993) (criticizing realists for “treat[ing] nation-states as unitary actors . . . . [when, in] reality, foreign policy decisions are the result of political processes within nation-states”).
400. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 29, at 446; Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1688.
401. See supra Part II.A.
402. See TRIBE, supra note 1, § 4-6, at 230 (“[S]tate action, whether or not consistent with current
federal foreign policy, that distorts the allocation of responsibility to the national government for the
conduct of American diplomacy is void . . . .”); supra text accompanying notes 270-74, 287; see also
Andrew Moravcsik, Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International
Bargaining, in DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: I NTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS
3, 28 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY] (noting the “normal
expectation that the statesman will preserve the maximum possible level of executive autonomy”).
403. For a concise exposition, see Putnam, supra note 199; for one of the rare applications in the
legal setting, and a useful literature review, see Robert J. Schmidt, Jr., International Negotiations
Paralyzed by Domestic Politics: Two-Level Game Theory and the Problem of the Pacific Salmon Commission, 26 ENVTL. L. 95 (1996).
404. This relies on the assumption that larger win-sets improve the prospect of reaching agreement,
see Putnam, supra note 199, at 437-38, rather than leading to squabbles over a larger range of possible
outcomes, see Frederick W. Mayer, Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The
Strategic Use of Internal Side-Payments, 46 INT’L ORG. 793, 797-98 (1992).
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actually achieved will favor the constrained side.405 It is often difficult for
negotiators to demonstrate credibly that they are bound by domestic constraints,406 but state laws might overcome this problem by directly communicating domestic constraints to foreign powers. A country confronted by
state sanctions, for example, might be more easily convinced that U.S. negotiators must achieve certain objectives in bilateral negotiations in order
to secure domestic political support, and may offer concessions in order to
placate those interests and obtain a ratifiable agreement.407
On balance, though, two-level game theory does not unsettle the
Framers’ model, largely because the Treaty Clause they designed establishes just such a game. One of the Constitution’s important innovations, as
we have seen, was precisely the creation of a credible constraint: assigning
negotiation to a substantially independent President, while simultaneously
liberating the Senate’s advice-and-consent function, meant that the President could reasonably assert that agreements under discussion would have
to satisfy a third party.408 Adding the states would upset the calculus. An
additional constraint, in the form of House approval, was specifically contemplated and rejected, and there is abundant evidence that securing state
405. See Putnam, supra note 199, at 440 (quoting THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF
CONFLICT 19-28 (1960)):
“The power of a negotiator often rests on a manifest inability to make concessions and meet
demands . . . . When the United States Government negotiates with other governments[,] . . .
if the executive branch negotiates under legislative authority, with its position constrained by
law, . . . then the executive branch has a firm position that is visible to its negotiating partners. . . . [Of course, strategies such as this] run the risk of establishing an immovable position that goes beyond the ability of the other to concede, and thereby provoke the likelihood
of stalemate or breakdown.”
406. See James A. Caporaso, Across the Great Divide: Integrating Comparative and International
Politics, 41 INT’L STUD. Q. 563 passim. But see Howard P. Lehman & Jennifer L. McCoy, The Dynamics of the Two-Level Bargaining Game: The 1988 Brazilian Debt Negotiations, 44 WORLD POL.
600, 640-42 (1992) (hypothesizing that Brazilian bargaining strength derived from domestic opposition
and weakness). Credibility problems are naturally greatest where the constraints have been artificially
generated. See Robert Pahre, Endogenous Domestic Institutions in Two-Level Games and Parliamentary Oversight of the European Union, 41 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 147, 147 (1997). See generally
SCHELLING, supra note 405, at 19-28 (presenting “a tactical approach to the analysis of bargaining”);
Peter B. Evans, Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics: Reflections
and Projections, in DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY, supra note 402, at 397, 402-03 (discussing “tied
hands” in negotiations).
407. Indeed, such a dynamic may be particularly useful in circumstances where international bargains are distributive rather than creating joint gains, such as where human rights are at issue. See
Mayer, supra note 404, at 797, 805, 816; id. at 798-805 (providing graphic illustrations relating to twoparty negotiations).
408. See supra text accompanying notes 206-11; see also Mayer, supra note 404, at 796 (“Having
one’s hands tied can be quite useful in extracting concessions from an opponent in negotiation. U.S.
negotiators, for example, have long used the threat of congressional rejection as a device for leveraging
concessions at the bargaining table.”); Putnam, supra note 199, at 448 (considering the influence of the
Senate on bargaining power of American negotiators and on the prospects for agreement).

2000]

NEGOTIATING FEDERALISM

1237

approval was deemed undesirable, largely because such consent posed too
serious a hurdle to agreement.409
We should also distinguish between the credible communication of
domestic preferences—which need not, of course, take legal form—and
activities that interfere with the conduct of diplomacy. The Senate, for its
part, was thought to lack diplomatic capacity and could not influence negotiations save through negotiating instructions, indirectly enforced
through its power of consent. In contrast, state and local governments possess a fluidity, dispatch, and authority that together poses a serious risk to
executive diplomacy.410 In particular, state activities creating multiple negotiating channels, establishing or maintaining subjects for ongoing negotiation (and, potentially, agreement), or generating demands for preemption
that otherwise would not exist, can hardly be said to ease the task for presidential negotiators.411
Finally, for domestic constraints to be useful, they must be reasonably
consistent with the federally defined interest.412 Plainly, state policies that
are antithetical to the federal objective—for example, opposing normalized
relations under any circumstances—will more likely hinder than help. But
even states desiring to support a federal objective may find it difficult to
conform to, or even to identify, that objective.413 The less elaborate, twolevel game embodied in the constitutional allocation of foreign relations

409. See supra text accompanying notes 162, 164-66.
410. It is no accident, perhaps, that strong governors—a phenomenon even less well anticipated by
the Framers than a strong President—have taken the lead in establishing states in foreign affairs. For an
early discussion of this phenomenon, see John Kincaid, The American Governors in International Affairs, PUBLIUS, Fall 1984, at 95.
411. If domestic constraints are too credible, moreover, such as to overwhelm the capacity of the
federal government to resolve them, any value is lost. At the extreme, for example, the lack of a supremacy clause might seem an ideal demonstration of domestic constraints, but it would also demonstrate that the negotiator could not promise to uphold any bargain struck. See Putnam, supra note 199,
at 438-39 (discussing involuntary defection); see also H ELEN V. M ILNER, I NTERESTS, I NSTITUTIONS,
AND INFORMATION: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 80-81 (1997) (noting that
international agreements are in general more difficult where domestic politics are involved).
412. See, e.g., MILNER, supra note 411, at 234.
413. For example, Massachusetts may have understandably considered its anti-Burma law to be
consistent with federal objectives, even when third-party relations were considered; the EU, for example, had publicly supported international action against the Burmese regime. But federal Burma policy
was intended to foster multilateral cooperation, and the Europeans viewed the particular type of sanction selected by Massachusetts—secondary boycotts—as particularly offensive. See National Foreign
Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 46-47, 53-54, 76-77 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525
(1999). Federal sanctions policy, writ large, appears to have rationed such tools and resorted to them
only in select cases, and federal European and east Asian policies created multi-issue linkages that
could scarcely have been anticipated. See id. at 47, 53-54.
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power seems better suited to the advantages of entrusting policy development to a negotiator with at least qualified independence.414
B. Does Positive Political Authority Suffice?
Most of the post-Founding insights into the scope of the Treaty Clause
have been afforded by the political branches, and the instances in which the
judiciary has enforced, rather than merely declared, the relevant norms are
passing few. The rarity of judicial intervention should not be surprising.
The treaty power is expressly allocated to the President and the Senate.
Justice Stewart’s concurrence in Zschernig noted that “the conduct of our
foreign affairs is entrusted under the Constitution to the National Government, not to the probate courts of the several States”415—and, he might
have added, neither was it entrusted to the Supreme Court. Dormant doctrines presuppose, of course, that the judiciary is not usurping federal prerogatives, but is merely preserving them for exclusive exercise by the political branches.416 Still, there is room for doubt as to whether courts have
the deft touch necessary to perform that function.417 If judicial intervention
is to be redeemed, we need a clearer explanation as to why the best judicial
rule is simply not to interfere.
1. The General Argument Against Judicial Intervention. A threshold
issue then, and one posed repeatedly and skillfully by Professor Goldsmith,
is why the political branches should not be left to protect their own
prerogatives. Congress may pass preemptive legislation, and the President
has executive agreements and regulations at his disposal. Given those
instruments, and the obvious superiority of the political branches in
assessing foreign relations, why empower the courts to intrude as well? To
be sure, the political branches can correct any decisions with which they
may disagree, thereby ameliorating the downside to judicial involvement.
Goldsmith argues, however, that the federal government is more likely to
step in where the courts underprotect federal interests—and thus courts will
tend, on balance, to generate uncorrected errors that unnecessarily
414. Cf. Putnam, supra note 199, at 456-58 (relaxing the assumption of the chief negotiator as a
faithful agent for her constituents).
415. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 443 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).
416. Cf. Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1256 n.139 (distinguishing between intervention by federal courts against the federal political branches and protective intervention, as in Zschernig).
417. If, as Justice Jackson asserted, courts lack the necessary information and capacity to secondguess the political branches on questions that are “delicate, complex, and involv[ing] large elements of
prophecy,” perhaps even judicial intervention on behalf of the political branches may do more harm
than good. See supra text accompanying note 83.
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federalize state law and preempt genuinely tolerable state activities.418
This argument raises numerous questions worth pursuing, though not
easily resolved. The turn to self-enforcing constitutional law seems to rest
on a fundamental skepticism about the traditional function of federal
courts—almost a political question doctrine favoring the states.419 The
premises of such a move, obviously, are debatable. Even if one concedes
that dormant foreign relations preemption is constitutional common law,
that does not mean that all such law is presumptively illegitimate, nor that
the foreign relations preemption should be discarded first.420
In any case, there is cause to be skeptical that Congress represents a
sufficient alternative. Even if Congress is fully aware of state encroachments, and concerned about them, it may find it difficult or costly to intervene—particularly given its notorious weaknesses at managing foreign
policy.421 In the alien land law controversies, for example, the federal gov418. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1692-95; Goldsmith, Formalism, supra note
29, at 1420.
419. Cf. Louis Henkin, Is There a ‘Political Question’ Doctrine? , 85 Y ALE L.J. 597, 622-23 (1976)
(suggesting the existence of “constitutional provisions which can properly be interpreted as wholly or in
part ‘self-monitoring’ and not the subject of judicial review,” with the arguable exception of the Guarantee Clause).
420. To the contrary, commentators with varying views on the legitimacy of federal common law
consider foreign relations to be the paradigmatic case for it. See Clark, supra note 257, at 1292-311 &
1298 n.252; Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67
COLUM. L. R EV. 1024, 1048 (1967); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts,
52 U. C HI. L. R EV. 1, 36-39, 54-59 (1985) (describing the principle of preemptive lawmaking as a potential warrant for federal common law); id. at 56 n.238 (identifying the federal common law of international relations as a possible example of preemptive lawmaking).
421. Compare Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1683 (“Congress is more likely to address state activity that harms the national foreign relations interest than it is to address other harmful
state acts.”), with ROBERT A. DAHL, CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY (1950) (generally describing
congressional inadequacies), and BARBARA HINCKLEY, L ESS THAN MEETS THE EYE: F OREIGN POLICY
MAKING AND THE MYTH OF THE ASSERTIVE CONGRESS passim (1994) (rebutting claims that Congress
has reestablished control over foreign relations), and KOH, supra note 46, at 123-33 (describing congressional inadequacies, with particular reference to matters of national security), and STEPHEN R.
WEISSMAN, A CULTURE OF DEFERENCE: CONGRESS’S FAILURE OF LEADERSHIP IN FOREIGN POLICY
12-16 (1995) (describing congressional efforts at foreign policy as “reactive” and “well below even its
general norm,” due largely to the lack of constituent interest). Much of the criticism directed at Congress, to be sure, concerns its deference to the President, but many of the reasons for its inattention and
paralysis would also seem to impair its ability to react to state encroachment. What is more, Congress’s
attempts to maintain a modicum of influence on presidential policy have often found expression
through nonstatutory means, such as public relations, which may have less than the desired effect on
state laws. See James M. Lindsay & Randall B. Ripley, How Congress Influences Foreign and Domestic Policy, in CONGRESS RESURGENT: F OREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY ON CAPITOL HILL 17 (Randall B.
Ripley & James M. Lindsay eds., 1993).
I assume, with Professor Goldsmith, that any significant foreign relations controversy will come
to Congress’s attention, see Goldsmith, Federal Courts , supra note 1, at 1682, though I am less sanguine that state activities discriminating against foreign nations are somehow more visible than analo-
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ernment tolerated state activities with manifest adverse effects on U.S. foreign relations.422 Although the federal government may since have grown
more sure of its authority, it continues to yield to state pressures.423 It is
hard to determine in any given case, of course, whether federal officials are
genuinely disturbed by state policies, and easy to speculate that Congress
would intervene if it really objected, as in the case of the Arab boycott.424
But the prevailing pattern—including the survival of state laws on the Eastern Bloc, South Africa, Burma, and the taxation of multinationals425—suggests that Congress is solicitous of state interests even in cases
where foreign policy considerations, taken alone, might dictate a different
approach.
The assertion that involving the judiciary tips the result toward excess
federalization is vulnerable for many of the same reasons. It seems like
gous activities discriminating against interstate commerce. Even if there is a more specialized legislative apparatus for foreign matters, the fact that potential complainants in cases of interstate discrimination enjoy legislative representation may more than make up the difference. See infra text accompanying note 426. The increasingly blurry distinction between foreign and domestic matters will further
erode the ability of Congress’s specialized committees to monitor foreign relations matters and quickly
initiate change. Compare Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1682-83 (emphasizing the function of legislative committees’ specializing in foreign affairs), with W ILLIAM I. B ACCHUS, T HE PRICE
OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: CONGRESS, THE EXECUTIVE, AND I NTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS FUNDING
38-40 (1997) (emphasizing the adverse effects of decentralizing reforms on committee authority and
ease of legislating), and H INCKLEY, supra note 421, at 12-15 (same), and Manning, supra note 383, at
311 (citing overlapping committee jurisdictions on foreign policy issues as posing “deep-seated and
probably ineradicable” problems).
422. Indeed, this very fact is cited to show the supposed absence of dormant foreign relations law.
See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1655.
423. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 76, at 676-78 (citing examples of federal accommodation of state activities affecting international relations); Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1,
at 1674-78, 1683 (same).
424. See supra text accompanying note 10. The Export Administration Act of 1979 may have been
successful in part because it was focused less on state-designed policies than on those reacting to “restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by foreign countries against other countries.” 50
U.S.C. § 2407(c) (1994).
425. See supra text accompanying notes 8, 11-13. As William Wong has explained, the persistence
of Iron Curtain statutes, notwithstanding Zschernig, posed potential problems for nonresident Chinese
aliens. See Wong, supra note 9, at 658-62; cf. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF
STATUTES (1982) (advocating judicial nullification on grounds of desuetude). In the case of South Africa, moreover, Congress passed and then retracted sanctions without preempting state measures, notwithstanding apparent disagreement with their continuation. See supra note 264. This result may have
been anticipated in Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300 (Ill. 1986), where
the Supreme Court of Illinois opined that “[t]he ability of this country to choose between a range of
policy options in developing its foreign policy in relation to the Republic of South Africa would be
compromised by the existence of State-sponsored sanctions which the Federal government could not
remove or modify to fit changing conditions.” Id. at 307. That description may make little formal sense,
given the Supremacy Clause, but it captures the practical difficulty in orchestrating a measured and
flexible federal response.
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guesswork to suppose that legislative intervention is more likely to be inspired by foreign policy interests than by the desire to vindicate state interests wounded by an adverse judgment, particularly given the domestic orientation of representative politics.426 And even if the risks of uncorrected
error are asymmetric, the consequences of the two types of error may not
be identical or equally intolerable. Judicial intervention may indeed protect
federal prerogatives when Congress would deem it unnecessary, but the
case for specially heeding that risk is unconvincing.
Finally, even if the ability of the federal branches to defend their own
prerogatives were currently satisfactory, the notion that their authority
would be unaffected by the demise of the judiciary’s role seems unrealistic.
Were the Supreme Court to conclude, for example, that the Constitution is
insufficiently clear to bar automatically state foreign relations activities,
political branch defenses of the federal monopoly—not infrequently
couched as principled defenses of a constitutional assignment—would be
deeply undermined, and states might naturally assume that the range of
permissible conduct had expanded.427 The dormant foreign relations doc426. One would assume that foreign interests are relatively less influential in congressional politics
than are the states, though it is certainly difficult to measure in conventional terms. Foreign interests are
handicapped by their lack of voting power and the foreclosure of most campaign contributions, see
Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1253 & n.133, but so are states. Both foreign interests and
states will find U.S. private surrogates for their interests, such as (in the case of the foreign governments) the National Foreign Trade Council. But see KLINE, supra note 4, at 223-26 (suggesting that
Congress tends to be disproportionately responsive to domestic interest groups on international issues);
cf. FRY, supra note 5, at 109 (contrasting the domestic orientation of Congress with the reorientation of
states toward international interdependence).
The stronger point, it seems to me, is that by comparison to congressional delegations from a
state in controversy, opposition from other members will be relatively diffuse—as will participation by
the State Department, which has other programmatic interests that may make it vulnerable to concerted
pressure from Congress. Cf. Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 29, at 1253-54 (supposing that support of congressional delegation from an affected state will be relatively more intense).
427. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY passim (1960) (describing the “building” and “legitimating” work of judicial review). This is
not the only possible reaction to judicial abdication, of course. One might also suppose that
“[l]egislators and other officials are likely to take the Constitution more seriously if they cannot pass the
buck to the courts[,] [f]or they are more likely to be blamed for unconstitutional actions if there is no
mode of correction.” Richard A. Posner, Appeal and Consent, N EW REPUBLIC, Aug. 16, 1999, at 37
(book review). But this supposes more obvious or well-understood norms than the dormant treaty
power, which has not been wholly successful when left to its own devices. See Kirgis, supra note 51, at
707-08 (noting, in light of lack of Supreme Court guidance, that states have to “take responsibility for
ensuring that they act within appropriate constitutional bounds when foreign relations are at hand” (citing authorities)); Shuman, Local Foreign Policies, supra note 20, at 162 (“The relevant court pronouncements have been so ambiguous and contradictory that few city attorneys have been convinced
that their municipal foreign policies were clearly illegal and not worth trying.”); id. at 167 (arguing that
standards announced by a lower court in the wake of Zschernig “are so vague and depend so heavily on
each case’s peculiar facts and circumstances that it is hardly surprising that few cities have been deterred by the highly uncertain prospect of a Zschernig violation”).
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trines and positive political authority are not, it seems clear, genuinely independent variables.
2. Positive Political Authority and the Dormant Treaty Power. Even
if judicial intervention in foreign relations is generally deleterious, that
does not necessarily impugn the dormant treaty power. If other dormant
doctrines are a yardstick, the case for reading a dormant component into the
Treaty Clause is relatively strong. Even Justice Scalia, a dogged critic of
the dormant Commerce Clause, acknowledges that the treaty power’s
structure—the assignment of positive authority to the federal government,
and the corresponding denial of that authority to the states—makes it an
appealing candidate for a preemptive judicial rule.428 Professor Goldsmith,
however, offers a clever inversion of this argument. In his view, clear
grants of federal authority make it more likely that the political branches
will successfully ward off any state encroachment. At the same time, the
prohibition on certain state ends—here, barring states from entering into
treaties, and requiring congressional consent for compacts—“attenuates the
possibility that states will . . . interfere[] with federal diplomatic
prerogatives.”429
Whether the possibility of state interference has actually been attenuated depends on how broadly the federal prerogative is construed. Whether
positive federal authority is a sufficient defense against state conduct,
moreover, depends on which branch’s power is being defended. While
Goldsmith assumes (with Barclays Bank) that Congress’s power to regulate
commerce is at stake,430 the treaty power is at risk too—and that has
meaningfully distinct implications.
To be sure, Congress possesses substantial authority to address state
interference with the treaty power. Though its own power to encroach on
negotiations may be limited,431 it has the power to authorize—or refrain
428. See Tyler Pipe Indus. v. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 261 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that “there is no correlative denial of power over commerce to the States in Art. I,
§ 10, as there is, for example, with the power to coin money or make treaties”).
429. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1707. In the quoted passage, Goldsmith was particularly addressing the need for a supplemental rule barring the states from sending or receiving ambassadors, but the example was meant to be illustrative. Were he to accept that prior consent was necessary in order to enter into foreign compacts, see supra text accompanying notes 252-60, congressional
guardianship would presumably seem still more adequate.
430. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1698-1705.
431. For example, Congress may be barred from intruding in ongoing negotiations, or from restricting the President’s ability to pursue negotiations on certain topics or with certain parties. Cf.
HENKIN, supra note 1, at 80 (“Limitations on Congressional power are implied in grants of power to the
President . . . .”); id. at 88 (“Even for champions of maximum Congressional authority, . . . [there is] no
doubt that [the President] alone, not Congress[,] can make treaties . . . . Congress has not seriously
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from authorizing—state negotiation with foreign powers toward compacts,
and appears to be the sole judge of the distinction between those pacts and
treaties.432 Congress may also enact legislation expressly proscribing state
diplomacy. It is difficult for it to do so, however, in any fine-tuned or expedient way. Congress’s ordinary frailties in managing foreign relations are
multiplied when it is asked to safeguard the integrity of international negotiations with which it may be wholly unfamiliar, particularly where intervention seems to sacrifice domestic interests for foreign ends or abstract
principle.433 More programmatic intervention is also rare, and rarely effectual.434 Goldsmith regards the Logan Act as dispelling “[a]ny remaining
doubt about the adequacy of legal protection for federal interests,”435 but
many would consider that statute’s virtual desuetude to prove quite the opposite point.436
doubted that the President is the sole organ of communication with foreign governments . . . .”). At the
same time, though, it can enact legislation overriding any treaty. See id. at 209-14 (distinguishing between the legislative override of a treaty and treaty termination). It may also interfere with the negotiating process in a number of ways that would be constitutionally problematic were they pursued by individual states. Thus, the House Committee on the Judiciary, in a report arguing for the now-discredited
view that the treaty-making power could not be used to invade congressional authority over matters
such as tariffs, conceded that while Congress “cannot reach out to negotiate with other nations” and
“cannot make compacts or agreements[,] [i]t may condition its own legislation on that of foreign nations, and thus make overtures of international policy.” J.R. TUCKER, POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO
NEGOTIATE TREATIES WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, H. REP. NO. 2680, at 7 (1885).
432. See supra text accompanying note 335. It may not, however, authorize the states to negotiate
toward treaties, however defined. See Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 724-25
(1838) (“By the first clause of the tenth section of the first article of the constitution, there was a positive prohibition against any state entering into ‘any treaty, alliance, or confederation:’ no power under
the government could make such an act valid, or dispense with the constitutional prohibition.”); Green
v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 37 (1823) (describing an argument of counsel).
433. See supra text accompanying notes 421-25. Should Congress affirmatively disagree with state
policies, of course, legislating may be attractive. But where it desires simply to clear the field for the
exercise of the treaty power, intervention will still be perceived as a substantive disagreement with the
extant state policies, with all the attendant political and legal problems that might entail. Spear notes:
For the administration, though, suits against the states over constitutional matters are a rather
conspicuous way to handle this particular flap. At issue, after all, is the country’s trade policies toward countries with nasty human rights records—a debate that the Clinton White
House is not exactly eager to provoke. “Washington is scared to death because it does not
want to be accused of being soft on human rights,” noted one Massachusetts official.
Spear, supra note 22, at 8. The more abstract constitutional arguments that Congress might muster in
favor of the federal monopoly are not only tough sells in any particular context, but also apply with
some force against congressional involvement.
434. Cf. KOH, supra note 46, at 124-25 (describing cumbersome and ineffectual procedural statutes
for controlling foreign policy, such as the War Powers Resolution).
435. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1707-08.
436. See, e.g., Detlev F. Vagts, The Logan Act: Paper Tiger or Sleeping Giant?, 60 AM. J. INT’L L.
268, 268-69 (1966) (noting the near-desuetude of Logan Act and criticizing its constitutionality); Curtis
S. Simpson III, Comment, The Logan Act of 1799: May It Rest in Peace, 10 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 365,
365-67 (1980) (same). As previously noted, however, the Act is important as an indication of early per-
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The courts, in consequence, are typically left to construe congressional
silence, and the import of that silence is very different in the treaty context.
With the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, the alternative to congressional authority is state authority; silence passes the baton, as it were.437 In
matters subject to the treaty power, on the other hand, the Senate is left free
to instruct the President and to insist either on sacrificing state authority or
preserving it. Barring Senate intervention, in turn, the President is considered to have unfettered authority to negotiate, or to refrain from negotiating. This raises the question, then, whether the Senate and the President,
and not just the Congress, have genuinely effective means of protecting
their authority and their vision of the federal interest against state encroachment.
The usual repository of federal treaty authority is the President, and
dormant treaty power preemption seems indispensable to protecting his
(and the Senate’s438) negotiating prerogatives. Certainly the conventional
alternatives seem meager. The power to adopt preemptive rules or regulations is commonly considered to require prior congressional authorization,439 and founding any such lawmaking on the President’s independent
ceptions as to the negotiating authority. See Vagts, supra, at 269.
437. See supra text accompanying notes 102-19 (discussing Barclays Bank).
438. State activities might interfere with some segregable Senate interest, such as its instructions to
the President to pursue certain policies in negotiations, or to refrain from negotiating on certain matters
or with certain sovereigns. Yet, the Senate has no authority to preempt state activities, save with the
cooperation of the House, which cannot be regarded as a necessary participant in exercising the treaty
power. See supra note 162 (noting that the Constitutional Convention rejected any role for the House in
treaty-making). The President, in any event, is not solely defending executive prerogatives. Unless
presidential negotiating authority is plenary, the Senate has engaged in de facto delegation of its
authority to instruct, which has then by hypothesis been misappropriated—along with its statutory entitlement to notice from the President concerning significant developments in negotiations. See U.S. Department of State, Treaties and Other International Agreements, 11 FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL ch. 700
(rev’d 1985) (Department of State Circular 175), reprinted in CRS, supra note 109, at app. 4 (detailing
negotiating procedures, including the obligation to inform and consult with congressional leaders and
committees). But cf. Steve Charnovitz, The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: Implications for
Environmental Cooperation, Trade Policy, and American Treatymaking , 8 T EMPLE INT’L & COMP. L.J.
257, 301 n.389 (1994) (reporting the circumvention of Circular 175 procedures); Richard J. Erickson,
The Making of Executive Agreements by the United States Department of Defense: An Agenda for Progress, 13 B.U. INT’L L.J. 45 passim (1995) (describing formal and de facto exemptions to Circular 175
procedures); Phillip R. Trimble & Jack S. Weiss, The Role of the President, The Senate and Congress
with Respect to Arms Control Treaties Concluded by the United States, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 645, 648
(1991) (speculating that procedures “probably do not have much impact on actual Executive branch
decisions”).
439. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) (holding that the exercise of substantive authority having the force and effect of law “must be rooted in a grant of such power by the
Congress and subject to limitations which that body imposes”); United States v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 526
F.2d 560, 572 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (“[N]o undelegated power to regulate commerce, or to set tariffs, inheres
in the Presidency.”).
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constitutional authority might fare poorly when confronted by contrary indications of congressional preference.440 Even were it authorized under the
Treaty Clause itself, requiring that the executive branch engage in lawmaking to protect negotiating authority would plainly compromise the warrant for involving the President in the first place. (Surely the constitutional
authority to negotiate in secrecy with foreign powers, subject only to Senate advice and consent, would be compromised by the need to anticipate
potential interference by rival state negotiators through publicly promulgated rules.441) More flexible instruments, such as executive intervention in
litigation, may offend norms against executive law making or arrogation of
the judicial function, 442 and may not even be conclusive.443 The best course,
Congress has, in point of fact, entrusted the President with some powerful regulatory instruments. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), for example, permits the exercise of substantial authority over private economic activity. See 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994); see also KOH,
supra note 46, at 48 (noting the possible abuses of IEEPA, including an invocation by the President to
overcome congressional resistance); Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98
YALE L.J. 1385, 1414-18 (1989). The Secretary of State also has some rather open-ended authority to
regulate the State Department’s functions. See 22 U.S.C. § 2651a(a)(4) (1994) (delegating to the Secretary of State the powers to “promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the functions of the Secretary of State,” and the power to delegate any “authority to perform any of the
functions of the Secretary or the Department to officers and employees under the direction and supervision of the Secretary”). To the best of my knowledge, there is at present no general statutory authority
that would permit the President to regulate state diplomacy.
440. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (describing presidential authority as at “its lowest ebb” when it is contrary to the established will
of Congress, such that “he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter”). In Youngstown, Congress’s consideration and rejection of a proposal to seize the steel mills appears to have sufficed to signal its will. See id. at 586. Irrespective of
congressional preference, it may be doubted whether the President has any solid basis for preemptive
lawmaking of this kind. See supra text accompanying note 108 (describing the constitutional bases and
the effect of independent executive authority, as well as the conventional treatment of executive branch
input in dormant foreign relations preemption case law). Such authority may be present, however, were
the premises of Zschernig accepted. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 163 (claiming that, under the facts of
Zschernig, “[n]o doubt, an act of Congress or a treaty, probably an executive agreement, perhaps an
official declaration, possibly even a rule made by the federal courts, could have forbidden what Oregon
purported to do”).
441. Cf. Vagts, supra note 436, at 300-01 (proposing that “one might give the Executive power to
issue regulations forbidding intercourse with specific countries on specific sensitive topics during particularly delicate times,” but noting that “[t]he authorities might, however, shrink from putting themselves in a position where they would have to incur the onus of declaring an emergency,” and also that
“[i]t might also seem dangerously like a censorship arrangement, viewed as a restraint on speech”).
442. See supra text accompanying note 110 (citing authorities).
443. Prior to the adoption of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603-11 (1994),
executive suggestions were often considered authoritative on sovereign immunity issues. See, e.g., Ex
parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943); Henkin, Provisional Measures, supra note 108, at
681-82; cf. Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 38 (1945) (failing to extend immunity in the
absence of presidential action). In other areas, like recognition matters, executive suggestions were regarded as less conclusive. See Moore, supra note 110, at 293-96. For consideration of their revival in
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it would seem, is for the judiciary to protect the President’s ability to exercise the treaty power, rather than cobbling together authority of more dubious origins and efficacy.
C. The Dormant Treaty Power and the Proper Scope of State Authority
As the preceding discussion suggested, the need for any dormant foreign relations doctrine depends substantially on the constitutional basis for
federal authority. Congress’s ability to legislate on matters of national concern may suffice to protect federal prerogatives under the Commerce
Clause; although a substantial body of case law suggests that it is not always enough, even in a purely domestic context.444 The treaty power, however, is a clearer basis for a dormant regime. The Treaty Clause assigns
constitutional responsibility to the President and the Senate, raising serious
doubts about the adequacy of Article I safeguards for Article II authority.
The scope of the federal authority at stake is also germane, since the
judiciary’s function in any dormant regime may be problematic if the
authority in question is either too slight or too great. If the interests at stake
are incidental, then positive political authority may yet suffice: Congress
may be an imperfect safeguard for the President and Senate, but so too is
the judiciary. For the reasons elaborated in Part II, however, the dormant
treaty power entails more than, say, preserving the President’s monopoly
on diplomatic formalities. The Framers intended to give the President substantive authority to determine the nation’s course of negotiations, subject
to Senate instruction. They supported that objective by denying the states
any corresponding authority—and by requiring that the states obtain congressional consent before they negotiate toward, or enter into, even lesser
international pacts.445 This allocation of authority is anything but incidental,
and seems to warrant judicial assistance.
On the other hand, if the dormant authority is substantial and wideranging, the problem becomes how to constrain the judiciary, including by
heeding customary separation of powers and federalism considerations.446
These fundamental and continuing concerns, more than the need to accommodate the states’ new toe hold on the global stage, and they require
careful tailoring of the judicial standard to its constitutional basis.447 This
connection with the dormant treaty power, see infra text accompanying notes 455-58.
444. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 63.
445. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; supra text accompanying notes 256-60.
446. See supra text accompanying notes 79 (noting bias against extra-constitutional exclusive federal authority), 81-83 (noting bias against judicial authority over foreign affairs).
447. Cf. Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law,
91 H ARV. L. REV. 1117, 1127-31 (1978) (describing the tension between constitutional common law
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approach rules out importing the traditional approaches to dormant foreign
relations preemption, which are hardly better suited to the Treaty Clause
than to their other bases—whatever those might be. At the same time, the
potential vulnerability and significance of the treaty power demands a more
active role for the courts in enforcing its dormant aspect than revisionist
critics of the federal monopoly have recognized.
1. Adapting Dormant Foreign Relations Preemption.
a. Effects testing. Defining the dormant treaty power through an
“effects” test might reorient and recover the entire dormant foreign
relations preemption doctrine, but at the price of importing its familiar and
debilitating flaws. All state activities “intru[ding] . . . into the field of
foreign affairs”448—not just those attempting to conduct foreign relations,
as was the case under the facts of Zschernig itself449—might equally be
regarded as interfering with the federal negotiating authority by, for
example, raising new and unwanted subjects for discussion and
settlement.450 Absent significant remedial limitations,451 even state laws
having no foreseeable effect on foreign relations when adopted, but later
flowering into a topic for international bargaining, might be regarded as
unconstitutional.
The near-inevitable process of balancing these effects with other values452 would pose a textbook problem of incommensurability:453 there is no
and separation of powers and federalism principles); cf. also Merrill, supra note 420, at 54-59.
448. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52
(1941)).
449. See id . at 437 (describing the Oregon statute, and judicial decisions applying it, as oriented
toward accomplishing foreign objectives); supra text accompanying notes 52, 372-75.
450. See Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266 (1890) (“[T]he treaty power of the United States extends to all proper subjects of negotiation between our government and the governments of other nations.”); id. at 267 (citing cases); see also In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 463 (1891) (paraphrasing Geofroy).
451. Such as those suggested by the Solicitor General’s position in Barclays Bank. See supra text
accompanying note 111.
452. See Charles Fried, Types, 14 CONST. C OMMENTARY 55, 57 (1997) (“Balancing is entailed by
effects tests because as a logical matter most courses of action have some tendency to contribute to a
forbidden effect—or to undermine the pursuit of a required effect.”).
453. For introductions to the problem of incommensurability, see Frederick Schauer, Commensurability and Its Constitutional Consequences, 45 H ASTINGS L.J. 785 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 795-812 (1994). See generally Symposium,
Law and Incommensurability, 146 U. P A. L. REV. 1169 (1998). For representative criticisms in the constitutional context, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943 (1987); Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 Y ALE L.J. 1 (1987). For a relatively sympathetic view of balancing against
its alternatives, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing
the Constitution, 111 H ARV. L. R EV. 54, 78-83 (1997). While some incommensurability objections are
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obvious means of comparing the national interest in bargaining unity with
the interests of individual states in autonomy. The difficulty of evaluating
an individual state’s interests is compounded by the Treaty Clause’s premise that the states’ individual interests are best promoted through national
unity.454
The courts might ameliorate these drawbacks to adjudicating foreign
relations by entertaining executive suggestions, a procedure that becomes
more appealing when federal exclusivity is grounded in the treaty power.
Here, the President’s agents would be opining on Article II authority,
which reduces separation of powers concerns about judicial abdication.
Courts would not defer, in other words, in the estimation that the issues are
better “righted through diplomatic negotiations rather than by the compulsions of judicial proceedings”455—itself a judicial judgment about the
proper means of conducting foreign relations and not always a correct
one456—but instead because the Treaty Clause itself dedicates the matter to
the President.
Still, many of the problems that dog executive suggestions, like their
ad hoc nature and lack of procedural protection for litigants, would persist.457 And even if the President’s entitlement to opine is clearer under the
clearly focused on the difficulty of comparing governmental interests with individual liberties, see, e.g.,
Robin West, The Supreme Court, 1989 Term—Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 43, 47-48 (1990), one need look no further than interests analysis in the conflict of laws to see
comparable problems in weighing governmental or institutional interests. See Larry Kramer, Note, Extraterritorial Application of American Law After the Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply to Professors
Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 750, 755 (1995) (criticizing multifactored balancing in the
choice-of-law context).
454. See supra text accompanying notes 268-74. The dynamic elements of any such balancing approach may also be disabling. The notion that one state’s activities might be found unconstitutional,
while another state’s similar activities are sustained because the national interest shifted somewhat over
time, is likely to sorely test the integrity of executive branch submissions and judicial review. Unless an
unrealistic parity is maintained, the result may be to open up more severe problems of federal-state relations than the underlying state activities could ever pose.
455. Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943).
456. In point of fact, successful diplomatic negotiations may be spurred by the shadow of judicial
proceedings—see, for example, the recent negotiations involving reparations by German industry to
survivors of the Holocaust—and diplomatic negotiations may determine that judicial proceedings are
the only appropriate solution. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 662-68 (1981) (describing
the genesis of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal).
457. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1709-10; Moore, supra note 110, at 299-302.
These flaws might be partially addressed by routinizing the process through administrative rules. See
Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1710; see also 22 U.S.C. § 2651a(a)(4) (1994) (authorizing
the Secretary of State to adopt rules and regulations necessary to carry out department functions). But
cf. Moore, supra note 110, at 299 n.119 (“‘[I]f the State Department were to set up a procedure for
hearings, its exercise of a judicial function would merely be more apparent.’” (quoting PHILIP JESSUP,
THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 83-84 (1959))). It is questionable, however, whether such a scheme
could easily promote both certainty and procedural fairness at the same time, and the ultimate discretion
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treaty power, its underlying rationale calls the wisdom of case-by-case defense into question.458 Routinely requiring executive input on specific matters of foreign relations, such as the status of pending discussions between
the United States and a foreign nation, will either yield nothing of value or
betray some of the virtues originally driving the decision to invest the
President with the treaty power. A solution that suffers many of the disadvantages of prevailing case law, and conflicts with its doctrinal raison
d’être, seems like no solution at all.
b. Purpose review. Other difficulties, though of a lesser degree,
afflict any attempt to focus exclusively on the purpose of state activities.459
Tests turning on legislative motivation are in vogue because they are
thought to be more amenable to judicial administration.460 But the challenge
of determining legislative purpose should not be too quickly
discounted—if, indeed, one can speak meaningfully of a unitary legislative
intent in the first place.461 In the foreign relations context, difficult matters
of judgment would be commonplace—such as whether reciprocal
inheritance laws are aimed more at fairness than at foreign relations,
extending equal treatment to aliens only to the extent that their home
countries see fit to do likewise, or whether state procurement policies aim
at external influence or just at avoiding moral taint and ethical
compromise.462 Such inquiries would also be delicate. The ordinary
of the Justice Department in representing U.S. interests in litigation may limit the State Department’s
ability to manage matters administratively.
458. As discussed at greater length below, the appropriateness of employing the treaty power to
permit case-by-case preemption of state activities depends to some degree on the default rule employed.
See infra Part III.C.3.
459. For a tentative endorsement, see Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1711 (suggesting
that, if positive political authority is insufficient, motive review may be the most appropriate solution,
but noting the problem of identifying legislative intent).
460. See, e.g. , Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REV.
297, 321-23, 353-56, 368 (1997); Richard Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 750 & n.105 (1994).
461. See Fallon, supra note 453, at 72-73. Professor Bhagwat, for one, does not consider the issue
at length, but claims that courts are relatively experienced at what he concedes may be an essentially
metaphorical inquiry. See Bhagwat, supra note 460, at 322-23; see also Fried, supra note 452, at 59-66
(considering intent as related to constitutionally constituted bodies). Of course, similar problems attend
inquiries into the intent of a body of “Framers.” See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 212-17 (1980). As explained below, though, the alternatives to
such an inquiry are more evident and more appealing in the dormant foreign relations context.
462. For example, in Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300 (Ill. 1986),
in which the Illinois Supreme Court held unconstitutional the state’s refusal to accord favorable tax
treatment to South African Kruggerands, the only legislative history cited by the court indicated that
that state legislators wished to avoid association with the unpopular South African regime. The court at
one point read this to indicate that the “plain purpose behind the exclusion was to avoid the appearance
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sensitivity of asking whether state and local officials purposefully violated
the Constitution 463 might be compounded by the avowed reluctance of the
Supreme Court to probe similarly into congressional motivations behind
the invocation of the Commerce Clause.464
Such difficulties may be avoided only where the declaration of purpose is explicit or nearly so. Focusing on such cases, though, raises potential problems of fit and overbreadth. The clarity of a foreign relations ambition has no necessary connection with the risk of interfering with federal
treaty functions. Many foreign-focused state and local activities pose little
risk of interfering with federal functions.465 At the same time, focusing on
explicit attempts to conduct foreign relations raises concerns about encroaching on the speech interests of state and local officials466 and in any
of encouraging South African investment,” id. at 302, but later ventured that “[t]he undisputed purpose
of the exclusion is to express disapproval toward South Africa and to discourage investment in its products,” id. at 305. In contrast, the Maryland Supreme Court concluded that “Baltimore City’s purpose in
enacting [its anti-apartheid ordinance] was simply to ensure that the City’s pension funds would not be
invested in a manner that was morally offensive to many Baltimore residents and many beneficiaries of
the pension funds.” Board of Trustees of the Employees’ Retirement Sys. v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 746 (Md. 1989).
In National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, the legislation’s purpose seemed apparent. The
sponsor of the bill, Representative Rushing, had been explicit in proclaiming the legislation’s foreignpolicy objectives; the lieutenant governor and governor had largely subscribed; and Massachusetts cited
no other objective in defending the legislation. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d
38, 46 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999). But it would have been open to Massachusetts to
disavow foreign-policy ambitions, in preference for a desire to avoid immoral associations. In a 1998
letter, Secretary of State Albright had acknowledged that, “one voice” considerations aside, “President
Clinton and I recognize the authority of state and local officials to determine their own investment and
procurement policies, and the right—indeed their responsibility—to take moral considerations into account as they do so.” Jim Lobe, Trade-U.S.: Clinton Backs Multinationals in Big Court Case, I NTER
PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 16, 2000, available in LEXIS, News library, Curnws file.
463. See Fallon, supra note 453, at 72.
464. See TRIBE, supra note 1, § 5-3.
465. The city of Boulder’s decision to help build a Nicaraguan preschool, for example, was sympathetically portrayed as an attempt to “challenge U.S. policies in Central America,” and it was just one
of “thousands of bilateral foreign agreements” that cities have negotiated that are “tantamount to political treaties.” Shuman, supra note 20, at 161.
466. Professor Porterfield, for one, has argued that nonbinding state and local resolutions, as well
as restrictions on the expenditure of public funds, are protected from preemption by the First Amendment. See Porterfield, supra note 18, at 2. For other invocations of free speech interests, see Bilder, supra note 5, at 829; Jay A. Christofferson, Comment, The Constitutionality of State Laws Prohibiting
Contractual Relations with Burma: Upholding Federalism’s Purpose, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 351,
361-63 (1998). But see Natsios, 181 F.3d at 61 (rejecting an argument that Massachusetts’s free speech
interests should influence the balance of interests in Zschernig analysis). As Professor Porterfield acknowledges, the Supreme Court has never recognized that state or local governments have First
Amendment rights, and lower courts have split on the question. See Porterfield, supra note 18, at 32-35.
One would have to take into account the risk that government speech may instead violate the First
Amendment. See TRIBE, supra note 1, § 12-4; see also MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT
SPEAKS: P OLITICS, L AW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 42-50 (1983) (considering, and
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event tends to earmark those measures already likely to attract sufficient
scrutiny from the political branches.
Finally, any purpose-dominated approach presupposes that we can define the improper purpose with sufficient clarity and that the motives constitute the constitutional wrong (or at least a good proxy for it).467 Considering the question as it is usually framed—whether the state aimed at
conducting foreign relations468—might be helpful if the Constitution expressly established foreign relations as a prerogative of the national government. But the Constitution is not written in these terms, and whether a
state has a foreign relations purpose provides us with little useful insight
into whether the dormant treaty power has been offended. A governor’s
blistering address on a matter of international concern, for example, might
create a fuss, inviting (or derailing) treaty negotiations. So too, however,
might a neighboring state’s evenhanded but severe liability regime, and it is
difficult to see how one could competently distinguish in kind or degree
among these, and other, state activities. Globalization, presumably, will
make drawing such distinctions still harder. If states and localities can legitimately claim that they no longer enjoy any purely “domestic” authority,469 attempts to distinguish improper foreign relations purposes, or even
to define benign purposes,470 may become impossible, especially if the judiciary defers to legislative expressions of purpose.471
At bottom, a purpose inquiry has the same problem as an effects approach: before considering how much state activity is too much, or what
purposes are illegitimate, we must first establish more clearly the constitutional basis for the claim of interference. If the premise for the claim is the
dormant treaty power, we need look no further than the type of acts asrejecting, the case for deeming governments to have free speech rights); Beth Orsoff, Note, Government
Speech as Government Censorship , 67 S. C AL. L. R EV. 229, 243-47 (1993) (arguing against attributing
free speech interests to government entities).
467. Cf. Bhagwat, supra note 460, at 332-37 (noting that the adequacy of the state purpose may
vary by context and that it must be closely tied to the underlying constitutional provision at issue).
468. See, e.g., Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1711 (citing Zschernig).
469. See supra Part III.A.
470. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 895 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“The test of a legitimate state purpose must be whether it addresses valid state concerns.”); cf. Agostini
v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997) (citing cases and distinguishing between illegitimate government action “with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion” and with legitimate secular purposes).
471. Keeping within the establishment context, see, for example, Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
56 (1985) (requiring that “a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion”); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983) (confessing a “reluctance to attribute
unconstitutional motives to the States, particularly when a plausible secular purpose for the State’s program may be discerned from the face of the statute”).
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signed to the President and Senate, together with those acts denied the
states.
2. An Act-Oriented Approach: Precluding State Bargaining. The
superior approach, both in terms of fidelity to the original understanding
and judicial manageability, is to proscribe a certain class of state acts likely
to interfere with the constitutional function of the national government—an
approach similar to that taken in recent cases establishing the
anticommandeering principle for the federal government.472 An act-oriented
approach tries to delimit a class of activities that exceeds the limits of state
authority under the Constitution, eschewing any attempt at measuring
effects, balancing, or focusing on governmental purpose. As made clear in
the next section, such an approach may be tempered by the interests of the
federal political branches, but otherwise assumes that the positive grants
and negative limitations of the Constitution establish a rule for judicial
application.
The state activities conflicting with the dormant treaty power might be
imagined as three bands progressing outward from the positive grant of
federal authority. The most proximate band consists of conduct that would
directly usurp the power given the President and the Senate—the power to
conclude agreements with foreign powers on behalf of the United States.
This unambiguously violates the constitutional text only to the extent that it
results in treaties or unconsented compacts. But it is highly unlikely that the
move from the Articles of Confederation was supposed to invest the states
with increased authority to send and receive ambassadors, and the federal
monopoly on diplomacy would mean little were individual states free to
hold themselves out as the United States.473

472. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932-33 (1997) (holding that a balancing of interests
analysis is inappropriate when a congressional act amounts to the commandeering of state officials);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992) (defending “formalistic” inquiries into whether
federal measures, despite their “perceived necessity,” improperly deviate from the form of government
set forth in the Constitution). See generally Fallon, supra note 453, at 67-68 (describing such principles
as “forbidden-content” tests); id. at 83-84 (explaining why forbidden-content tests play only a small role
in constitutional decisionmaking when compared to other kinds of tests); Fried, supra note 452, at 5674 (distinguishing between “intents,” “effects,” and “acts” as bases for constitutional doctrine). Printz
specifically rejects balancing as “inappropriate” where “it is the whole object of the law to direct the
functioning of the state executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework of dual sovereignty . . . .” Printz, 521 U.S. at 932. As the remainder of the opinion makes clear, however, the “object” of the law—apart from its form—is irrelevant. See, e.g., id. at 904 (emphasizing that “the Brady
Act purports to direct state law enforcement officers to participate . . . in the administration of a federally enacted regulatory scheme”).
473. See supra Part III.B.2.
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A less proximate, but broader, second band of activities—transparent
attempts by states to fashion agreement in their own capacities—represents
a more significant problem.474 Left unconstrained, states occasionally perceive matters to be of local interest that in fact implicate the national interest, or fail to realize opportunities that would have been secured by the aggregation of state interests through unified negotiation.475 The Constitution
is best read as continuing the prohibition in the Articles of Confederation
on the sending or receiving of emissaries without congressional consent,
and as requiring in any event that agreements with foreign powers receive
consent before they are effectuated, as well as vesting the authority for
treaties exclusively in the federal government.476
A third band encompasses implicit bargaining—ostensibly unilateral
state measures, like the reciprocal inheritance statute at issue in Zschernig
or the procurement law in Natsios, that are in practice contingent on the
policy of foreign powers. It is unclear whether such activities are generally
more or less harmful than explicit bargains. Ostensibly unilateral conduct
does not raise the same risk of conflicting foreign engagements, or occasion as many disputes with foreign powers over breach. By the same token,
however, such conduct lacks some of the safeguards of more formal bilateral or multilateral bargains. States pursuing an actual agreement might
wish to enhance the agreement’s legitimacy and efficacy by seeking approval as an Article I compact, which creates an incentive to conform with
Congress’s vision of the national interest.477 Actual agreements with foreign powers, constitutional or not, also require the other party’s consent,
perhaps reducing the possibility of conflict.478
Whether or not their effects are strictly comparable, unilateral but
contingent state activities bear a strong functional resemblance to explicit
bargaining. The state of Washington, for example, would be barred, even
absent relevant federal enactments, from negotiating toward an agreement
474. Even prior to the adoption of the Constitution, foreign powers did not easily mistake an individual state’s authority with the authority of the United States. See supra note 274-75 and accompanying text.
475. See supra Part III.B.2.
476. See supra text accompanying notes 257-60.
477. Unless adopted as a proper Article I compact, state agreements lack the force of federal law
and may be more vulnerable as a consequence. But see New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 811
(1998) (explaining that “congressional consent ‘transforms an interstate compact [from a creature of
state law] into a law of the United States’” (quoting Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438 (1981) (citing
Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983))).
478. Ill-considered agreements with foreign powers would still risk disputes with third parties: a
pact with Taiwan, for example, may be perfectly amicable, but it would tend to pose other problems. In
addition, the interests of the United States may be injured if the bargain was less than what might possibly have been achieved.
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with China on the subject of software piracy.479 Similar collective action
and externality problems would be raised, however, were Washington instead to enact a measure that was expressly contingent upon China’s satisfaction of otherwise negotiable conditions, such as by permitting state purchase of goods only from countries that have satisfactory software policies
(or by barring purchases from those that do not). The same issues would be
raised, finally, even were a quid pro quo merely implicit—such as where
Washington imposed a flat procurement ban, but it could be discerned that
the ban would likely be relieved were China to remedy the basis for the
state’s complaint.480
Under each of these scenarios, the state of Washington would be implicitly or explicitly offering to alter state policy if a foreign government
changes its policy. This is bargaining, in one form or another,481 and has
been recognized and reproved as such—important exceptions like the Prussian life insurance saga notwithstanding. The bar on state entreaties to for479. Cf. James Kynge, China Throws Out Microsoft Piracy Case, F IN. T IMES, Dec. 18, 1999, at 6
(“Software piracy in China is rampant and independent analysts believe more than 90 per cent of the
software patented by Microsoft and other companies is pirated.”).
480. Distinguishing between such cases and “purely” unilateral conduct may appear to reintroduce
troublesome issues of intent. It should be stressed, however, that intent is at issue solely for purposes of
determining whether the state conduct is bargaining in the first place, not for distinguishing between
legitimate and illegitimate motivations for identical conduct. Cf. Fried, supra note 452, at 63 (explaining how consequences can be examined as inconclusive evidence of intent, rather than as an independent or determinative effects inquiry). In practice, most of the relevant legislation will be contingent in
nature. Instances in which a state discriminates against a foreign power without respect to its political
character or policies—discriminating, as it were, on grounds that are diplomatically immutable—should
be relatively rare.
481. See WILLIAM C. M ITCHELL, P UBLIC CHOICE IN AMERICA: A N INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 383 (1971) (defining bargaining as “[a] means of exchange in which the terms of settlement are within the control of the partners to the exchange”). The precise typology of these forms of
bargaining has been considered by international lawyers. In the example employed in the text, Washington’s decision to condition eligibility for government procurement on establishing a satisfactory
software policy might be characterized as a reciprocal law—essentially, a contingent reward “mak[ing]
the observance of a certain conduct by foreign governments a condition for its operation.” Arthur Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal Aspect of a Perennial Idea, 49 N W. U. L. REV. 619, 628 (1954). Its decision to bar procurement based on explicit or implicit conditions could be characterized as “retorsion,”
that is, contingent retaliation that attempts to “induc[e] another state to change a policy which is undesirable but not unlawful.” Id. at 629; see also id. at 630 (differentiating between reciprocal acts and
those of retorsion).
The bargaining approach would ordinarily exclude, on the other hand, “reprisals,” which are oriented solely toward past acts. While reprisals may incidentally influence future conduct, they aim at
reparation rather than at attempting to modify the other party’s acts, and are not contingent upon any
change. See id. at 629. In the context of interstate compacts, it has also been suggested that reciprocal
legislation does not in practice require much formal negotiation. See Joseph R. Starr, Reciprocal and
Retaliatory Legislation in the American States, 21 M INN. L. R EV. 371, 373 (1937). That overlooks the
negotiating function of the legislation itself as well as the possibility of iteration between sovereign
authorities. For further discussion, see infra note 508.
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eign powers has always been construed more broadly than as a mere proscription of state emissaries. Under the Articles of Confederation, Virginia’s preferential treatment of French brandy was permissible only to the
extent that it could be construed as purely gratuitous, rather than compensatory.482 Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Holmes v. Jennison later made
clear that ostensibly unilateral bargains may fall within the Compact
Clause, a principle largely consistent with subsequent decisions discussing
the treatment of foreign compacts.483 And there is a significant and unavoidable body of case law standing for the proposition that the power to
engage in foreign relations was generally denied the states. The notion that
both formal and implicit bargaining violate the dormant treaty power was
most clearly, if unsuccessfully, captured in the briefs in Clark v. Allen and
Zschernig v. Miller, only to be swamped in the Zschernig majority’s overbroad vindication of federal supremacy.484
So construed, the dormant treaty power may be regarded as either underinclusive or overinclusive. The bargaining approach certainly does not
proscribe all state activities that may disrupt U.S. foreign relations, omitting in particular unilateral but noncontingent conduct. Some activities—for example, Boulder’s donation of playground equipment to the
Sandinistas,485 or New York City’s renaming of a city street corner near the
Nigerian mission to the United Nations486—may or may not be sufficiently
482. See supra text accompanying notes 297-300. Those decisions have reflected Chief Justice
Taney’s approach to the variety of bargaining even in the domestic context. In United States Steel Corp.
v. Multistate Tax Commission, 434 U.S. 452 (1978), the Court regarded various “interstate agreements
effected through reciprocal legislation without congressional consent,” id. at 469, as permissible not
because they failed to meet the requisite form of compacts, but rather because they did not enhance state
power within the meaning of the test suggested by Virginia v. Tennessee, see id. at 469-72. As noted
previously, though, the Court appeared to accept that the scope of the exemption owed harmless state
compacts would differ in the context of foreign compacts. See supra note 358.
483. See supra text accompanying notes 339-58.
484. See supra text accompanying notes 363-75.
485. See supra note 465.
486. See Opusunju v. Giuliani, 669 N.Y.S.2d 156, 157 (Sup. Ct. 1997). Opusunju considered New
York City’s decision to name the street corner opposite the Nigerian Mission to the United Nations for
Kudirat Abiola, the slain wife of a Nigerian dissident. See id . Superficially, at least, the city’s action
seems best classified as a reprisal. See supra note 481. Were it apparent that New York City would rename the street corner in response to some accommodation by the Nigerian government, the matter
might fall within the purview of the bargaining approach; the best indications, however, are that the
name change was intended to be permanent. See East Timor Action Network, Inc. v. City of New York,
71 F. Supp. 2d 334, 339-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (describing various city naming initiatives and characterizing the Abiola street sign as “permanent”); Clyde Haberman, Spelling Out Foreign Policy in Street
Signs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1997, at B1 (noting that Nelson and Winnie Mandela Corner remains so
named even after the fall of apartheid and the divorce of the eponymous activists). The Nigerian response was to rename a street in front of the U.S. embassy in Lagos after Louis Farrakhan. See Political
Street Game, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 7, 1998, at 13. Any explicit or implicit bargaining between the city of
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incendiary to be caught by an effects-focused test, but even more clearly
would not be deemed unconstitutional under the dormant treaty power.
More prominent state “Buy American” laws487 and tax laws impacting
multinational corporations488 would similarly survive any dormant treaty
power objection. Such measures do not meaningfully attempt to alter the
conduct of foreign governments (which cannot, for example, easily become
“American” so as to satisfy a procurement statute). Perhaps surprisingly,
such measures are generally excused under the prevailing effects-centered
approach without serious contemplation of their potential impact, illustrating both the unpredictability of the effects approach and the intuitive appeal
of an alternative.489
For much the same reason, the bargaining approach would also excuse
most speech-tinged conduct by state officials. An inflammatory “sense”
resolution, denunciation of a foreign leader, or other one-time affronts490
New York and Nigeria would undoubtedly fall within the exceptions indicated below. See infra text
accompanying notes 507-14.
487. See supra text accompanying note 14.
488. See supra text accompanying note 73.
489. Thus, for example, while a California state court struck down the California “Buy American”
statute on Zschernig grounds primarily because of its potential overseas effects, see Bethlehem Steel
Corp. v. Board of Comm’rs, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800, 805 (Ct. App. 1969), similar statutes were upheld at
least in part because they were not contingent on foreign government behavior—in addition to avoiding
other behaviors criticized in Zschernig. See Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 913-14
(3d Cir. 1990) (holding that, in contrast to Zschernig, “Pennsylvania’s statute provides no opportunity
for state administrative officials or judges to comment on, let alone key their decisions to, the nature of
foreign regimes”); K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 381 A.2d
774, 783-84 (N.J. 1977) (“Nor is there any evidence to suggest that the political climate in a potential
foreign bidder’s nation has ever motivated the inclusion of the Buy American condition in an invitation
for bids or that its inclusion is predicated on an assessment of the internal policies of any foreign country.”); North Am. Salt Co. v. Ohio Dep’t of Transp., 701 N.E.2d 454, 462 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (observing that statutory provisions favoring in-state and U.S. purchasing “do not provide Ohio officials
with an opportunity to treat foreign nations differently based upon the ideological bent of a nation’s
government, or based upon any other factor. Rather, the provisions apply equally to all foreign nations.”).
Courts have reached similar results with respect to state inheritance statutes not contingent on
foreign-government conduct, even where the statutes do attempt to influence the conduct of foreign
citizens or might be the basis for complaint by foreign governments. See Shames v. Nebraska, 323 F.
Supp. 1321, 1326 (D. Neb. 1971) (distinguishing state statute precluding nonresident aliens from inheriting a certain class of Nebraska land from Zschernig both on the grounds of its benign application and
because, “[u]nlike the Oregon statute, the Nebraska statute herein challenged does not contain such a
reciprocity provision”). Compare Estate of Kraemer v. Kraemer, 81 Cal. Rptr. 287, 294 (Ct. App. 1969)
(holding unconstitutional, on Zschernig grounds, provisions of the California probate code that conditioned the inheritance of real property on foreign reciprocity), with Estate of Horman v. State, 485 P.2d
785, 797-98 (Cal. 1971) (en banc) (upholding, against a challenge based on Zschernig, provisions of the
California probate code requiring that all nonresident aliens claim their interests in estates within five
years from the date of death).
490. See, e.g. , F RY, supra note 5, at 98 (citing New York City’s removal of Yasser Arafat from a
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might easily cause greater consternation than an arid statute or judicial decision;491 if an effects approach is to distinguish such cases, it must depend
on the tenuous First Amendment interests of governments and their officials.492 The dormant treaty power, in contrast, naturally targets a narrower
class of speech-related conduct—bargaining493—but disregards other
speech without attempting to invoke the First Amendment.494
Finally, the dormant treaty power takes a relatively generous view of
state activities relating to private parties. States engage in a wide variety of
internationally oriented commercial activities involving domestic and foreign corporations.495 They also regulate the conduct of private individuals
in a wide variety of ways, as Zschernig and Barclays Bank illustrate.496 Under the orthodox federal monopoly, the identity of the immediate target of
state action was less significant than whether such action might cause offense; state interaction with private parties might be preempted given sufficient secondary consequences, such as where influential foreign complainants might realistically enlist a foreign power in espousing their claims.497
public concert and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s welcome of the IRA’s Gerry Adams); Palumbo, supra
note 4, at 219 (citing Mayor LaGuardia’s criticism of Adolph Hitler); id. at 221 (citing Mayor Wagner’s
conduct toward King Saud); Porterfield, supra note 18, at 7 (describing state and local “sense” resolutions); Kevin Whitelaw, The Very Long Arm of the Law, U.S. N EWS & W ORLD REPORT, Oct. 14, 1996,
at 57, 57 (reporting that “[a]t least one chamber of 42 state legislatures has declared support for U.N.
representation for Taiwan”).
491. For example, were Oregon’s legislature to have adopted a resolution condemning Iron Curtain
governments, the risk of confrontation might well have exceeded those posed by low-visibility declarations by the state’s probate courts on reciprocal inheritance rights.
492. See supra note 466 (evaluating First Amendment considerations).
493. Cf. Roth, supra note 326, at 270 n.102 (criticizing the draft of a Logan Act indictment of
Philip Agee but not the “much narrower and more compelling” case that might have been made against
Agee based on Agee’s offer of a specific quid pro quo: his betrayal of classified information about covert CIA operations in Iran in exchange for the Iranian release of U.S. hostages).
494. It is still possible, however, that such conduct would come under the Logan Act, see supra
notes 326, 434, or under other federal statutory provisions, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 954 (1994) (criminalizing false statements made to influence a foreign government). Free speech objections might be interposed in any such prosecution.
495. See generally FRY, supra note 5, at 66-100; HOCKING, supra note 382, at 70-99; John M.
Kline, Managing Intergovernmental Tensions: Shaping a State and Local Role in US Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN RELATIONS AND FEDERAL STATES 105 (Brian Hocking ed., 1993).
496. See supra text accompanying notes 49, 73.
497. See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 453 (1979) (projecting that
“[t]he risk of retaliation by Japan [to a tax imposed on Japanese corporations] is acute, and such retaliation of necessity would be felt by the Nation as a whole”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941)
(“Experience has shown that international controversies of the gravest moment, sometimes even leading
to war, may arise from real or imagined wrongs to another’s subjects inflicted, or permitted, by a government.”), quoted in Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S.
275, 279-80 (1875) (speculating about potential retaliation by the British government to the application
of a California statute respecting aliens); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm’rs, 80 Cal. Rptr.
800, 805 (Ct. App. 1969) (speculating, in applying Zschernig, that the California Buy American Act
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Such an approach invites speculative and potentially self-fulfilling worstcase scenarios, given the clear incentive, on the foreign entity’s part, for
saber-rattling. Courts have resisted this impulse largely on extrinsic
grounds, such as the domestic orientation of the state law in question, or its
evenhandedness, that have little to do with the prospect of foreign effects.498
The bargaining approach, in contrast, disregards not only noncontingent state conduct, but also state relations with foreign (and domestic) private parties contingent on their conduct rather than that of a foreign power.
There is no hint that the Framers were concerned about state agreements
with private parties, domestic or foreign. To the contrary, their use of the
term “foreign powers” makes it clear that they considered the forbidden
counterparts to state compacts to be precisely the same parties with which
the national government would be forging treaties.499 State activities like
invited retaliation by foreign nations concerned by the state’s “selfish provincialism”); cf. Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987) (noting, in addressing personal jurisdiction over
a private defendant in a products liability matter, the relevance of “the Federal Government’s interest in
its foreign relations policies”); Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d 307, 321 (5th Cir. 1987)
(noting, after adverting to Zschernig, that for the purposes of forum non conveniens analysis, “[f]ederal
foreign policy interests do not disappear when purely private foreign parties come before U.S. courts”);
Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231, 239 (9th Cir. 1969) (Ely, J., dissenting) (arguing that, in light of Zschernig, “[i]f alien corporations are to be made subject to the jurisdiction of
American courts on the basis of an isolated transaction, then that decision should be made as a matter of
national policy, particularly in light of possible reprisals, political, economic, or legal”).
498. A federal district court concluded that the state of Washington’s rules relating to oil spills did
not interfere with federal authority by regulating foreign vessels because the rules merely allowed the
State to “exercis[e] its police power by regulating both foreign and domestic tankers to protect the environment” and were not keyed to the worthiness of a foreign regime. International Ass’n of Indep.
Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484, 1499 (W.D. Wash. 1996). In affirming in
relevant part on appeal, the Ninth Circuit ignored the latter consideration and focused on the fact that
the state regulations operated within Washington’s territorial limits and had only incidental or indirect
extraterritorial impact. See International Ass’n of Indep. Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Locke, 148 F.3d
1053, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Locke, 120 S. Ct. 1135,
1152 (2000). It should be clear, however, that a foreign government’s ire will not necessarily be mollified by arguments that a U.S. state treats all parties equally shabbily.
499. See, e.g., T HE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 107 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“The imbecility of our government even forbids [foreign powers] to treat with us. Our ambassadors
abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 144 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The want [of a power to regulate commerce] has already operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial treaties with foreign powers, and has given occasions of dissatisfaction between the States.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 281 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (describing “the advantage of uniformity in all points which relate to foreign powers; and of
immediate responsibility to the nation in all those for whose conduct the nation itself is to be responsible”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 452 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961):
[t]he ministerial servant of the Senate could not be expected to enjoy the confidence and respect of foreign powers in the same degree with the constitutional representatives of the nation, and, of course, would not be able to act with an equal degree of weight or efficacy. . . .
[T]he Union would, from this cause, lose a considerable advantage in the management of its
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the funding of export initiatives by local concerns, attempts to entice foreign direct investment, and regulation of foreign persons, will rarely offer
any basis for a court to infer an attempt to bargain with a foreign country,
regardless of the potential for controversy.500 In less transparent circumstances, attributes like evenhandedness can serve not merely as questionable proof that state conduct will not irritate foreign relations, but rather as
evidence that the state law is not in fact contingent on altering foreign sovereign policies.501
As these examples indicate, the bargaining approach’s lenity toward
certain classes of state activities may in practice be nonunique, with the
only difference being the ability of that approach to explain the omissions.
external concerns . . . .
Accord T HE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (observing
that “[t]he Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members”).
Timothy Blank has argued that the shift from the Articles of Confederation’s bar on agreements “with
any King prince or state” and the similar dynamics involved with foreign trade groups, license treating
at least some private foreign interests as “foreign powers” for Compact Clause purposes. Blank, supra
note 252, at 1075-89. For the reasons expressed above, however, I find that argument unconvincing, not
the least because it suggests that the federal treaty power and the areas presumptively proscribed to the
states are not coextensive. See R ESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 43, § 301(1) (defining an “international agreement” in relevant part as one “between two or more states or international organizations”);
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 2(1)(a), 8 I.L.M.
679, 681 (defining a treaty, for the purposes of the convention, as “an international agreement . . . between states”); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations, done Mar. 21, 1986, art. 2(1)(a), 25 I.L.M. 543, 545 (defining the scope of the Convention to cover “treaties between one or more states and one or more
international organizations”); see also R ESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 43, § 301 rptr. note 5 (defining a “negotiating state” as one that “takes part in drawing up and adopting the text of a multilateral
agreement”); id. § 312 (defining the responsibilities of “negotiating states”); Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, supra, art. 2(1)(e), 8 I.L.M. at 681 (defining negotiating states); Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations, supra, art. 2(1)(e), 25 I.L.M. at 546 (defining negotiating states and negotiating organizations).
While Arthur S. Miller argued as long ago as 1960 that modern economic conditions demanded that the
agreements between American corporations and foreign nation-states be treated like international
agreements of the United States, see Miller, supra note 383, at 1557-66, that advice has not been
heeded.
500. See, e.g., Blank, supra note 252, at 1073-75, 1080-85 (describing agreements of Indiana, Oregon, and Florida with Japanese corporations in which these states agree to repeal unitary tax structures
in exchange for promises of investment).
501. Applying this approach to New York Times Co. v. City of New York Commission on Human
Rights, 361 N.E.2d 963 (N.Y. 1977), for example, it would be permissible for New York City to maintain its general ordinance prohibiting racial discrimination in employment advertising, even to the extent of inferring discrimination on the part of South African employers, so long as the policy was not in
fact an invitation to the South African government to revise its practices. The New York Court of Appeals, in contrast, based its constitutional holding on the ground that the municipal commission, in reviewing employment advertising by South African firms, “conducted an inquiry that might have been
considered offensive by the Republic of South Africa and which might have been an embarrassment to
those charged with the conduct of our Nation’s foreign policy.” Id. at 969.
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Even if the result is unsatisfactory in some respects, insofar as it fails to
preempt some potentially harmful state activities, that is simply the result
of deriving the limits on state authority from the Constitution rather than
from the pages of Foreign Affairs. Locating federal exclusivity in the principles of the Treaty and Compact Clauses permits us to see that the constitutional value at stake is control over the beginning, middle, and end of negotiations, not control over every possible topic of negotiation. Other
mechanisms, too, may license federal preemption. Established constitutional doctrine, such as the prohibition on discrimination toward foreign
commerce, would continue to block certain kinds of state policy. The political branches, moreover, are undeniably best able to protect their institutional interests in any cases causing genuine alarm.502
The more serious objection, it seems to me, is that the dormant treaty
power is overinclusive, in too broadly condemning the wide variety of arrangements that states may seek to strike with foreign powers. States may,
of course, seek congressional consent for anything short of a treaty—a
class which Congress is substantially free to define. 503 But it is by no means
clear that “any agreement or compact” was supposed to comprise all pacts
between states and foreign powers. Certain instances of bargaining—for
example, negotiations by Virginia with the Kingdom of Belgium to open a
foreign trade office in Brussels504—are obviously unworthy of congressional attention. Distinguishing such circumstances threatens to involve the
judiciary in freewheeling effects testing, or requires importing other possible bases for exemption, such as one for state proprietary activities,505 that
may be neither doctrinally sound nor easy to administer.506
502. See supra Part III.B (discussing whether action undertaken by the political branches renders
judicial intervention unnecessary).
503. But see, e.g., Blank, supra note 252, at 1068 n.8 (suggesting that all agreements between states
and foreign nations are “absolutely forbidden”).
504. Cf. Liner, supra note 384, at 11 (updating the impact of Virginia’s choice to place an economic development office in Brussels); see also Brenda S. Beerman, Comment, State Involvement in
the Promotion of Export Trade: Is It Time to Rethink the Concept of Federalism as It Pertains to Foreign Relations?, 21 N.C. J. I NT’L L. & C OM. REG. 187, 206 (1995) (describing the state of North Carolina’s activities).
505. See supra note 67 (discussing the relevance of the market-participant doctrine to dormant Foreign Commerce Clause analysis and to Zschernig).
506. Given a market-participant exception, the decision by certain states to pull Soviet vodka from
state liquor store shelves after the Soviet Union shot down flight KAL-007, or Oregon’s attempt to dun
the Soviet Union for costs it had incurred after Chernobyl, might be suspect, while the purchase by
Oregon of Soviet-made nuclear reactors would have been unlikely to attract scrutiny—even if the former activities were no more governmental in character, and the reactor purchase no less fraught with
potential foreign policy complications (perhaps for relations with third countries downwind). A similar
distinction may be extracted from treaty law, which traditionally regards commercial agreements between states, governed by some body of contract law, as something less than an international agreement
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A focus on the externality and collective action rationales for the dormant treaty power permits some intuitively appealing line-drawing. Typical
purchasing or investment agreements between a state and a foreign power
are not contingent on the foreign power’s affairs of state, or, if they are,
they pose no appreciable risk of altering those conditions for other states or
municipalities—such agreements are exchanges purely on economic terms,
seeking a transaction-specific economic response.507 Under these circumstances, such activities cannot be said to produce externalities of the kind
that the treaty power was intended to avoid.508
or treaty. For example,
[a]n international agreement, as defined, does not include a contract by a state, even with
another state, that is essentially commercial in character and is intended to be governed by
some national or other body of contract law. Examples include a loan agreement, a lease of a
building, or a sale of goods.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 43, § 301 cmt. d. But nothing in the commercial character of such
agreements is inimical to resolution by treaty, and they may take that form. See 14 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-11 (Marjorie M. Whiteman ed., 1970) (citing authorities).
507. Thus, if Oregon had elected to buy Soviet nuclear reactors, it would have influenced the Soviet Union only to the extent of encouraging the production of nuclear reactors. The purchase would
not, in the ordinary course, have sought more broadly to compel a shift in Soviet energy policy or to
deprive the other states of reasonably equivalent economic opportunities. Likewise a typical sister-city
relationship. Such agreements do not, to put the matter formally, create any cognizable externalities of
the kind warranting the federal monopoly and its dormant component.
Contractual relations may, of course, presuppose certain background political conditions; a state
government might for example insist on an escape clause to protect itself against dramatic shifts in foreign exchange rates or political regime. But such ancillary terms can be easily distinguished from the
primary conditions indicated by typical sanctions legislation, and they would moreover be exempted
under the exceptions described below.
508. A further example concerns state law relating to the reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments, a complicated issue that can only briefly be sketched. In Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), a
diversity case, the Supreme Court suggested that federal law—informed by “the structure of international jurisprudence”—required a rule of reciprocity. Id. at 227. It is unclear whether Hilton is still good
law in the wake of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS, § 98 cmt. e (1971) (querying whether reciprocity continues to be an obligatory consideration);
LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: C ASES AND MATERIALS 885-86 (4th ed. 1995) (same); E UGENE
F. S COLES & P ETER HAY, C ONFLICT OF LAWS § 24.35 (2d ed. 1992) (same). Further doubt has been
sown by Zschernig, compare Eugene F. Scoles & Laila E. Aarnas, The Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Nation Judgments: California, Oregon, and Washington, 57 OR. L. REV. 377, 381 (1978)
(suggesting that, given Zschernig, state courts may no longer apply reciprocity requirements, even
where required to do so by a state statute), and Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 G EO. L.J. 53, 70
n.90 (1991) (same), with B RILMAYER, supra, at 885-86 (indicating the uncertainty regarding the scope
of Zschernig), and SCOLES & H AY, supra, § 24.35, 1000 n.5 (same), and by the appreciation that the
reciprocity aspect of Hilton was “magnificent dictum,” Johnston v. Compagnie Générale
Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121, 123 (N.Y. 1926). The result is that some states either disregard the requirement or enforce it solely as a matter of state law. See, e.g., Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger,
833 F.2d 680, 691 n.7 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that Illinois law does not recognize a reciprocity requirement); Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 867-68 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (considering it unlikely that federal or D.C. law mandates a reciprocity inquiry); Chabert v. Bacquié, 694 So. 2d 805, 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
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State bargaining may also involve zero-sum situations—where the risk
posed by one state’s bargain with a foreign power is solely to another
state’s opportunity to engage in precisely the same conduct. In these conditions, the opportunity for collective-action gains are likely to be minimal.
If, in fact, there is jockeying for the singular right to open a trade mission,
or to become a sister city,509 the purposes of the federal monopoly are not
obviously implicated. While the states might benefit from collusion, or the
federal government might wish to intervene for distributive reasons, either
possibility assumes a situation in which American governments possess
near-monopoly power.510
Distinguishing cases where externalities or collective action advantages are absent is by no means easy, and it impairs the analytic clarity of
the bargaining approach. Yet such difficulties are more defensible than the
line-drawing problems characterizing a pure effects test. Unlike an effects
approach, the basis and limits for which do not appear in the Constitution,
the dormant treaty power and its exceptions are derived from the convergence of the Treaty and Compact Clauses. The grant of the treaty power
was coupled with the understanding that federal authority was conferred to
help the states avoid the externalities and collective-action problems that
App. 1997) (holding that, under Florida law, reciprocity is a permissive, but not a mandatory, precondition for recognizing a judgment).
But if reciprocity is otherwise relevant under state law, see, e.g., Banque Libanaise Pour Le
Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000, 1004 (5th Cir. 1990), or under international law incorporated as
federal common law, see Hilton, 159 U.S. at 227; cf. Her Majesty, Queen v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161,
1163-64 (9th Cir. 1979) (assuming, without deciding, that reciprocity may be required either by federal
or state law), would it violate the dormant treaty power? In form, yes. But mere reciprocity—absent any
procedure for evaluating and inspiring other change in the content of foreign law—seems to impose no
externalities. The United Kingdom’s decision to recognize the laws of Ohio does not in any way diminish the prospect that it would also recognize the laws of Kentucky. Accordingly, state adoption of a
reciprocity requirement would not violate the dormant treaty power, whether or not it would have violated Zschernig.
509. Sister City International (“SCI”) insists that a foreign jurisdiction have “only one sister city,
county, or state in the US,” though it is not clear whether SCI’s threat to withhold recognition has any
real effect. SCI Affiliations Policy (visited Mar. 3, 2000) <http://sister-cities.
wego.com/go/wego.pages.page?groupId=10442&view=page&pageId=17772&folderId=17188&panelI
d=-1&action=view&JServSessionId=3fef9dccfb8101ff.6796.952313303413> (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
510. Such a “beggar-thy-neighbor” scenario, in which one state is pitted against the other, should
be distinguished from collective action benefits that might occur by coordinating foreign offices, not to
mention the externalities that the former may impose as a result of inconsistencies with national policy.
See, e.g. , HOCKING, supra note 382, at 79-84 (describing the problems with coordinating foreign investments). The political alternative to judicial intervention in these circumstances may be especially
attractive: not only could Congress preempt disruptive or otherwise counterproductive state competition, but the political branches could indicate that borderline state conduct should be exempted from
dormant treaty power scrutiny. See infra Part III.C.3 (discussing the benefits of positive political
authority).
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persisted under the Articles of Confederation, rather than to remedy
“‘whatever concerns [the states] alone.’”511
Similarly, whatever the scope of the Compact Clause, it does not appear to have been contemplated that it would extend to state activities of no
national interest. This is the thesis, at any rate, of the litmus test proposed
in Virginia v. Tennessee,512 where the Court described the interstate compacts of significance under the Compact Clause as those leading to “the
formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in
the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy
of the United States.”513 One would anticipate that few cases falling below
this threshold would even be subjected to challenge.514
Neither exception would redeem, however, the Massachusetts legislation on Burma presently before the Supreme Court. The Massachusetts
statute falls squarely within the bargaining approach to the dormant treaty
power. While the immediate objects are corporations doing business in
Burma, the statute is unambiguously conditioned not just on their behavior,
but on the present regime’s indefensible conduct. (Were a democratically
legitimate government to succeed to power, and the expected reforms to
ensue, one might safely assume the legislation would be repealed—a matter
confirmed by evidence of Massachusetts’s objective.515) The state legislation evidently seeks to alter conditions for all manner of interactions with
Burma and could scarcely be said to be devoid of externalities, or to create
externalities solely appreciable by a rival for the very same bargain.
This conclusion does not, it must be said, mean that all nonfederal
protest against Burma is unconstitutional. To the contrary, the bargaining
approach more clearly delineates permissible alternatives than does the ef511. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 n.11 (1941) (“‘My own general idea was, that the States
should severally preserve their sovereignty in whatever concerns themselves alone, and that whatever
may concern another State, or any foreign nation, should be made a part of the federal sovereignty.’”
(quoting a 1787 letter from Jefferson to George Wythe)). One of the singular appeals of the federal monopoly, it must be recalled, is its claim to defend the interests of the states as participants in a federal
system, not just the interests of the national government writ large. Cf. Edward T. Swaine, Subsidiarity
and Self-Interest: Federalism at the European Court of Justice, 41 H ARV. I NT’L L.J. 1 (2000) (arguing
that the European Court of Justice must take a similar approach in assessing “federal” benefits of uniformity).
512. 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
513. Id. at 519; accord United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 472-73
(1978) (endorsing this approach).
514. One reason that a state might refrain from challenging such arrangements, of course, is that a
challenge would not only be an indictment of its own right to participate, but would also establish
precedent limiting its own opportunities on future occasions.
515. See supra notes 23, 462; see also text accompanying notes 479-80 (describing the use of legislative purpose to provide evidence of bargaining).
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fects-oriented approach of Zschernig and its “one voice” proxy. Massachusetts officials may deliver speeches condemning Burma, even if the disruptive effect of such speeches is far more severe than the effects of the state’s
procurement policy.516 Perhaps more significant, procurement policy may
properly make doing business with the state contingent on a corporation’s
compliance with standards governing its own conduct, so long as those
standards are not a pretext for effecting change by a foreign sovereign. An
evenhanded policy concerning respect for worker rights,517 for example,
would ordinarily be unobjectionable. Internationally oriented requirements
reasonably consistent with foreign power policies—such as state requirements that companies doing business in Northern Ireland refrain from religious discrimination 518—would also past muster, so long as they are consistent with other federal law. Finally, as described below, state activities
caught by the bargaining approach may be excused by the federal political
branches, including the President, under circumstances appropriate to the
administration of the treaty power.
3. The Judicial Function of Positive Political Authority. As others
have observed, one of the failings of the present dormant foreign relations
doctrine is that it “prompts judicial intervention by the same trigger that
induces political response,” namely observable foreign effects. 519 This point
is easily overstated, even in regard to the present doctrine. Neither the
courts nor Congress are self-starting, and the effective power in either
quarter of foreign complainants, particularly those espousing the national
government’s rights against the states, has not been overwhelming.520 But
the claimed redundancy between the political process and judicial doctrine
is certainly worsened when the prospect of political participation in
516. Those espousing the orthodox approach to dormant foreign relations preemption make similar
claims, though it is by no means clear why. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Jack H. McCall, States’
Rights and Foreign Policy: Some Things Should Be Left to Washington, F OREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2000,
at 13-14 (2000) (suggesting that the Constitution allows state officials to pass nonbinding resolutions or
to lobby congressional representatives in order to effect changes in national foreign policy). A difficult
case for the bargaining approach would be raised under certain circumstances, of course—for example,
were Massachusetts to adopt a law requiring gubernatorial protests against Burma unless and until a
change in the regime transpires.
517. See supra note 501 (describing New York Times Co. v. City of New York Commission on Human Rights, 361 N.E.2d 963 (N.Y. 1977)).
518. See Kline, Continuing Controversies, supra note 13, at 116; Cities Slap Sanctions Against
Foreign Powers, TELEGRAPH HERALD, Apr. 15, 1998, at C7.
519. See Goldsmith, The New Formalism, supra note 29, at 1414 (discussing the dormant Commerce Clause and quoting Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 Y ALE L.J.
425, 436 (1982)).
520. See supra text accompanying notes 422-25.
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litigation is considered. Not only is judicial intervention stimulated as the
political branches are prompted, but the executive branch is given the
opportunity, however tenuous, of applying its resources in lobbying the
judiciary—rather than the legislature, the American public, and the foreign
governments concerned.521 The appeal of removing the judicial option from
the equation is apparent.
To a degree, the dormant treaty power’s bargaining approach avoids
this problem: because it focuses on the act of state bargaining, rather than
foreign effects, executive branch expertise is less obviously relevant. But it
also possible, in my view, to rationalize political participation in the judicial process without estranging it. Under the bargaining approach, a more
productive task for the executive branch lies in determining when the rule’s
application is too severe. One means by which that might be accomplished
is through congressionally authorized rules or regulations delineating certain types of acts which, in the President’s view, do not amount to proscribed bargaining. Barring that, the executive branch might be permitted
to submit its conclusion, without elaboration, that a given state activity
does not interfere with the performance of the treaty power and to require
that the judiciary treat a timely submission to that effect as dispositive in
the absence of exceptional circumstances.
Permitting this sort of executive branch involvement has several compelling virtues. First, it ameliorates the potential severity of the dormant
treaty power for state bargaining activities bearing on foreign relations—though, for the reasons described above, the bargaining approach is
more predictable, and less broad in certain regards, than its alternatives.522
521. The problem is all the more acute on those occasions when members of Congress participate
in judicial proceedings as amici—as quite a few did in both the lower court and Supreme Court proceedings in National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 120 S.
Ct. 525 (1999).
522. In some cases, accordingly, the bargaining approach’s severity is no greater than the orthodox
federal monopoly shorn of ad hoc exceptions. For example, both the bargaining approach and Zschernig
are bedeviled by potentially positive practices like the state recognition of foreign judgments. As Justice
Harlan observed in Zschernig, if inquiry into the administration of foreign law is prohibited to the
states, then the provision of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (which is identical
to the current version, see U NIF. F OREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOG. A CT § 4(a)(1), 13 U.L.A. 268
(1986)) permitting nonrecognition of judgments “rendered under a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law” is presumably
unconstitutional—a conclusion Justice Harlan found difficult to believe was intended by the majority.
See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 461-62 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also R ESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1971) (predicating the recognition of foreign judgments
rendered “after a fair trial in a contested proceeding”). Perhaps other federal law validly dictates such
considerations, as Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), once suggested. See id. at 202 (suggesting general conditions for recognition). But see supra note 508 (noting the questionable authority of Hilton in
light of Erie and Klaxon). In any event, such an awkward result exemplifies the need for permitting po-
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Second, permitting executive submissions provides a limited check against
judicial overreaching, by allowing low key executive intervention as an alternative to the definitive lawmaking characteristically required to overcome a displeasing court decision. Although the resulting rule does not go
nearly so far as the judicial abdication proposed by some,523 it serves the
political branches better by allowing the judiciary to protect their prerogatives while permitting the low-cost correction of judicial error.
The resulting burdens on the executive branch would not likely be ruinous. A rule or regulation exempting certain types of state activities from
automatic preemption, on grounds that they do not pose serious risk of externalities or afford collective action advantages, may be less controversial
than requiring executive-led preemption in the throes of a particular controversy. The alternative, executive submission, may occasion more frequent and divisive dispute. At the same time, voluntary and programmatic
executive branch intervention would run little risk of compromising the
national interest in the confidentiality of negotiations (or the lack of negotiations) with foreign powers. The relatively small class of cases subject to
the bargaining approach as compared to, say, cases involving a potential
defense of foreign sovereign immunity, should also help ensure that the
burden is manageable.524 Of course, to the extent that the executive branch
prefers not to have the option of submission, it is free to adopt a conservative approach, or even an administrative rule to the effect that the participation will be systematically declined.525
Nor would executive submission in this context unsettle the separation
of powers between the President and the courts. To be sure, such submissions encroach on the judicial function, in the sense that they deny to
judges the sole power to determine outcome. Any procedural doctrine permitting waiver, or statutory restriction on standing, does much the same
thing.526 Assigning an outcome-determining role to the executive branch
alone is more the crux of the problem, but that is hardly unique in constitulitical intervention, a function difficult to reconcile with the conventional bases for the federal monopoly. See supra Part I.C.2 (noting that because the Court has found the federal monopoly to be derived
from the Foreign Commerce Clause, it tends to ignore the executive’s input in these matters).
523. See supra note 29.
524. But cf. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983) (describing the
political pressure placed on the State Department by foreign nations seeking immunity prior to the
adoption of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976).
525. Such “housekeeping” rules would not present the same potential difficulties as administrative
rules directed at primary state conduct. But cf. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1710 (proposing the consideration of administrative rules as an alternative to judicial intervention).
526. See, e.g., supra note 264 (citing Uruguay Round Agreements Act provisions limiting causes of
action against states for breaches).
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tional or statutory matters.527 Critically, moreover, it is appropriate given
the structure of the treaty power. One may well question an outcome in
which the President assumed the authority to preempt, by brief, an individual state’s laws; this would exceed the President’s authority under the
Treaty Clause itself, since a negotiated treaty has preemptive effect only
after the Senate has consented and the President afterward ratified. With
the dormant treaty power as the preemptive backdrop, however, the President’s decision to exempt certain state acts from scrutiny is precisely as
broad as his plenary authority to prevent national treaties from being negotiated. In authorizing state participation in world affairs, the President is
really doing no more than exercising his prerogative to cash in the national
chips.
Finally, there would be little if any harm done to the separation of
powers between the President and the legislature. Executive submissions
have the beneficial function of signaling, however obliquely, the direction
of the President’s management of foreign relations; either the Senate or
Congress may, within the constraints of the Treaty Clause, informally intervene to direct or correct the executive branch judgment. Equally important, Congress retains the power to dictate the permissible scope of state
activities, thereby relieving the states not only of dormant treaty power
concerns but also, at the same stroke, of uncertainties created by the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause and statutory preemption. The importance
of the treaty power requires, of course, that the legislative authorization or
acquiescence in state activities should not lightly be inferred. Barclays
Bank, properly understood, was less a wholesale rejection of dormant foreign relations preemption than an indulgent reading of congressional delegation to the states.528 The Court’s reasoning, however defensible in purely
Foreign Commerce Clause terms, plainly does not consider the effect on
527. The dormant Commerce Clause, for example, may be characterized as a rule precluding the
states from certain types of regulations while permitting the Congress to override the principle as it
deems fit, see Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 H ARV. L. R EV. 1, 1017 (1975), or as one invalidating state regulations in the relevant areas absent congressional authorization, see Merrill, supra note 420, at 56 & n.239; Schrock & Welsh, supra note 447, at 1138-41. An
analogue of the purely statutory front might be the procedure for approving antitrust consent decrees
prior to the enactment of the Tunney Act, see Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93528, 88 Stat. 1706 (1974), and perhaps even afterward, see United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d
1448, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that a “public interest” inquiry under the Tunney Act entails limited judicial review).
528. Compare Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 324-27 (1994) (discussing
the congressional tolerance of state initiatives), with id. at 329 (noting the possibility for congressional
delegation to the executive branch), and National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 71-77
(1st Cir.) (concluding that Congress had not implicitly assented to state regulation touching on Burma
and had instead delegated its authority to the President), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999).
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the President’s treaty power—authority that congressional inaction cannot,
under any view, divert to the states.
CONCLUSION
Viewed through the lens of the dormant treaty power, the flowering of
state foreign relations activities is less a source of constitutional dissonance
than an opportunity to revitalize neglected doctrine, doctrine that was itself
inspired by intensive state activities in the late eighteenth and midnineteenth centuries. The grounding of the dormant treaty power in the
Constitution, political branch practice, and case law interposes a powerful
constraint on latter-day efforts to retreat wholesale from the federal monopoly orthodoxy.
At the same time, the dormant treaty power, and the bargaining approach it commends, does not lightly dismiss the normative virtues of localism. Instead, it attempts to respect one of the central insights of the
Founding—namely, that state bargaining generates disadvantages for the
collective interests of the states that are best avoided by centralizing the
conduct of international negotiations in the Senate and the President. Understanding the treaty power as the source of dormant federal foreign relations authority not only explains why some dormant doctrine is necessary
but also frees states and localities to engage in a wide range of activities regardless of their consequences. If a constitutional struggle remains, it is
between state activities and the terms of the Constitution, not the struggle
of a house divided.

